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Abstract 
 
Corporate governance (CG) has recently received much attention because of the wave of 
financial scandals in the early 2000s and the more recent global financial crisis. CG 
reforms, including laws, codes and listing rules have been established to protect 
shareholders’ rights and restore investors’ confidence in the capital market. These 
reforms have largely contributed to the evolution of internal and external governance 
mechanisms that are aimed at mitigating agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. However, overemphasis has been placed on the monitoring and control 
dimensions of governance, which may hinder entrepreneurial activities, obscure business 
prosperity and contribute to a narrow perspective on CG.  
 
It has been argued that there is a need to broaden CG beyond compliance (conformance) 
to a set of rules and laws, to include the performance aspects of governance that focus on 
strategy and value creation. In other words, governance should not only focus on 
monitoring managerial performance to ensure accountability to shareholders, but also on 
mechanisms that motivate management to optimise shareholders’ wealth. Enterprise 
governance (EG) framework has been introduced to keep the balance between the 
conformance and performance dimensions of governance. However, few studies address 
the possible tension between conformance and performance. Moreover, there is no 
agreement among these studies on the relationship between conformance and 
performance in the governance context.  
 
Arguably, Value-based Management (VBM) is an appropriate approach to address the 
issue of EG. VBM adopts value creation as an overall objective, develops a strategy that 
contributes to value creation and integrates it into decision-making. In this way, VBM 
can act as an effective mechanism for motivating management to maximise shareholder 
wealth, which works in parallel with other CG mechanisms, to mitigate agency conflicts 
resulting from the separation between ownership and management.  
 
This study aims to develop a contingency framework of EG through operationalising the 
conformance using CG and performance using corporate entrepreneurship (CE). This 
framework examines the inter-relationships between VBM, compliance with the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (CCCG), CE and the ultimate effect on 
organisational performance. More specifically, the study empirically examines the effect 
of compliance with the CCCG on CE, and whether VBM can achieve a balance between 
compliance with the CCCG and CE, should a conflict exist. The study also examines 
whether a fit between contingency variables (company size, agency conflicts, uncertainty, 
strategy and decentralisation), VBM, compliance with the CCCG codes and CE is 
associated with organisational performance.  
 
To achieve the aim of this study a cross-sectional survey, based on a questionnaire, is 
conducted to identify the level of VBM implementation, contextual and organisational 
factors in the large and medium quoted companies in the UK. The questionnaire targets 
the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in these companies as key informants. In addition, a 
content analysis of the annual reports of the sampled companies is undertaken to measure 
the level of compliance with the CCCG. Financial data (e.g. organisational performance) 
have been obtained from the DataStream, Fame and Thomson One Banker databases. 
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Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) is adopted for data 
analysis and hypotheses testing. 
 
The results suggest that VBM implementation is positively associated with agency 
conflicts, low cost strategies and decentralisation. Compliance with the CCCG is 
positively associated with agency conflicts and company size. CE is positively associated 
with company size, uncertainty and differentiation strategies. In addition, the fit between 
compliance with the CCCG and contingency factors significantly predicts the market-
based performance. The fit between CE and the contingency factors significantly predict 
the perceived performance. However, the results regarding the effect of VBM on 
organisational performance are mixed. While VBM has no significant direct effect on the 
market-based performance, VBM has indirect positive effect on the market-based 
performance acting through compliance with the CCCG as an intervening variable. VBM 
is significantly associated with compliance with the CCCG but not with CE. No evidence 
is found for negative association between compliance with the CCCG and CE.   
The results support a large number of the proposed relationships between the contingency 
factors, VBM, compliance with the CCCG and CE. The results also suggest that using 
both compliance with the CCCG and CE as intervening variables in the relationship 
between VBM and organisational performance contributes to explaining the mixed results 
in the VBM literature. In terms of the EG framework, VBM does not keep a balance 
between conformance and performance. VBM emphasises the compliance with the CCCG 
(conformance) at the expense of CE (performance). The results did not provide significant 
evidence of a conflict between compliance with the CCCG and CE, the area which lacks 
empirical evidence. 
This study contributes to the literature at different levels. At the theoretical level, this 
study develops a theoretical model that links a performance management system (PMS), 
i.e. VBM, to CG practices and CE. This model attempts to bridge the gap between 
different disciplines, including management accounting, CG and entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, combining both the contingency theory and the agency theory lenses 
contributes to the development of a comprehensive model of EG. At the methodological 
level, unlike previous studies, this study measures VBM practices on a continuum, rather 
than categories. Multiple data collection methods are used, and a powerful statistical 
technique (PLS-SEM) is adopted for data analysis. At the empirical level, the study is 
conducted in the UK. Though it is different from the US in many aspects, very few studies 
have been conducted in this context in many research areas such as VBM, CG and CE. 
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Chapter (1) 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Corporate governance (CG) has received much attention since the wave of financial 
scandals in the early 2000s and the more recent global financial crisis (Moxey and 
Berendt, 2008). CG reforms including laws, codes, principles and listing rules have been 
established to protect shareholders’ rights and restore investors’ confidence in the capital 
market. From the agency theory perspective, these reforms have largely contributed to the 
evolution of a number of CG mechanisms that aim to mitigate the agency conflicts 
resulting from the separation between ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Dey, 2008). However, overemphasis is placed on the monitoring and control 
dimension of governance (conformance), which may hinder entrepreneurial activities, 
obscure business prosperity (performance) and contribute to a narrow perspective on CG 
(Filatotchev and Wright, 2006). Therefore, a number of studies raise concerns on possible 
conflict or tension between the conformance and performance dimensions of governance 
(Cornforth, 2004; Spira and Bender, 2004; Kovacevic, 2009). 
The framework that addresses the tension between the conformance and performance 
dimensions is known as “Enterprise Governance” (EG) (Connell, 2004) or “Integrated 
Governance” (Busco et al., 2005). However, little is known about the relationship 
between accountability (conformance) and enterprise (performance) in the governance 
context at either organisational or systematic levels, especially in the UK (Short et al., 
1998, 1999; Spira, 200, Conell, 2004; Lees, 2005, 2010). Further, little is known about 
the tools that can help companies to ensure accountability of management to shareholders 
without obscuring business prosperity and enterprise (Conell, 2004; Busco et al., 2005; 
Lees, 2005, 2010).  
The recent global financial crisis has deepened the ongoing debate about increasing 
shareholders’ power, and whether it is part of the problem or should be part of the reform 
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(Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Arguably, value-based management (VBM) is an 
appropriate approach to keep the balance between conformance and performance and to 
achieve the objectives of EG (Starovic et al., 2004). VBM adopts shareholder value 
creation as an overall objective, develops strategies, organisational design, action plans, 
value drivers and performance measures that are aligned with this objective (Ittner and 
Larcker, 2001). Accordingly, VBM mitigates the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders (Stewart, 1991; Lovata and Costigan, 2002), aligns their interests (McLaren, 
2005) and creates shareholder value (Crowther, 2003). Accordingly, VBM has the 
potential to bring the two dimensions of EG (conformance and performance) closer and 
to maintain balance between them (Starovic et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the potential role 
of VBM in achieving the objectives of EG receives little attention in the literature. 
1.2 Research Motivation 
This research is motivated by the ongoing debate about CG and its importance in 
avoiding business crises all over the globe, such as the notorious failure of high profile 
companies at the beginning of this century (e.g. Enron, WorldCom in the US and 
Marconi in the UK) and the most recent global financial crisis. These crises have 
received growing international attention to the role that strong CG structure can play to 
avoid such crises (Solomon, 2010). This attention has brought CG to the top of the 
business and political agenda, which has led to a number of reviews and reforms 
(including CG codes such as the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (CCCG) in 
the UK and laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US) at both national and 
international level (Connell, 2004). 
However, the recurring and cyclic nature of these crises raised concerns over the efficacy 
of these reforms in ensuring the effectiveness of CG in controlling management 
behaviour, as well as motivating their entrepreneurial behaviour towards improving 
performance and increasing the wealth of business (Keasey et al., 2005). For instance, 
analysing the causes of failure in the aforementioned companies reveals that poor 
governance is not the only factor that has led to such failures; other factors such as poor 
strategies, ineffective risk management, weak strategy execution and inability to respond 
to fast-changing market conditions are of equal, if not greater importance in explaining 
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such failures (Connell, 2004; Fahi et al., 2005). For instance, the failure of Marconi in the 
UK provides an interesting example of acquisition strategy failure (Connell, 2004). 
Generally, corporate failures can be attributed to two main reasons (Keasey et al., 2005). 
First, inefficiency in managing the firm’s operations, which can lead to an overall 
decrease in firm profits; Second, management failure in undertaking its stewardship role, 
as managers may operate the firm efficiently and maximise their profits, but they may 
redirect part of those profits from shareholders via paying excessive remuneration not 
related to performance. The CG system should consider both efficiency (performance) 
and stewardship (conformance) dimensions of corporate management (Keasey et al., 
2005). Therefore, the need for a wider perspective of CG, such as the EG framework, to 
address the conformance and performance dimensions is imminent. 
This study is also motivated by calls from several scholars (e.g. Short et al., 1998, 1999; 
Spira, 2001; Connell, 2004; Keasey et al., 2005; Lees, 2005, 2010) to adopt a wide  
perspective of CG to address both the accountability and enterprise aspects of 
governance. For instance, Short et al. (1998, 1999) call for studies to investigate the 
effect of governance on accountability and enterprise, an area which remains poorly 
understood, especially in the UK, and the link between academic research and practice in 
this regard is weak, at best. 
Since then, a number of studies have addressed the possible tension between 
conformance and performance within the EG framework. However, there is no agreement 
among these few studies on the relationship between accountability and enterprise in the 
governance context at either organisational or systematic levels (Spira, 2001). For 
instance, it is argued that overemphasis on accountability obscures business prosperity 
and constraints enterprise (Hampel, 1998; Short et al., 1999). However, other scholars 
such as Tricker (1997), Charkham (1998) and Connell (2004) argue for no trade-off 
between accountability and enterprise. Nonetheless, neither view is firmly supported with 
empirical evidence, which raises the need for further research in this area (Cornforth, 
2004; Spira, 2001; Spira and Bender, 2004; Kovacevic, 2009). 
The study is also motivated by the development of the CCCG in the UK, which provides 
an interesting example of the debate about accountability and enterprise within the 
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regulatory framework of CG in the UK. However, little is known about compliance with 
this code and its effect on performance. Therefore, this study attempts to address this gap 
in the literature. 
1.3 Research Problem 
The research problem embarks on the agency problem that stems from the separation of 
ownership and control. CG codes have been introduced proposing best practices to 
mitigate agency conflicts and align the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Dey, 2008). However, these codes overemphasised the 
accountability aspects of governance (conformance), which raised some concerns over 
the enterprise aspects of governance (performance) (Hampell, 1998). For instance, in the 
UK the Cadbury Report (1992) was criticised for being too prescriptive, focusing more 
on accountability aspects of governance and risk damaging the spirit of enterprise 
necessary for economic success (Short et al., 1999). Recently, Larcker et al. (2011) 
provide some evidence of negative stock price reactions to the recent governance 
regulations in the US, following the latest global financial crisis.   
Therefore, it is argued that there is a need to broaden the concept of governance beyond 
the compliance to a set of CG rules and laws (conformance) that focus on accountability, 
to include the performance aspects of governance that focus on strategy and value 
creation (performance) (Busco et al., 2005). For instance, Short et al. (1999) argue that 
governance, in a broader definition, should not only focus on monitoring managerial 
performance to ensure accountability to shareholders, but also mechanisms for 
motivating management to maximise shareholders wealth should be included.  
Furthermore, the literature suggests a potential trade-off or tension between the 
conformance and performance dimensions of governance (Cornforth, 2004; Spira and 
Bender, 2004; Kovacevic, 2009). The tension arises because the board of directors in 
quoted companies is required to play a dual role and to act in two different ways to 
undertake the responsibilities of the conformance and performance roles (Cornforth, 
2004). While the conformance role is reactive, risk averse and more focused on 
monitoring, the performance role is more proactive, risk taking and more focused on 
value creation (Cornforth, 2004). 
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The possible tension between conformance and performance in the governance context is 
addressed using the EG framework. This framework is based on the notion that the spirit 
of enterprise governance must work within a sound framework of accountability and the 
balance between them is crucial (Clarke, 1998). In other words, CG mechanisms should 
ensure accountability, but not at the expense of enterprise. Therefore, the main problem is 
to ensure accountability of management to shareholders without sacrificing enterprise, 
and to identify practices that companies can adopt throughout the business cycle to 
deliver sustainable performance (Lees, 2010). This problem has implications at both 
macro and micro levels. 
At the micro-level (corporate), the key issue is to ensure that the board undertakes its 
responsibilities effectively (Lees, 2010), and identifies the best practices and tools that 
help the management of the company to meet the CG requirements ensuring 
accountability to shareholders, whilst also seeking business success and value creation 
(Connell, 2004; Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2005; Lees, 2005). Previous studies basically 
address the conformance and performance dimensions separately and propose best 
practices for each dimension independently. For instance, the conformance dimension is 
addressed by compliance with CG codes and standards subject to audit. Because the 
performance dimension is not subject to a regime of standards and audits, companies seek  
best practices and tools such as the balanced scorecards (Connell, 2004; Lees, 2005, 
2010). However, little is known about the best practices that can keep the balance 
between the two dimensions. 
At the macro level (policy making), the problem is setting the appropriate regulatory 
framework of CG practices by policy makers that help businesses to pursue their 
objectives within an attainable framework of accountability. Understanding the effect of 
the current regulatory framework of CG on business enterprise and performance would 
help policy makers to decide if its requirements should be tightened or relaxed. For 
instance, the development of the CCCG in the UK has witnessed many changes to the 
code provisions, based on revisions and commissioned reports (Solomon, 2010). While 
the current study empirically addresses the problem at a corporate level, generalisable 
findings at this level would provide useful insights to policy makers, which can assist in 
setting or adjusting the regulatory framework of CG at the macro level. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
To address the research problem, this study uses the EG framework seeking answers to 
the following questions:  
1- Is there any potential trade-off or tension between conformance and performance? 
2- Does VBM achieve the objectives of EG, keeping the balance between 
conformance and performance?  
3- Are there any contingency relationships between agency conflicts, company size, 
uncertainty, strategy and decentralisation on the one hand, and VBM, 
conformance and performance dimensions of EG on the other hand? 
4- Does the fit between the contingency factors, VBM, the conformance and 
performance dimensions of EG positively affect organisational performance? 
 
1.5 Research Aim and Objectives 
This research aims to address the possible tension between conformance and performance 
within the EG framework, and to assess the ability of VBM to keep the balance between 
conformance and performance. More specifically, the objectives of this study are 
fourfold: 
1- To develop a contingency framework of EG that operationalises the conformance 
and performance dimensions into measurable constructs. 
2- To assess the possible tension between conformance and performance. 
3- To assess the ability of the VBM approach to keep the balance between 
conformance and performance. 
4- To examine the implications of fit among contingency factors, VBM and the 
conformance and performance dimensions of the EG on organisational 
performance. 
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1.6 Research Methodology 
To achieve the aim and objectives of this study a cross-sectional survey, based on a 
questionnaire, is conducted to identify the level of VBM implementation and contingency 
factors in large and medium quoted companies in the UK. The questionnaire targets the 
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in these companies as key informants. In addition, a 
content analysis of the annual report is undertaken to measure the level of compliance 
with the CCCG. Financial data related to the performance is obtained from DataStream, 
Fame and Thomson One Banker databases. Additionally, Partial Least Squares Structural 
Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) is used to test the theoretical model. 
1.7 Research Significance 
This is a multidisciplinary study that attempts to bridge the gap between management 
accounting, CG and entrepreneurship disciplines. Unlike previous studies, this study 
adopts a positivist approach to develop a contingency framework of EG that 
operationalises the conformance and performance dimensions into measurable constructs. 
The contingency framework also adopts a holistic approach that investigates the inter-
relationships between VBM, CG and CE, as important predictors of organisational 
performance, which can provide insights into the complementary or conflicting 
relationships among these predictors in their effects on organisational performance. 
Moreover, perspectives from contingency theory and agency theory have been used to 
develop the theoretical framework, which provide insights into the relationship between 
conformance and performance. The use of these perspectives can help to reconcile 
conflicting results, regarding the superiority of value-based measures over traditional 
performance measures, and the effect of both CG and CE on organisational performance. 
This can lead to a better design of performance management systems (PMSs), CG 
structure and entrepreneurship orientation, taking into consideration the contextual and 
organisational factors. 
Understanding the complementary/conflicting relationship between conformance and 
performance can also help policy makers in deciding the appropriate regulatory 
framework of CG that ensure accountability without sacrificing enterprise. In addition, 
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companies can develop a better understanding of best practices that can achieve a balance 
between conformance and performance. 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter has presented the research background, research problem, research questions 
and objectives, and motivations of this research. The remainder of this thesis is structured 
as follows: 
Chapter 2 will explain the literature relating to the EG framework and its dimensions 
including conformance and performance. The conformance dimension will be discussed 
in the light of CG systems in the UK and compliance with the CCCG. Performance 
dimension will be discussed in the light of CE. Once this is established, this chapter will 
discuss in detail VBM, as a proposed approach to achieve the objectives of EG, keeping 
the balance between conformance and performance.  
Chapter 3 will discuss the main concepts and assumptions of both contingency theory and 
agency theory, which are adopted in the current study and justification of this adoption. 
Further, this chapter will explain the process of drawing on the premise of contingency 
theory and previous studies in VBM, CG and CE literatures to develop a theoretical 
model. The theoretical model aims to operationally define the conformance and 
performance dimensions of EG using CG and CE, and to assess the ability of VBM to 
achieve the objectives of EG, keeping the balance between conformance and 
performance. Based on the theoretical model, the study hypotheses will be developed and 
presented in this chapter.  
Chapter 4 will outline the main research paradigms and methodologies used in 
accounting research in general, and justification of adopting a positivist research 
paradigm and cross-sectional methodology in this study. Methods of data collection 
including questionnaire survey, content analysis and archive data will be illustrated. This 
chapter will also illustrate and describe the sample selection process and the process of 
administrating the survey. Further, analytical procedures will be presented and choices of 
statistical methods will be justified. 
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Chapter 5 will outline the development of the measurement model, including the 
operationalisation of the proposed research constructs in the theoretical model, and the 
development of the appropriate measures of these constructs, as suggested by the 
literature. This chapter will explain in detail the procedures used to refine these 
measurements, using factor analysis in addition to the assessment procedures of the 
measurement model, including constructs reliability and validity.  
Chapter 6 will summarise descriptive statistics of the research constructs, as suggested in 
the measurement model. Subsequently, it will explain in detail the followed procedures to 
assess the significance of the structural relationships between the research constructs in 
the structural model, which provides the basis for testing the research hypotheses.  
Chapter 7 will discuss the results of hypotheses testing. It will start with presenting the 
results of the structural model and the inferences drawn from hypotheses testing. 
Findings will be compared with prior research findings and differences to be explained. 
In addition, the results of the multi-group analysis will be discussed, and further analysis 
of competing models will be provided to highlight the significance of findings from 
testing the research hypotheses. 
Chapter 8 will present a summary of this research and draw conclusions, based on 
findings from testing the research hypotheses. This chapter will also highlight the 
limitations of the current study, providing avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
2.1  Introduction 
The growing concern about CG in the context of the recent financial crisis casts doubt 
over the effectiveness of the current CG reforms in avoiding the occurrence of such 
crises. Therefore, the need to broaden the CG perspective beyond compliance to a set of 
conventional rules becomes imminent. Arguably, EG is one way towards a wider 
perspective of CG. Although EG is of importance, only a modest body of literature 
examines this framework. Therefore, the focus of this chapter is to explain the underlying 
concepts and principles of the EG framework and its dimensions (conformance and 
performance), with particular focus on the UK as a context of this study. In particular, 
this chapter critically reviews the literature related to conformance (CG), performance 
(CE) and VBM as a proposed approach to address EG, identifying the gaps that can help 
in developing a theoretical framework for this study.  
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The following section will discuss the EG 
framework in the literature and the underlying concepts and principles. The third section 
will discuss the conformance dimension of EG through defining CG mechanisms that can 
be used to mitigate agency conflicts and ensure accountability of management to 
shareholders. In addition, the development of corporate governance codes in the UK will 
be presented in this section. The fourth section will discuss the performance dimension of 
EG through defining CE, as an important aspect of business, to ensure the enterprise 
aspect of CG and value creation. The fifth section will assess VBM, as a proposed 
approach to address EG, and achieve a balance between the conformance and 
performance dimensions of EG. The sixth section will articulate the identified gaps in the 
literature and the possible directions of this research. Finally, a summary of the chapter 
will be provided in the seventh section. 
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2.2 Enterprise Governance 
EG illustrates a framework that deals with both the CG and business governance aspects 
of a company, to bridge the gap between CG studies and business success literature 
(Connell, 2004). As an important development in CG, EG contributes to developing good 
CG practices, strategically linked with performance management that focus on the key 
drivers to move the business forward (Connell, 2004).   
EG can be defined as a “set of responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and 
executive management with the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that 
objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks are managed appropriately and verifying 
that an organisation’s resources are used responsibly” (Information Systems Audit and 
Control Federation, 2001, cited in Connell, 2004: p.2). 
EG or integrated governance, which constitutes the entire accountability framework of 
the organisation, comprises two dimensions that need to be in balance: conformance and 
performance (Connell, 2004; Busco et al., 2005). However, the balance between 
conformance and performance is critical (Clarke, 1998). A potential tension between the 
two dimensions exists, as a result of the conflicting demands on boards to ensure the 
business and governance aspects of the business (Connell, 2004; Cornforth, 2004; Spira 
and Bender, 2004). 
However, very little is known about EG and the tools that can help companies ensure the 
accountability of management to shareholders without obscuring business prosperity and 
enterprise. Therefore, a critical review of studies that proposes the EG framework is 
provided below. 
2.2.1 The Enterprise Governance Framework 
A number of studies in the literature address the EG framework and address the tension 
between conformance and performance in the governance context. This framework is 
based on the notion that the spirit of EG must work within a sound framework of 
accountability and the balance between them is crucial (Clarke, 1998). In other words, 
governance mechanisms should ensure accountability, but not at the expense of 
enterprise. In addition, this framework focuses on the dual role of board of the directors 
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in corporate governance (Huse, 2007). This role includes protecting shareholders’ rights 
through ensuring accountability, meanwhile enhancing value creation by providing 
knowledge and resources that help managers to assume the risks that benefit shareholders 
(Zahra et al., 2009). 
2.2.1.1 Keasey and Wright (1993)  
One of the earliest studies (Keasey and Wright, 1993) proposes a CG framework from a 
wide perspective, based on two key elements (see figure 2.1): supervising of management 
performance and ensuring accountability of management to shareholders and other 
stakeholders. While accountability contributes to the stewardship dimension, supervision 
of management contributes to the efficiency dimension of CG and both are important to 
mitigate agency conflicts that result from separation between ownership and control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Corporate Governance Framework 
Source: Keasey and Wright (1993, p. 292) 
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The framework suggests that good CG should not only monitor and control the 
management, but should also motivate managerial behaviour towards business success. 
However, the two dimensions are argued to be closely inter-related and there is no 
implication of conflict between the two dimensions in this framework. 
2.2.1.2 Charkham (1995)  
In a broader systematic view, Charkham (1995) conducts a comparative study of CG in 
five countries. The study identifies two main principles for assessing CG systems that are 
applicable at all times and everywhere. Firstly, dynamism that enables management to 
drive a company forward without unjustified constraints that may result from 
governmental interference, fear of litigation or displacement. Secondly, accountability 
that ensures that management is accountable for its decisions and actions. However, this 
framework does not provide any implication for possible conflicts between the two 
criteria (Spira, 2001). 
2.2.1.3 Tricker (1997)  
Similarly, Tricker (1997) develops a framework of board activities from the information 
systems perspective. The framework suggests that the board of directors should be 
looking both internally (business activities) and externally (strategic thinking), whilst also 
focusing on the future, present and recent past (see figure 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Framework for Analysing Board Activities 
Source: Tricker (1997, p. 109) 
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To do so, the board is expected to spend a great deal of time in formulating strategies and 
setting the direction of the company (future oriented/outward looking), to be followed 
with policy and plan setting to direct the management decisions necessary to implement 
these strategies (future oriented/inward looking). However, the board is expected to focus 
on the business performance monitoring and supervising management (past and present 
oriented/inward looking), and to undertake its responsibility of being accountable to 
shareholders and other stakeholders (past and present oriented/outward looking).  
Furthermore, the framework addresses the paradox in CG where one board is expected to 
play two different roles (see figure 2.3), performance and conformance. The former 
contributes to the long term performance of the company through strategy formulation, 
policy making and producing guidelines to direct management decisions. The latter 
ensures that management complies with policies, plans and regulations to ensure 
accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders. While the framework admits the 
difficulty the directors may experience in “wearing two hats”, these roles are seen as 
complementary to each other rather than being in conflict (Spira, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Two Primary Functions of the Board  
Source: Tricker (1997, p. 110) 
2.2.1.4 Connell (2004)  
In an important research project commissioned by IFAC and CIMA, Connell (2004) 
develops an EG framework comprising conformance and performance dimensions (see 
figure 2.4). The basic notion of this framework is that good CG or conformance on its 
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own cannot make a company successful. The performance dimension, which focuses on 
strategy and value creation, should also be considered. To address the oversight gap in 
the performance dimension, Connell (2004) proposes a “CIMA strategic scorecard” as an 
effective mechanism to assist the board of directors in identifying strategic positions, 
dealing with strategic options, implementing strategies and tackling strategic risks. In 
addition, twenty seven case studies were carried out to identify the main causes of 
corporate successes and failures. CG issues and strategic issues were the main themes for 
the success and failure stories. 
The study also suggests that while conformance leads directly to accountability, it can 
indirectly contribute to value creation. Similarly, performance leads directly to value 
creation, but indirectly contributes to accountability and assurance. Though this 
framework acknowledges the conflicting demands on boards to ensure that both the 
conformance and performance aspects of business are addressed in balance, an 
implication of a complementary relationship between the two dimensions exists in this 
framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Enterprise Governance Framework 
Source: Connell (2004, p. 11) 
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2.2.1.5 Busco et al. (2005)  
Similarly, Busco et al. (2005, 2006) broaden the notion of EG, adding a third dimension 
to conformance and performance that relates to knowledge-based governance. This 
dimension manages the processes of learning and knowledge sharing through knowledge 
management, learning processes and organisational culture. According to Busco et al. 
(2005, 2006), knowledge management and learning processes contribute to both 
conformance and performance dimensions of governance through improving individual 
commitment to the company rules, principles and goals. Therefore, effective governance 
systems should integrate three main dimensions. The first is compliance with rules, codes 
and principles. Secondly, measurement-based governance that measures and controls 
performance and value creation using forecasts, analyses and performance measures. 
Thirdly, knowledge-based governance manages the processes of learning and knowledge 
sharing through using knowledge management. 
 
Figure 2.5: Integrated Governance Framework  
Source: adapted from Busco et al. (2005, p. 37) 
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Using case studies of global organisations, the study provides empirical evidence 
supporting the role of PMSs (e.g. balanced scorecard) in integrating governance. In 
particular, the way in which the performance and knowledge dimensions are related to 
each other through PMS, which can be used as a tool to communicate and align the 
objectives, priorities and values of the company with individual priorities. 
2.2.1.6 Fahi et al. (2005)  
Similarly, Fahi et al. (2005) extend the EG framework further, adding corporate 
responsibility as a third dimension to conformance and performance dimensions. 
Corporate responsibility comprises environmental and social stewardship. The 
importance of this dimension stems from the growing interest in creating stakeholders 
value including employees, customers, suppliers and community in addition to the 
increasing requirements for reporting on the social, environmental, ethical and cultural 
impact of corporate practices. 
 
Figure 2.6:  Enterprise Governance Framework 
Source: Fahi et al. (2005, p. 3) 
 
According to this framework, the relationship between conformance and performance is 
interchangeable, as the conformance leads directly to accountability and assurance, but 
can contribute to value creation. Conversely, performance leads directly to value creation 
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but can contribute to accountability and assurance. In addition, corporate responsibility is 
as important as conformance and performance to sustainable value creation. Furthermore, 
this framework has highlighted the importance of people (employees), culture, 
innovation, leadership and communication in achieving the best results in performance. 
2.2.1.7 Bhimani and Soonawalla (2005) 
From the reporting perspective Bhimani and Soonawalla (2005) introduce a framework 
of corporate responsibilities comprising a spectrum for corporate disclosure 
responsibilities. The spectrum locates Corporate Financial Reporting (CFR), CG, 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Stakeholder Value Creation (SVC) on a 
continuum of corporate disclosure responsibility (see figure 2.7). The framework 
contributes to the debate on conformance and performance reporting issues, taking a 
comprehensive approach to address the corporate disclosure responsibility from different 
perspectives. 
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Figure 2.7: Corporate Responsibilities Continuum                                                                                                                             
Source: Bhimani and Soonawalla (2005, p. 168) 
The basic notion of the continuum is that conformance is not entirely detached from 
performance assurance, and performance itself can be regarded as one form of corporate 
conformance requirements. At one end of the continuum conformance with reporting 
standards is emphasised, where audit committees can be used as a key oversight 
mechanism. At the other extreme of the continuum emphasis is placed on corporate 
performance, where codes and standards are not applicable. Instead, companies can rely 
on best practice tools and techniques. In addition, there is an increasing difficulty in 
imposing mandatory codes and standards moving in the continuum from CFR to CG to 
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CSR to SVC. However, a number of oversight mechanisms can be used across the four 
categories of corporate responsibilities (see table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Oversight Mechanisms on Corporate Responsibilities 
Financial 
Reporting 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Shareholder Value 
Creation 
GAAP Sarbanes–Oxley Act GRI Strategic Scorecard 
GAAS Audit Committees SA 8000 Balanced Scorecard 
SEC/FSA/AICPA 
Guidelines 
Internal Audit 
Mechanisms ISO 9000 Economic Value Added 
 Remuneration Committees 
Stakeholder 
Advisory Panels Quality Function 
 Audit Committee Charter Matrices  Deployment Matrices 
   
Other Business 
Performance 
Management Tools 
 
Source: Bhimani and Soonawalla (2005, p. 171) 
2.2.1.8 Van der Stede (2009) 
From the risk management perspective, Van der Stede (2009) introduces the EG 
framework reflecting on the recent global financial crisis and economic downturn. From 
that perspective, EG is a “conceptual framework - not a particular tool per se - that puts 
reliable scrutiny and sustainable performance under one umbrella, addressing how firms 
might think about the need to align both items in the short and long term. It resonates 
with formal risk management approaches, such as Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)” 
(Van der Stede, 2009: p. 40). 
According to Van der Stede (2009), the EG framework (see figure 2.8) involves business 
governance, which is related to short and long-term performance (sustainable 
performance). It also comprises CG, which relates to conformance, risk management or 
scrutiny, both in the short and long term (reliable scrutiny).  
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The cornerstone of this framework is its focus on the long term “reliable” scrutiny (risk 
management) and “sustainable” performance. In addition, this framework posits that “risk 
management and performance are two sides of the same coin. They should be considered 
in unison rather than subjugating the level of scrutiny as a mere reaction to performance 
functions” (Van der Stede, 2009: p.40). This study contributes to the EG framework 
through incorporating an important rising theme in CG, i.e. risk management. However, 
the concepts are very abstract and lack empirical support.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Enterprise Governance (Conformance and Performance) 
Source: Van ser Stede (2009, p. 40) 
2.2.2 Evaluating Previous Studies of Enterprise Governance  
The review of previous studies that have addressed the EG framework (see table 2.2) 
indicates that these studies agree on at least two dimensions of EG, namely conformance 
and performance. The conformance or compliance is used as an equivalent to 
accountability and the performance dimension is used as an equivalent to enterprise. 
However, the exact relationship between conformance (accountability) and performance 
(enterprise) in the governance context is not clear from these framework at either 
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organisational or systematic levels (Spira, 2001), especially since most of these 
frameworks lack empirical evidence (e.g. Keasey, 1993; Tricker, 1997; Bhimani and 
Soonawalla; Fahi et al., 2005; Van der Stede, 2009). 
According to Spira (2001), the literature is dominated by the agency theory perspective, 
where systems are assessed based on the level of alignment achieved between the agent 
and principal interests. From this perspective, enterprise can be seen as a part of the 
governance system, rather than conflicting with it. For instance, the EG frameworks 
proposed by Tricker (1997), Charkham (1998) and Connell (2004) support this view, 
arguing that there is no trade-off between enterprise and accountability. 
However, it is argued that overemphasis on accountability can obscure business 
prosperity and constraint enterprise (Hampel, 1998; Short et al., 1999). The literature also 
suggests a potential trade-off between the conformance and performance dimensions of 
governance (Cornforth, 2004; Spira and Bender, 2004; Kovacevic, 2009) as a result of 
the conflicting demands on boards to undertake the responsibilities of the conformance 
and performance roles (Cornforth, 2004).  
Also, some studies with focus on entrepreneurial activities have challenged the basic 
assumptions of the agency theory. For instance, O’Sullivan (2000) provides empirical 
evidence from the US and Germany that market for corporate control as a governance 
mechanism negatively affects innovation and hinders enterprise. Nonetheless, neither 
view is firmly supported with empirical evidence, which raises the need for further 
research in this area (Spira, 2001). According to Short et al. (1998, 1999), the effect of 
governance on accountability and enterprise remains poorly understood, especially in the 
UK and the link between academic research and practice in this area is weak at best. 
Furthermore, most of these frameworks (e.g. Keasey, 1993; Charkham, 1995; Tricker, 
1997; Fahi et al., 2005) do not provide a clear idea about how companies can keep a 
balance between conformance and performance in terms of best practice and the tools 
that can be used to achieve the main objective of EG.  
Although Connell (2004) proposes “the CIMA strategic scorecard” to assist the board of 
directors to address the strategic oversight gap, very little is known about its applications 
in practice. Apart from the case study by Busco et al. (2005), which focuses on the role of 
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strategic PMSs such as the balanced scorecard to integrate conformance with 
performance with knowledge management, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge no 
other studies provide any empirical evidence on the role of PMSs in achieving the 
objectives of EG.  
2.3 The Conformance Dimension  
The rationale of the conformance or control role of the board of directors is primarily 
based on agency theory (Hung, 1998). The board of directors can play an important role 
in overcoming the agency problem that arises from the separation of the management 
function (initiation and implementation) and the control function (ratification and 
monitoring) (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The main role of a board of directors is to 
“reduce the potential divergence between shareholders and management, minimise 
agency costs and protect shareholders’ investments” (Hendry and Kiel, 2004: p.503). The 
control role of the board of directors can be exercised through monitoring and approving 
important decisions, hiring, firing and rewarding top management (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b).  
Within the EG framework conformance is equivalent to CG and addresses a number of 
issues, such as board of directors (role, structure, committees, remuneration) and internal 
controls (Connell, 2004; Lees, 2010). Conformance has been extensively covered in the 
literaure and can be addressed through compliance with corporate governance codes 
and/or standards (Connell, 2004; Lees, 2010). In addition, the audit commitee can be 
used as an oversight mechanism at board level to ensure the effectiveness of CG practices 
(Connell, 2004). 
CG can be defined as “the system by which companies are directed or controlled” 
(Cadbury, 1992), or “the process of supervision and control intended to ensure that the 
company’s management acts in accordance with the interest of shareholders” (Parkinson, 
1994: p.159). Despite the growing interest in CG as an essential and dynamic aspect of 
business, there is no distinct, widely accepted definition for CG (Solomon, 2010). 
Instead, different definitions of CG reflect the variation in CG according to the context 
(Hambrick et al., 2008) and the variation in theoretical perspectives.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Previous Studies of Enterprise Governance 
 
 
 
 
 Keasey and 
Wrights 
(1993) 
Charkham 
(1995) 
Tricker 
(1997) 
Connell 
(2004) 
Busco et al. 
(2005) 
Fahi et al. 
(2005) 
Bhimani and 
Soonawalla 
(2005) 
Van der 
Stede (2009) 
First Dimension  
 
Accountability Accountability Conformance Conformance Compliance Conformance Conformance Corporate 
Governance 
Second Dimension   Supervision of 
Management 
Performance 
Dynamism Performance Performance Performance Performance Performance Business 
Governance 
Third Dimension      Knowledge 
Management 
Corporate 
Responsibility 
  
Empirical Study No Comparative 
Study  
No Case Study Case Study No No No 
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The theoretical perspectives range from a narrow view that restricts CG to the 
relationship between a company and its shareholders, as articulated in agency theory, 
to a broader view that extends CG boundaries to comprise the relationships between a 
company and different stakeholders including shareholders, employees, customers 
and suppliers, as articulated in stakeholder theory (Solomon, 2010). 
2.3.1 Corporate Governance and Agency Problems 
Agency problems arise from a possible disagreement between the utility functions of 
agents and principals (Lan and Heracleuos, 2010) and costless contracting (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). Different sources of agency problems can be identified, including 
moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980), earning retention, risk 
aversion (Jensen, 1986) and time horizon (Healy, 1985).  
From the agency perspective, at least three ways can be used to increase the 
likelihood that management acts in the interest of the shareholders: bonding managers 
contractually, monitoring them and/or providing them with incentives that align their 
interests (Denis, 2001). However, complete contingent contracts in an uncertain world 
are unfeasible (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Monitoring solutions are costly and can be 
practically impossible (Denis, 2001). Long-term incentive contracts alone cannot 
align the conflicting interests (Healy, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Therefore, a number of CG mechanisms (Weir et al., 2002) have been proposed to 
constrain the opportunistic behaviour of management (Fama and Jensen, 1983a), 
mitigate agency conflicts (Dey, 2008) and minimise agency costs (McKnight and 
Weir, 2009). These mechansims can be classified into external and internal CG 
mechanisms.  
External governance mechanisms include the managerial labour market and market 
for corporate control. Efficient labour markets ensure that corporate mangement is 
rewarded according to the market estimation of the extent to which they are aligned 
with shareholders’ interests based on past performance (Fama, 1980). Moreover, the 
market for corporate control, as a part of the managerial labour market (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983) can be considered as the ultimate disciplinary mechanism for weakly 
performing managers that allow replacement of the current management team with a 
more efficient one.    
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However, the managerial labour market and market for corporate control only 
represent a partial solution to the agency problem and they are not generally 
welcomed by managers, as they may lose their jobs or the value of their human capital 
(Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). Therefore, internal governance mechanisms are rather 
important to mitigate agency conflicts.  
Internal CG mechanisms include institutional investors, managerial ownership, non-
executive directors, independence and audit committees. For instance, institutional 
investors can monitor company management, align management interests with those 
of the shareholders and consequently improve the company’s performance (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996). Institutional investors also have the power to initiate 
performance measures that align the interests of management and owners and help to 
increase shareholder value (Lovata and Costigan, 2002). 
The increased percentage of management ownership in the company is an important 
governance mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts and reduce agency costs (Lovata 
and Costigan, 2002). Consequently, if managers have a large interest in the 
company’s capital, there is less emphasis on performance evaluation systems and 
contracting that align shareholders’ and managers’ interests. Conversely, a lower 
percentage of management ownership can lead to more reliance on contracting and 
PMSs (such as VBM), that align shareholders’ and managers’ interests (Hogan and 
Lewis, 2005; Lovata and Costigan, 2002).   
The board of directors is also one of the most important governance mechanisms that  
can mitigate agency conflicts through monitoring management decisions and 
undertaking the responsibility of hiring, firing and rewarding management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b; Watson and Ezzamel, 2005). Board characteristics such as board size 
(Hanifa and Hudaib, 2006), non executive directors (Watson and Ezzamel, 2005), 
duality (Weir et al., 2002) and board committees, such as audit committees (Weir et 
al., 2002) play an important role in determining the board effectiveness.  
2.3.2 Development of Corporate Governance in the UK 
The development of CG in the UK provides an interesting example of the continuous 
debate on accountability and enterprise in the governance context, which makes it an 
appropriate context to address the research problem. The UK, as a leading country, in 
the field of CG, is one of the earliest countries to introduce a flexible regulatory 
framework, based on a “comply or explain” basis, since publication of the Cadbury 
26 
 
Report (1992). In this section, the development of the CG codes in the UK is 
discussed reflecting on the EG issue. A summary of these developments is also 
provided at the end of this section (see table 2.3). 
2.3.2.1 Cadbury Report (1992) 
CG has received increased interest in the UK in the last two decades. Following the 
failure of large companies at the beginning of the 1990s in the UK (e.g. Maxwell and 
BCCI), the Cadbury Report (1992) has been issued in response to the public concern 
over the way in which companies were being operated, and the worries regarding the 
misuse of power prevailing in the Maxwell case (Solomon, 2010). Therefore, the 
main focus of its recommendations is on control and accountability issues (Keasey et 
al., 2005). 
In this sense, the report emphasises the control role of the board of directors, as the 
most important governance mechanism, transparency and commnication issues with 
shareholdrs, and the role of institutional investors  (Solomon, 2010). For instance, the 
Cadbury Report (1992) recommends separation of the chief executive and chairman 
posts on the board. It also calls for more non-executive director representation on the 
board of directors (three at least).  
Though Cadbury Report had a significant contribution to good CG practices in the 
UK and all over the world (Solomon, 2010), it has been criticised for being too 
prescriptive  and overemphasising accountability and control aspects of governance at 
the expense of enterprise (Short et al., 1999). 
2.3.2.2 Greenbury Report (1995) 
In 1995 the Greenbury Committee was established as a response to concerns over 
directors’ excess remuneration (Solomon, 2010). The Greenbury Report (1995) 
includes some guidelines for setting and reporting remuneration for directors by the 
remuneration committee, comprising only non-executive directors. However, the 
basic objective of this report is to establish some balance between the executives’ 
remuneration and their performance, rather than reducing their salaries and 
compensations (Solomon, 2010).  
2.3.2.3 Hampel Report (1998) 
In 1995 the Hampel Committee was established to review the implementation of both 
the Cadbury Report and the Greenbury Report. The Committee submitted its report to 
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Table 2.3: Key Developments in CG Reforms in the UK 
Date Event 
May 1991  The Cadbury Committee was established 
Dec 1992 Publication of final report of the Cadbury Committee 
April 1993 UK Stock Exchange Listing Rules require statement of compliance with 
Cadbury Code of Best Practice 
Jan 1995 The Greenbury Committee was established 
July 1995 Publication of the Greenbury Report and Code of Best Practice 
Oct 1995 UK Stock Exchange Listing Rules require statement of compliance with 
Greenbury Code of Best Practice 
Nov 1995 The Hampel Committee was established 
Jan 1998 Publication of the Hampel Report 
June 1998 Publication of the Combined Code ( Hampel, Cadbury and Greenbury) 
Sept 1999 Publication of the Turnbull Report on Internal Control 
Aug 2002 The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 came into force for 
reporting periods ending on or after 31 December 2002 
Jan 2003 Publication of the Higgs ‘Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-
executive Directors’ 
Jan 2003 Publication of the Smith Report about audit Committees 
July 2003 Publication of the CCCG to apply for reporting periods beginning on or 
after 1 November 2003 
July 2005 The FRC started a review of the Combined Code (2003) to evaluate the 
progress in implementing the Code and to address any emergent issues  
June 2006 Publication of the CCCG to apply for reporting periods beginning on or 
after 1 November 2006 
April 2007 The FRC started a review to the Combined Code (2006) to evaluate the 
progress in implementing the Code and to address any emergent issues 
Dec. 2007 The FRC began consultation on a small number of possible amendments to 
the Code 
June 2008 Publication of the Combined Code (2008) to apply for reporting periods 
beginning on or after 29 June 2008 
Oct. 2008 The Chancellor of the Exchequer requested a review of the causes of the 
global financial crisis 
March 2009 The Turner Review has been issued after reviewing the causes of bank 
failures and the global financial crisis 
Nov 2009 Walker Report has been issued after reviewing the causes of bank failures 
and the global financial crisis 
May 2010 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) came into force for the 
financial years beginning on or after 29 June 2010 
Source: Adapted from Keasey et al. (2005, p. 24) 
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the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to address the concerns raised for the Cadbury 
Report, related to the overemphasis on accountability, in an attempt to keep a balance 
between accountability and business prosperity (Solomon, 2010). Therefore, the 
report criticises the ‘box-ticking’ approach used by many companies; instead, a CG 
system based on principles rather than prescription was suggested (Short et al., 1999; 
Keasey et al., 2005). Thus, the compliance should be with the spirit of the code, not 
the form and letters. 
The Hampel Report (1998) sets a number of principles, recommending at least one 
third of directors to be non-executives, the majority to be independent with disclosure 
requirements in the annual report about their independence. One of the non-executive 
directors should be appointed as a senior non-executive, to whom any concerns 
should be passed.  
2.3.2.4 The Combined Code (1998) 
After issuing the Hampel Report, the Hampel Committee provided a set of principles 
endorsing the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel recommendations in the Combined 
Code (1998). This code was published by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1998 
and continued to be based on a “comply or explain” basis, consistent with the UK 
approach for CG (Combined Code, 1998). 
2.3.2.5 Turnbull Report (1999) 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales published the report of 
the Turnbull Committee to address the internal control issue in the UK CG system, 
which received little attention in previous reports (Turnbull Report, 1999). The report 
provides some guidelines to implement a sound internal control system to fulfil the 
requirements of the Combined Code (Turnbull Report, 1999). 
2.3.2.6 The Higgs Report (2003) 
The collapse of large companies (e.g. Enron and WorldCom) in the US at the 
beginning of this century has revealed that non-executive directors were not effective 
in performing their governance role in monitoring and management behaviour 
(Solomon, 2010). In the UK, the Higgs Committee issued its report in 2003, after 
reviewing the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors in performing their 
governance role (Higgs Report, 2003).  
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Though the Higgs Report endorses most of the provisions of the Combined Code, it 
comprises a number of significant reforms that have received a sizeable opposition 
from a number of chief companies, which have contributed to an intense debate 
between the management of companies and institutional shareholders (Keasey et al., 
2005). For instance, the report recommends increasing the proportion of non-
executive directors in the boards (at least half), making their remuneration more 
reasonable, and establishing stronger links between non-executive directors and 
shareholders (Solomon, 2010). 
Therefore, many critical comments have been raised towards the report’s 
recommendations, as being very prescriptive, divisive with regard to the relationship 
between executive and non-executive directors and may challenge the role of the 
chairman by the new role of the senior independent non-executive director (Keasey et 
al., 2005). 
2.3.2.7 The Smith Report (2003) 
Parallel to Higgs Report, the Smith Report (2003) was published in the wake of 
corporate failures in the US, to address the audit committee issues in the UK CG 
system. The audit committee and internal audit function have been highlighted as one 
of the main reasons for the high profile scandal of large companies, such as Enron 
(Solomon, 2010). The Smith Report (2003) covers the main area of the audit 
committee including membership, responsibilities, communication with shareholders 
and the relationships between the board of directors and the auditor..  
2.3.2.8 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003, 2006, 2008) 
In 2003, the FRC issued the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) 
comprising the recommendations of previous reports including Cadbury, Greenbury, 
Hampel, Turnbull, Higgs and Smith Reports (Combined Code, 2003). Though the 
Combined Code is not as prescriptive as the Higgs Report, it retains almost all the 
recommendations of this report, changing the language and the tone, rather than the 
content, to absorb the business opposition and critics (Keasey et al., 2005; Solomon, 
2010).  
In response to concerns regarding the somewhat prescriptive recommendations of the 
Higgs Report, the Combined Code relaxed some of these recommendations 
(Combined Code, 2003). For instance, allowing small companies under FTSE 350 not 
to comply with the recommendation that at least half of the board members are 
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independent non-executives. Furthermore, the recommendation that the chairman of 
the board should not chair the nomination committee was dropped and the 
recommendation related to the CEO, who should not become the chair of the same 
company was been moderated, to allow such appointments following consultation 
with major shareholders (Keasey et al., 2005). 
In 2005, the FRC started a review of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(2003) to evaluate the progress in implementing the Code. Following this review, the 
FRC consulted on several changes to the 2003 version of the Combined Code and the 
changes were approved issuing the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2006), 
to come into effect for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 November 2006. 
These changes allow the chairman to sit on the remuneration committee, where he or 
she was considered independent at the time of appointment, and the shareholders to 
vote by proxy with the option of withholding their vote (Combined Code, 2006). 
In 2007, the FRC started a review to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(2006) and some changes to the code provisions were approved issuing the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance (2008), to come into effect for reporting periods 
beginning on or after 29 June 2008. These changes relate to removal of the restriction 
on an individual to chair more than one FTSE 100 company and allowing the 
chairman of listed companies outside the FTSE 350 to be a member of, but not chair, 
the audit committee, providing he or she was considered independent on appointment 
(Combined Code, 2008). 
2.3.2.9 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, the Chancellor, in October 2008, 
requested a review of the causes of the global financial crisis and recommendations 
for regulations (Solomon, 2010). In response, the Turner Review was published in 
March 2009, which covered a number of issues that caused the bank failures and 
especially those related to the excessive remuneration in the banking sectors and the 
link between the structure of remuneration and executives’ attitudes towards risk 
taking (Solomon, 2010). 
Similarly, in November 2009 the Walker Report was issued after reviewing the CG 
practices in the UK banks and other financial institutions.  
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The Walker Report comprised a number of recommendations addressed to the FRC, 
some of these recommendations have been implemented through revisions to the 
Code (now renamed the UK Corporate Governance Code). The recommendations 
focus on executive remuneration and the role of the board of directors, including 
issues, such as increasing the time commitment from non-executive directors and 
paying more attention to risk management (Solomon, 2010). 
In March 2009, the FRC launched a review of the implementation of the Combined 
Code. Following the consultation on the proposed changes to the code, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined Code) published in May 2010, 
to come into effect for the financial years beginning on or after 29 June 2010. The 
new code comprised significant changes, including the name and structure of the 
code, which reflects many of the recommendations of the Walker Report (Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010).  
2.3.3 Compliance with Corporate Governance Codes in the UK 
Since the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992), when CG reform started in the 
UK, the voluntary approach of “comply or explain” has been adopted as the preferred 
approach of regulation in the UK (Solomon, 2010). The rationale of this approach is 
that there is no single structure of CG that can fit all companies. Instead, every 
company may select the appropriate CG mechanisms that fit with its conditions. 
Therefore, to allow more flexibility, compliance with the code is not compulsory; 
however, disclosure related to compliance is (MacNeil and Li, 2006).   
In general, the results of the surveys conducted to evaluate the level of compliance 
with the different CG codes in the UK reveal that these codes are widely accepted in 
practice and a great number of compnies are fully compliant with all provisions. 
Moreover, the level of compliance is increasing overtime (MacNeil and Li, 2006; 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). For instance, the survey commissioned by the 
Cadbury Committee in 1995 reported a very high level of compliance by large quoted 
companies with three or more non-executive directors in the board (97%) and 
separation between chairman and CEO posts (82%) (Keasey et al., 2005). Similarly, 
Conyon and  Mallin (1997) and Laing and Weir (1999) found a very high degree of 
compliance to the recommendations of the Cadbury Report and an increasing trend, 
especially between large companies, to comply with these recommendations such as 
dealing with duality, non-executive directors membership and board sub-committees.  
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However, since issuing the first version of the CCCG in 1998, fewer studies have 
assessed the compliance with the code’s provisions and principles. For instance, Pass 
(2006) investigates the extent of compliance with the combined code (2003) for a 
sample of 50 large UK companies. The results suggest that 17 (34%) of the 
companies are fully compliant with the code’s provisions throughout the reporting 
year, 22 companies (44%) did not fully comply but took some actions or provided 
acceptable explanations and only 11 companies (22%) continued to breach the code 
without taking actions or even providing acceptable explanations (Pass, 2006). 
Similarly, Arcot et al. (2010) analysed compliance with the provisions of the CCCG 
in 245 non-financial companies belonging to FTSE 350 for the period from 31 
December 1988 to 30 June 2004. In a sample of 1286 company-year observations, the 
overall frequency of compliance with eight of the eleven provisions of the code was 
84.7% with an increasing trend of compliance over the years. On average, the overall 
compliance per provision increased from 76.7% to 91.4% between the period from 
1998 to 2004.  
However, MacNeil and Li (2006) argue that despite the increased level of compliance 
over time, there is a significant prevalence of non-compliance. Further, the non-
compliance is not closely monitored by investors, whose tolerance to non-compliance 
is related to greater financial performance, as measured by the share price.  
2.3.3.1 Compliance with Corporate Governance Codes and Performance 
In spite of the fact that there has been some evidence that UK companies have, in 
general, complied with the principles of the Cadbury Report (Conyon and Mallin, 
1997; Laing and Weir, 1999) and the CCCG (Pass, 2006; Arcot et al., 2010), little is 
known about the impact of compliance on corporate performance, especially in the 
UK (Laing and Weir, 1999) and the results are mixed (Weir and Laing, 2000). 
Furthernore, review of the CG literature indicates that most studies examine the effect 
of single or some internal and external CG mechanisms, such as managerial 
ownership  (Short and Keasey, 1999; Davies et al., 2005) on performance rather than 
investigating the overall compliance with the CG code. However, the emphasis on 
relating a single or subset of CG mechanisms to performance has been criticised, as it 
ignores the fact that CG mechanisms are substitutes and not independent of each other 
(Weir et al., 2002). Therefore, a more holistic approach has emerged in the literature 
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investigating the relationship between a bundle of CG mechanisms or CG indices and 
performance. 
For instance, Weir et al. (2002) analyse the relationship between corporate 
performance and a number of internal CG mechanisms (including board structure 
variables, such as proportion of non-executive directors, duality, debt financing and 
managerial ownership) and external corporate mechanism (market for corporate 
control) for all quoted, non-financial UK companies in the UK during the period 
1994-1996. The results suggest that the  market for corporate control is an effective 
governance mechanism and can work as a substitute for other internal governance 
mechanisms. Accordingly, Weir et al. (2002) conclude that prescribed internal 
governance mechanisms may not be effective, instead companies should have more 
freedom to choose internal governance mechanisms that fit their situations. 
In a seminal work, Gompers et al. (2003) develop a CG index (CGI), comprising 24 
equally-weighted CG provisions of approximately 1500 large companies in the US. 
The study concludes that companies with strong shareholder rights (measured by 
CGI) outperform (measured in risk-adjusted stock returns) companies with weak 
shareholder rights during the 1990s. However, these results are challenged by a 
similar study by Core et al. (2006) who did not find any evidence to support the 
argument that weak governance causes poor stock returns in the same sample of 
companies used in Gompers et al.(2003) over an extended period of time (1990-
2003). Bhagat and Bolton (2008) provide three alternative ways to explain the mixed 
results. The superior return performance for companies wih strong shareholder rights 
may be specific for a period and sample, the inadequate risk-ajustment, and/or the 
endogenity in governance-performance relationship. 
In summary, most of the previous studies are based in the US and examined only a 
small subset of CG mechanisms. In general, the results are mixed (Hanifa and Hudaib, 
2006) and suggest that some mechanisms are linked to performance, while others are 
not (Brown and Caylor, 2009). To overcome this problem, other studies examined the 
impact of a summary measure of governance on firm performance (e.g. Gompers et 
al., 2003) and found that firms with lower shareholder rights (weak CG structure) 
have lower firm valuation. However, Core et al. (2006) could not sustain the same 
results over an exteneded period of time. Therfore, more studies are needed in this 
area of research, especially in the UK, using a more holistic approach to develop a 
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better understanding of the relationship between the overall compliance with CG 
codes and performance. 
2.4 The Performance Dimension  
The performance dimension in the EG framework relates to strategy and value 
creation (Connell, 2004; Lees, 2005, 2010), where assurance by means of standards 
and audit is not feasible (Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2005). Alternatively, companies 
can rely on best practice tools and techniques to address the oversight gap in the 
performance dimension (Connell, 2004; Lees, 2005, 2010). Unlike Connell (2004) 
and Lees (2005, 2010), who define the performance dimension in terms of strategy 
and strategic decision-making, this study operationally defines the performance 
dimension in terms of entrepreneurial activities (CE) necessary to increase the wealth 
of business (Zahra, 1996). CE is as important as strategic management and, arguably, 
they complement each other in creating wealth (Ireland et al., 2001, 2003). While 
strategic management focuses on developing sustainable competitive advantage 
(Ireland et al., 2003), CE focuses on the process that leads to venture creation (Cooper 
et al., 2000). 
The importance of CE for the successful performance of a company has risen as a 
result of the increasing intensity of competition at both domestic and global levels, as 
it can help in acquisition of new capabilities, developing new venture streams and 
improving performance (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009). Recently, CE 
has become a popular topic because of a wide range of reasons from economic (the 
growing awareness of the importance of business founding and innovation to 
economic growth and social welfare, especially in the increasingly growing markets 
such as China, India and Latin America), symbolic (public charm of independent 
entrepreneurs) and financial to careerist (Miller, 2011).  
2.4.1 Corporate Entrepreneurship Definitions 
The word "entrepreneurship" is derived from the French word “entreprendre” (Collins 
Dictionary, 2010), which means to launch or undertake. The word is used now in 
English to entail “new entry” or undertaking/launching a new project. The literature 
suggests many typologies to describe entrepreneurship from different perspectives, 
the differences between these typologies reflect a wide range of combinations of 
individual, organisational and environmental factors (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  
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However, the fundamental act of entrepreneurship is “new entry”, which can be 
achieved through entering new or established markets with new or existing goods or 
services (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). The new entry can take many forms, such as 
business start-ups, launching new products or technology, expansion to a new market 
and globalisation (Miller, 2011). Lumpkin and Dess (1996) distinguish between 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial orientation as “entrepreneurship basically relates 
to “new entry”, while entrepreneurial orientation focuses on the process that leads to 
new entry” (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996: p.136). According to Miller (2011), the shift 
from focusing on what (entrepreneurship) to how (entrepreneurial orientation) is an 
important advance in entrepreneurship research.  
Entrepreneurship has been linked to the behaviour of entrepreneurs (owner-managers) 
in creating new entry in small businesses. However, entrepreneurship and small 
business are not synonymous (Carland et al., 1984). As a result of the increasing 
importance of large companies in the economy, there is an increasing interest in 
entrepreneurial orientation in large companies (Zahra, 1996). The term CE is 
normally used to refer to entrepreneurship in established mature firms (Brunninge and 
Nordqvist, 2004). 
CE can be defined as “the process whereby an individual or a group of individuals, in 
association with an existing organisation, create a new organisation, or instigate 
renewal or innovation within that organisation” (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999: p.18). 
In another definition, CE is defined through focusing on its dimensions as “the sum of 
a company’s innovation, renewal and venturing efforts. Innovation involves creating 
and commercialising products and technologies, providing financial and human 
resources for innovative projects and maintaining an appropriate infrastructure for 
innovation. Renewal means revitalising a company’s business through innovation and 
changing its competitive profile. Venturing requires creating and nurturing new 
business in current and new industries” (Zahra, 1995: p. 227). 
Exploring different definitions of CE reveals that it is characterised by the existence 
of innovation along with the objective of rejuvenating or redefining organisations, 
market, or industries in order to create or sustain competitive dominance (Covin and 
Miles, 1999). However, according to Antoncic and Hisrich (2004), different terms 
have been used to describe the construct of CE, such as entrepreneurial orientation 
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(EO), intrapreneurship, corporate venturing, innovative, entrepreneurial strategy and 
entrepreneurial posture.  
2.4.2 Corporate Entrepreneurship Dimensions 
CE is considered a multi-faceted construct and scholars have used many typologies to 
capture alternate dimensions of entrepreneurship (Miller, 1983; Covin and Slevin, 
1989; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Short et al., 2010). Based on Miller’s 
conceptualisation, three dimensions have been identified as being commonly used in 
the literature: innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness. Innovativeness is the 
company tendency to engage in and to support creating new ideas through developing 
new products/services as well as technological leadership via R&D in new processes 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009). Risk taking is the level to which 
managers accept to make large and risky resource commitments (Miller and Friesen, 
1978). Proactiveness refers to “seeking new opportunities which may or may not be 
related to the present line of operations, introduction of new products and brands 
ahead of competition, strategically eliminating operations which are in the mature or 
declining stages of life cycle” (Venkatraman, 1989: p.949).  
Further, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) suggest autonomy and competitive aggressiveness 
dimensions as additional components of the CE construct. Autonomy refers to the 
ability of taking action free of organisational constraints (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; 
Lumpkin et al., 2009), while competitive aggressiveness reflects how companies react 
to the existing competitive trends and demands in the market (Lumpkin and Dess, 
2001), proactiveness focuses on taking initiatives towards clients, competitive 
aggressiveness relates to behaviour in comparison with competitors (Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996). 
Although these efforts have contributed to capturing the various dimensions of CE, 
there is no consensus about what constitutes entrepreneurship. Such lack of consensus 
has encouraged research to build and test a broader theory of entrepreneurship, which 
makes it difficult to investigate the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
performance (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). 
2.4.3 Corporate Entrepreneurship and Performance 
CE is an important practice for a company’s survival, profitability, growth (Zahra, 
1996; Zahra et al., 2009), and business success (Thornhill and Amit, 2001; Miles and 
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Covin, 2002; Antoncic and Prodan, 2008). Therefore, the main stream of research in 
CE scrutinises the performance implications of CE directly or under different 
environments and strategies (moderated by contextual and organisational factors) 
(Miller, 2011). 
The literature suggests that CE is highly associated with superior performance (Rauch 
et al., 2009). For instance, Hult et al. (2003) investigate the role of entrepreneurship in 
establishing cultural competitiveness in organisations through examining the 
interaction effect of four variables (entrepreneurship, innovativeness, market 
orientation and organisational learning) on performance using an extended survey for 
764 strategic business units in the US. The results suggest that entrepreneurship, 
among other variables, is the most significant and proactive means of developing a 
market-based culture.  
In a different context, Avlonitisa and Salavoub (2007) examine the effect of variations 
in entrepreneurial orientation (measured by product innovativeness) in SMEs on 
performance. For a sample of 149 manufacturing companies in Greece, the study 
classifies companies into two groups using cluster analysis (active entrepreneurs and 
the passive entrepreneurs). The results suggest that active entrepreneurs outperform 
passive entrepreneurs in terms of introducing new products, and the uniqueness of 
these products significantly contribute to performance. 
Some other studies in the literature find moderate association between CE and 
performance (Rauch et al., 2009). For instance, Zahra (1991) examines the association 
between CE and performance using data from 119 of the Fortune 500 industrial firms 
for the period 1986 to 1989. The results suggest moderate association between CE and 
company performance. One explanation for the moderate relationship is the fact that 
some CE ventures were still in their early years and it would take several years before 
they would give return. 
Similarly, Lumpkin and Dess (2001) relate two dimensions of CE (proactiveness and 
competitive aggressiveness) to performance using a survey covering 124 executives 
from 94 companies in the US. The findings suggest that proactiveness is positively 
associated with performance, while competitive aggressiveness exhibits a poor 
association with performance. A further analysis reveals that the relationships 
between the two dimensions and firm performance are contingent on the external 
environment and business life cycle. 
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However, other studies fail to provide evidence on association between CE and 
performance (Rauch et al., 2009). For instance, Covin et al. (1994) investigate the 
moderating effect of strategic missions on the relationship between adopting 
entrepreneurial strategic postures (CE) and company performance through an 
extended survey, using questionnaires that cover 330 senior executives of 
manufacturing companies in the US. The initial results reveal that, in general, 
adopting entrepreneurial strategic postures is not significantly correlated to company 
performance. However, further analysis reveals that companies with build-oriented 
strategic missions outperform those with more hold- and harvest-oriented strategic 
missions when they adopt entrepreneurial strategic postures. 
In summary, the significance of the relationship between CE and business success 
varies among studies (Rauch et al., 2009). While some studies conclude that 
companies that are highly entrepreneurial outperform companies that are less 
entrepreneurial (e.g. Hult et al., 2003; Avlonitis and Salavoub, 2007), other studies 
find lower correlation between CE and performance (e.g. Zahra, 1991; Lumpkin and 
Dess, 2001) or even no significant relationship at all between CE and performance 
(e.g. Covin et al., 1994). However, the results in general support the argument of 
having positive performance implications for CE (Rauch et al., 2009).  
The results of previous studies suggest some variables moderate the relationship 
between CE and performance, such as environmental hostility (Zahra and Covin, 
1995; Zahra and Garvis, 2000), strategic mission (Covin et al., 1994), strategy and 
structure (Covin and Slevin, 1991) and company size (Rauch et al., 2009). However, 
there is little agreement on what constitutes suitable moderators, the area which needs 
further research (Rauch et al., 2009). Further, other studies suggest that these 
variables can work as antecedents rather than being moderators in relating CE to 
performance (Zahra, 1991). 
The results are generally consistent with the basic assumptions of contingency theory 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009) and suggest four alternative models for 
the contingency relationship between CE and performance including moderating 
effects, mediating effects, independent effects and interaction effects (Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996). Moreover, most of these studies have been conducted in the US and very 
few studies have been published using data from companies outside the US. 
39 
 
2.4.4 Corporate Entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance 
There is growing interest in how CG and ownership structure can affect CE (Zahra, 
1996). The relationship between CG and CE has become greatly controversial at the 
beginning of this century, as a result of the collapse of large companies in the US such 
as Enron and WorldCom, where the CEOs and boards of directors of these companies 
were more entrepreneurial and held less accountable (Taylor, 2003).  
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              Figure 2.9: Board Leadership Approach 
            Source: Taylor (2003, p. 4) 
 
Therefore, it has been argued that the effective board of directors should achieve a 
balance between entrepreneurship (strategy, corporate renewal and innovation) and 
CG (being accountable to shareholders and maintaining rigorous financial controls) 
(Taylor, 2003). According to Taylor (2003), the board leadership approach (see figure 
2.9) is neither over-dependent on the charismatic leader (individual entrepreneurship), 
nor over-dependent on financial control at the expense of corporate development 
(CG). The preferred approach is a combination of entrepreneurship with 
accountability and control which takes the form of CE. 
Alhough calls for studying the association of governance and ownership structure 
with entrepreneurial activity are not totally new (Porter, 1992), few studies have been 
conducted in this area investigating the impact on R&D (e.g. Daily and Dalton ,1992) 
and their results are contradictory (Zahra, 1996). The results of empirical studies 
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suggest that some CG mechanisms (e.g. non-executive directors’ representation in the 
board) have a negative impact on CE and other governance mechansims (long term 
institutional ownership) have a positive impact on corporate entrepreneurship. 
For instance, Hitt et al. (1996) investigated the effect of the market for corporate 
control on internal and external innovation, for a sample of 776 companies engaged in 
mergers and acquisitions in the US, during the period 1985-1991. The results indicate 
that companies engaged in acquisitions and divestitures pay more attention to 
financial controls, less attention to strategic controls and, thus, produce less internal 
innovation. Furthermore, an active acquisition strategy negatively affects the internal 
development of firm innovation. This effect has been attributed to the transaction 
costs of acquisition-related activities that absorb managers' time and energy, which 
leave little time for managers to deal with other important projects and target firm 
managers, in particular, become strongly risk averse. Therefore, active engagement in 
the market for corporate control can be negative to an organisation's wellbeing in 
industries in which innovation is important. 
In a survey covering top senior managers of 127 manufacturing companies on the 
1998 Fortune list, Zahra (1996) found that CE is positively associated with executive 
stock ownership and long-term institutional ownership. On the other hand, CE is 
negatively associated with the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and 
short-term institutional ownership. However, stock ownership by non-executive 
directors, to some extent, mitigates the negative effect of their representation on the 
board.  
The negative impact of non-executive directors’ representation on the board 
corresponds to the concerns raised towards the increasing trend of non-executive 
directors’ appointment as required by many CG codes. These concerns relate to the 
limited time or ability of non-executive directors to absorb the immense amount of 
information needed to understand a company’s operations (Zahra, 1996). Moreover, 
the lack of ownership interest by non-executive directors in a company results in 
those directors being less inclined to monitor management performance or even 
encourage entrepreneurial activities (Zahra, 1996). Therefore, stock ownership by 
non-executive directors better aligns their interest with shareholders’ interests and 
provides them with more incentives to monitor management performance and to 
encourage entrepreneurial activites. In a similar study for medium-sized companies, 
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Zahra et al. (2000) conclude that, in general, commitment to CE is high when both 
executives and non executives’ stock ownership increases in their company, CEO and 
chairman posts are separated and board size is medium.  
In summary, despite the fact that both CG and CE have the same objective of 
improving performance and creating value, the two constructs at the conceptual level 
seem to be contradictory and may be irreconcilable. CG emphasises control, 
monitoring management performance and ensuring accountability; on the other hand, 
CE focuses more on innovation and creating new opportunities, where entreprenurial 
activities require less control and restrictions on decision making.  
However, few studies investigate the relatonship between CG and CE and their 
interaction effect on perfromance. The limited research in this area has been attributed 
to the fact that theories of CG did not systematically incorporate an analysis for the 
economics of innovation (O'Sullivan, 2000). Arguably, VBM can be considered an 
appropriate approach to address the tension between conformance (CG) and 
performance (CE) and to bring the two dimensions closer to achieve the objectives of 
EG. For instance, in a research project commissioned by CIMA about maximising 
shareholders’ value, Starovic et al. (2004) have addressed this issue, arguing that the 
value based management approach can play an important role in keeping the balance 
between the conformance and performance dimensions of EG, as follows: 
“Value-based management thus places the interests of owners of companies back  at 
the centre of decision-making. This in turn means those investors can rely on more 
than just the instruments of CG to protect them from the possible conflicts of interest 
arising from the split between ownership and management. In this way, managing for 
value has the potential to bring the two sides of the enterprise governance framework 
closer and join them in a more comprehensive approach to management” (Starovic et 
al., 2004: p. 23). Nonetheless, the potential role of VBM in achieving the EG 
objectives has received little attention in the literature. 
2.5  Value-Based Management   
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the view of corporate success shifted its 
emphasis from achieving competitive advantage through outperforming competitors 
on technological capability and the acquisition of raw materials (Mills, 1994), towards 
a finance-influenced view in which shareholders’ interests are total or dominant 
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(Walters, 1997). Value based management (VBM) became popular in the mid-1980 
when Rappaport published his seminal text, “creating shareholder value: the new 
strand for business performance” in 1986. Companies such as Boots, LIoyds TSB and 
Cadbury Schweppes were soon making explicit public commitments to increasing 
value for their shareholders (Starovic et al., 2004).  
The focus on value creation was triggered by a more competitive environment, 
increased investor activism (Athanassakos, 2007), competitive labour markets for 
corporate executives (Rappaport, 1986), emergence of active markets for corporate 
control (Rappaport, 1986; Copeland et al., 2000), expansion of institutional 
investment and more liquid securities market (Young and O’Byrne, 2001) and 
impressive endorsements by corporate leaders who have adopted the approach (Fahi 
et al., 2005). Further, the growing criticisms of the traditional accounting measures 
such as EPS and ROI for not being linked to shareholder’s value has motivated many 
companies to adopt the VBM approach (Fahi et al., 2005). 
2.5.1 Value-Based Management Definitions 
The basic concept of value can be tracked back to 19th century economic theory, 
which pioneered the idea of residual income. However, the term VBM and managing 
for shareholder value (MSV) were not commonly being used until authors such as 
McTaggart and Copeland in the mid-1990s (Starovic et al., 2004). Eventually, the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC 1998) considered VBM as the latest 
evolution stage in management accounting practices (MAPs), where attention has 
been focused on the creation of value through using techniques and technologies that 
identify the key drivers of customer value, shareholder value and organisational 
innovation (Ittner and Larcker, 2001).  
VBM can be defined as “a formal, systematic approach to managing companies to 
achieve the objective of maximizing value creation and shareholder value overtime” 
(McTaggart, 1994: p. 21). However, this definition basically focuses on the objective 
of VBM. In another definition that focuses on the alignment process, VBM “aligns 
strategies, polices, performance, measures, rewards, organisation, processes, people 
and systems to deliver increased shareholder value” (Black et al., 1998: p.15). 
Similarly, it can also be defined as an approach to management whereby the 
company's overall aspiration, analytical techniques and management processes are all 
aligned to help the company maximise its value by focusing on the key drivers of 
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value (Copeland et al., 2000). In a comprehensive definition, VBM is defined as “a 
managerial approach in which the primary purpose is long run shareholder wealth 
maximization. The objectives of the firm, its systems, strategy, processes, analytical 
techniques, performance measurements and culture have as their guiding objective 
shareholder wealth maximization” (Arnold, 2008: p. 620). 
In summary, from a strategic perspective, VBM as a holistic management approach 
aims to provide consistency of the corporate mission (business philosophy), strategy 
(course of actions to achieve the corporate mission), CG (determines the corporate 
mission and regulates the activities of corporation), organisation of the corporation, 
decision processes and systems, performance management processes and systems and 
reward processes and systems (Value Based Management, 2011). 
Theoretically, VBM involves a shift away from the use of traditional accounting 
measures such as net profit and EPS which, arguably, offer an unreliable guide to 
shareholder value creation, to a number of alternative measures consistent with the 
principles of economic profit (Bromwich, 1998). These measures will be discussed in 
detail in the following section. 
2.5.2 Measuring Shareholder Value 
During the 1980s and 1990s growing concerns on traditional accounting measures 
have emerged, especially on the scope of subjectivity that most accounting standards 
allow (Starovic et al., 2004). Alternatively, a number of value-based measures or 
value-metrics based on the concept of shareholder value are proposed by a number of 
consultants, such as Rappaport (1986) and Stewart (1991). These measures have in 
common the basic premise that profit needs to be measured in a way that takes into 
account the cost of the capital employed to generate it (Bromwich, 1998; Starovic et 
al., 2004). 
These measures include Shareholder Value Added (SVA), Economic Profit (EP) or 
Residual Income (RI), Economic Value Added (EVA), Cash Flow Return on 
Investment (CFROI) and Total Business Return (TBR) (Starovic et al., 2004). 
2.5.2.1 Shareholder Value Added (SVA) 
Rappaport (1986) developed SVA to estimate the value of the shareholders’ stake in a 
company and evaluate strategic decisions (Rappaport, 1986; Starovic et al., 2004). 
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SVA can be estimated through discounting the expected future operating free cash 
flows using a certain cost of capital, as follows: 
SVA = (Present Value of Cash flow from Operations during the Forecast Period + 
Residual Value + Marketable Securities) - Debt 
The most important problem with SVA is predicting the variables required to estimate 
it (Starovic et al., 2004). Therefore, it is not commonly used by companies and, 
arguably, is less popular than its founder (Copeland, 1994). For instance, an 
international survey by the European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD) 
for VBM practices reported that only 8% of respondents used SVA (Boulos et al., 
2001). 
2.5.2.2 Economic Profit (EP) or Residual Income (RI)  
According to Bromwich and Walker (1998), EP or RI has a long history at both the 
theory level (e.g. Solomons, 1965) and the practice level (e.g. GM co. since 1920s). 
EP is the excess of earnings (revenues) over expenses, including cost of capital. It can 
be calculated as annual accounting profits minus an interest charge on the book value 
of assets (cost of capital) (Bromwich and Walker, 1998): 
EP = Accounting Profit after Tax – Cost of Capital 
EP can be used in measuring performance, evaluating businesses and strategic decsion 
making. However, one of the important problems with this approach is based on the 
accounting profit, which is based on traditional accounting conventions and rules 
(Starovic et al., 2004). 
2.5.2.3 Economic Value Added (EVA)  
EVA is the most popular variant of EP approaches, which was founded by Stern 
Stewart and Co. (Bromwich and Walker, 1998). In the INSEAD survey, more than 
47% of the respondents claimed to use EVA as the EP measure (Boulos et al., 2001). 
Although EVA is a variant of EP, Stewart (1991) points that at least three problems 
threaten the calculation of EP, including the use of accruals-based bookkeeping; the 
bias resulting from applying the prudence concept and the understated capital as a 
result of using “successful efforts accounting” (Stewart, 1991; Starovic et al., 2004). 
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To address the measurement problems in EP, Stewart (1991) suggests up to 164 
adjustments to accounting profits and capital, on which EVA is already based 
(Stewart, 1991; Starovic et al., 2004). EVA can be calculated as follows: 
EVA = Adjusted Operating Profits after Tax - (Adjusted Invested Capital * Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital) 
Arguably, EVA grasps all the advantages of the EP approach and the argued 
improvements in accounting profit after being adjusted (Stewart, 1991; Starovic et al., 
2004). However, it is rather complicated, time consuming in implementation and 
lacks the theoretical foundations of the suggested adjustments (Zimmerman, 1997; 
Starovic et al., 2004). 
2.5.2.4 Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI) 
CFROI was developed by HOLT Value Associates in collaboration with Boston 
Consulting Group (Ameels et al., 2002). According to the INSEAD survey, CFROI 
was very popular as 23% of the respondents argued to use CFROI as a measure of 
shareholder value creation (Boulos et al., 2001). CFROI can be considered a real 
measure of rate of return, as it relates the cash generated by a business to the cash 
invested (Starovic et al., 2004). CFROI is defined as the annual gross cash flow 
relative to the invested capital of a business unit (Ameels et al., 2002).  
CFROI is calculated by converting the accounting profit into real cash flow and 
converting capital invested in the business into an inflation adjusted measure of 
investment in business and, finally, the annual cash performance to be converted into 
a measure of economic performance over the average life of company’s assets using 
the principles of IRR to find the r value, which approximates the value of CFROI 
(Starovic et al., 2004) in the following equation (Ameels et al., 2002): 
Gross Operating Asset Investment = 	∑ 	  +   () 
Where: 
CF Gross cash flow 
W  Expected residual value of non depreciating assets 
 
Arguably, CFROI is an accurate and advanced measure of economic performance as 
it is not misshapen by the effect of inflation and depreciation as other approaches, 
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such as EP and EVA. In addition, it incorporates the internal rate of return (IRR) 
concept used in evaluating capital investments and reflects the way in which the stock 
market judges a company performance (Starovic et al., 2004). However, calculating 
CFROI is rather complicated, time consuming and costly to implement (Starovic et 
al., 2004). 
2.5.2.5 Total Business Return (TBR) 
Total business return (TBR) is the internal equivalent of the external total shareholder 
return (TSR) measure, which considers capital gains and dividends received by 
shareholders (Starovic et al., 2004). TSR represents the change in capital value of a 
company over a one-year period, plus dividends, expressed as a plus or minus 
percentage of the opening value (Ameels et al., 2002). 
Total Shareholder Return = [(Pt+1 - Pt) + D t+1] ÷  Pt 
Where: 
P      share price 
D     paid dividends 
t      beginning of the period 
t+1   end of the year  
 
According to the INSEAD survey, 7.4% of the respondent companies were using TSR 
(Boulos et al. 2001). It has been argued that TBR addresses the problems of short 
term performance measures such as EVA® and CFROI, as it incorporates the long-
term effect of decisions taken in a particular period on the value of the business. This 
is because TBR combines both the cash flow performance of a business with the 
change in value that occurs during a certain period (Starovic et al., 2004). 
However, using the TSR measure is not without problems, as it can only be calculated 
for companies that are quoted on the stock exchange. Moreover, it cannot be used to 
calculate shareholder return at business unit level or for specific product market 
combinations. In addition, because it is driven by many factors beyond the control of 
the firm’s executives, it is an inefficient measure in evaluating performance 
(Bannister and Jusuthasan, 1997; Ameels et al., 2002). 
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2.5.3 Value-Based Management Success 
Theoretically, VBM implementation seems to be simple. However, VBM 
implementation is more complicated than many of its proponents have thought and 
requires a great deal of patience, effort and money (Haspeslagh et al., 2001). For 
instance, Slater and Olson (1996) argue that simply applying the tools of VBM does 
not guarantee an increased shareholder value. These tools focus on the financial 
management and actions at the level of top management, whereas value creation is the 
outcome of the actions of individuals and groups throughout the firm. Therefore, 
VBM, as a management approach, should engage, motivate and reward the people 
throughout the organisation who create shareholder value.  
Similarly, Bannister and Jesuthasan (1997) point out that failure of some 
organisations that have been adopting VBM does not necessarily cast doubt to the 
approach itself. Rather, such failures may take place because these organisations are 
not ready to manage within a value-based context. Effective use of VBM generally 
entails striking changes in the way an organisation tackles everything, from budgeting 
to goal setting, to capital allocation, to performance management and even to 
compensation.  
In the INSEAD survey of a large number of international companies, Boulos et al. 
(2001) suggest five key value-driven elements for VBM success, including an explicit 
commitment to value creation, education and intensive training of managers and 
employees in the shareholder value creation process, building ownership through 
rewarding managers and employees on corporate and/or business unit economic profit 
measures, empowering business units and broadening process reforms (Boulos et al., 
2001).  
In summary, to ensure its success, VBM should be implemented as a holistic 
management approach that adopts shareholder value creation as an overall objective, 
develops strategies, organisational design, action plans, value drivers and performance 
measures that are aligned with this objective (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). Finally, 
introducing primary changes to a company's culture might be the most difficult 
challenge for management (Boulos et al., 2001). 
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2.5.4 Value-Based Management and Performance 
Proponents of VBM argue that VBM mitigates the agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (Stewart, 1991; Lovata and Costigan 2002; Ryan and 
Trahan, 2007), aligns their interests (McLaren, 2005) and creates shareholder value 
(Crowther, 2003). However, VBM has been criticised because calculating value-based 
measures (e.g. EVA) is complicated; moreover, its implementation is not an easy 
process and it is costly (Lovata and Costigan, 2000; Haspeslagh et al., 2001). 
VBM has been challenged with the growing and continuing debate on the importance 
of shareholder value relative to other measures such as employment, social 
responsibility and environment (Copeland et al., 2000). Accordingly, reconciling the 
competing claims of shareholders and other stakeholders has become crucial (Mills 
and Weisten, 2000). 
In addition, it has been claimed that interest in VBM approaches has decreased as a 
result of the growing interest in society, environment and starting of a more socially 
responsible era of business, with different concerns to the maximisation of 
shareholder value. However, it is believed that it provides a good opportunity to study 
the phenomenon as a completed cycle (Cooper and Crowther, 2008). Management 
accounting research has been criticised as being more driven by changes in practice, 
resulting in the disappearance of some research topics, as the next ‘innovation’ 
emerges, even though earlier innovations may have not been fully investigated (Ittner 
and Larcker, 2001).  
The mixed results of empirical studies regarding the relationship between VBM and 
performance have contributed to make the debate about VBM unresolved. For 
instance, proponents of VBM argue that value-based measures (especially EVA) are 
more correlated to the share price than traditional accounting measures (e.g. EPS and 
ROI) and they are better used as predictors of stock return (Ittner and Larcker, 1998, 
2001). However, the results of these studies are contradictory. For instance, Stewart 
(1991, 1994), Grant (1996), Lehn and Makhija (1997), Young and O’Byrne (2001), 
Athanassakos (2007), Ryan and Trahan (2007) and Rapp et al. (2011) have supported 
the claims of superiority of value-based measures over traditional accounting 
measures in explaining stock returns.  
Conversely, other studies such as Dodd and Chen (1996), Chen and Dodd (1997), 
Biddle et al. (1997) and Bao and Bao (1998) provide some evidence against value-
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based measures in terms of its explanatory power of stock returns and information 
content. Despite the fact that VBM is not an entirely new approach, the debate 
concerning the superiority of value-based measures over traditional accounting 
measures in the literature has not been resolved (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). 
Further, little attention has been paid in the VBM literature to the extent of preferring 
these measures for management planning; evaluating management performance and 
control purposes (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). Accordingly, there is no clear evidence 
whether the organisations that use value-based measures as internal performance 
measures for performance measurement and compensation purposes can outperform 
organisations that use PMSs based on other performance measures (Zimmerman, 
1997; Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Francis and Minchington, 2002). The mixed results of 
these studies have been partially explained by deficiency in the implementation of 
VBM (Slater and Olson, 1996; Bannister and Jesuthasan, 1997; Armour and Mankins, 
2001; Haspeslagh et al., 2001; Morisawa and Kurosaki, 2002).  
However, the present study argues that, in addition to the implementation-related 
factors, contingency factors can play an important role in explaining such mixed 
results. This argument is supported with the results of previous studies, such as 
Anderson and Young (1999), which conclude that success or failure of sophisticated 
accounting techniques may not only be related to implantation-related factors, but also 
to more general contingent factors related to the organisation characteristics and its 
environment. Accordingly, the enhanced performance outcomes depend on how 
different types of PMSs best suit or fit with an organisation’s specific context 
(Tillema, 2005; Chenhall 2006). Accordingly, some recent studies in VBM literature 
such as Athanassakos (2007), Cooper and Crowther (2008) and Lueg and Shaffer; 
(2010) suggest that using the contingency theory approach towards studying VBM 
can help to explain the mixed results. Therefore, this study opted for the contingency 
theory approach in addressing the research problem to respond to a call by Ittner and 
Larcker (1998) to identify the contingency factors that explain the cross-sectional 
differences in the predictive ability of value-based measures.  
2.6 Gaps in the Literature 
This chapter has examinedthe EG framework from a UK context, based largely on the 
review of literature in EG, CG, CE and VBM. The review of literature identifies a 
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number of gaps and reveals directions for further research. These gaps are explained 
as follows: 
Reviewing studies that have addressed the EG framework reveals that there is some 
ambiguity regarding the relationship between the conformance and performance 
dimensions of EG. While these studies admit the conflicting nature of the 
conformance and performance dimensions of EG, the exact relationship 
(conflicting/complementary) between the two dimensions is not clear and lacks 
empirical evidence, especially in the UK. This raises an important question regarding 
the potential trade-off or tension between conformance and performance. 
Furthermore, little is known about best practices and approaches to keep the balance 
between conformance and performance, which raises another question regarding the 
effectiveness of some of the proposed approaches (e.g. VBM) in achieving the 
objectives of EG. 
Therefore, more research is needed in this area to operationalise the EG dimensions, 
especially the performance dimension, into measurable constructs, so that the 
relationship between the two dimensions can be explored. In addition, the best 
practices proposed (e.g. VBM) to achieve the objectives of EG need to be empirically 
assessed in terms of the balance between conformance and performance. 
Review of the CG (conformance) literature reveals that it is dominated by studies that 
examine the effect of compliance with a single or small subset of CG mechanisms on 
performance, especially in the US, rather than examining the overall effect of all CG 
mechanisms. These studies ignore the complementary relationships between differnt 
CG mechanisms. In addition, the literature emphasises the effect of these mechanisms 
on performance, with less attention to its effect on CE. Therefore, more studies are 
needed, especially in the UK, to examine the overall effect of compliance with the 
CCCG on both CE and performance.  
Reviewing the CE literature reveals that there is little agreement on defining CE and 
identifying which dimensions shape this construct, the area which needs further 
research. In addition, the mixed results regarding the relationship between CE and 
performance, which largely depend on some other contingency factors, suggest that 
using the contingency theory perspective can contribute to reconciling these mixed 
results. Further, the literature review of VBM suggests that it can be considered one of 
the best practices that has the potential to achieve the objectives of EG. However, the 
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mixed results regarding the relationship between VBM and performance, in addition 
to some clues about possible effects of some contextual factors on this relationship, 
suggest that using the contingency theory perspective can contribute to explaining 
these mixed results. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter presented the EG frameworks with reflection on the UK. In this respect, 
the conformance and performance dimensions were identified as main dimensions for 
EG. An examination of the development of CG and CE was presented subsequently in 
operationalising the conformance and performance dimensions. In order to examine 
the EG framework, the VBM approach was proposed to achieve balance between 
conformance and performance in the UK.  
Reviewing the literature reveals some gaps and a number of theoretical perspectives 
that can be used to address the research problem such as agency theory, which 
dominates the CG discipline. In addition, contingency theory can be used to reconcile 
the mixed results regarding the effect of VBM, CG, CE and performance. Therefore, 
the two theoretical perspectives will be used in this study as a foundation for the 
theoretical model.  
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter aims to develop a theoretical framework of EG that integrates the agency 
and contingency theories perspectives. The review of the literature in the previous 
chapter reveals that an agency theory can contribute to developing a better 
understanding of the mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts between owners and 
managers, and using the contingency theory, as a lens to address the EG issue, can 
contribute to developing a better understanding of the relationship between 
conformance and performance, thus reconciling the mixed results in CG, CE and 
VBM studies.  
This chapter is divided into six sections. The second section will discuss the main 
concepts and assumptions of agency theory including its contribution to management 
accounting, CG and CE research. In addition, it discusses the common themes and 
differences between agency theory and contingency theory. The third section will 
discuss the main concepts and assumptions of contingency theory, including its 
contribution to management accounting, CG and CE research. The fourth section will 
present the theoretical model developed in this study, operationalising the 
conformance and performance dimensions of EG, VBM and the contingency factors. 
The fifth section will discuss the development of the study’s hypotheses based on the 
expected relationships between the model constructs as indicated in the theoretical 
model. The final section will present a summary of the chapter. 
3.2 Agency Theory 
Although agency theory was rooted in economics and finance disciplines (Lan and 
Heracleous, 2010), it has been used by scholars in many other disciplines including 
accounting, marketing, political science, organisational behaviour and sociology 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The blueprint of the theory was in the early work of Berle and 
Means (1932) on the separation of ownership and management. However, it is also 
credited to the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) and Fama 
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and Jensen (1983a), who have contributed to the development of the theory. 
Eventually, it has become a dominant theoretical perspective in a number of 
disciplines, such as CG (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lan and Heracleous, 2010) and 
accounting research (Lambert, 2007). 
Two streams of agency theory have been developed in the literature, namely positivist 
and principal-agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). While the two streams share some common 
characteristics, such as the unit of analysis and assumptions related to information, 
people and organisation, they differ in mathematical rigour and style (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The positivist stream of agency theory is less mathematical than the principal-
agent model and exclusively focuses on the agency relationship between owners and 
managers in public corporations (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal-agent stream 
entails vigilant assumptions that are followed by logical deduction and mathematical 
proof. Therefore, it is more abstract and can be applied to any agency relationship 
(e.g. employer-employee) (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The positivist agency stream mainly focuses on identifying the governance 
mechanisms that contribute to solving the agency problem. The principal-agent 
stream is mainly concerned with identifying the most efficient contract for agency 
relationships. However, the two streams can complement each other. While the 
positivist agency stream identifies a variety of contract alternatives, the principal-
agent stream points out which one is the most efficient, assuming different levels of 
uncertainty, risk aversion and information (Eisenhardt, 1989). The present study uses 
the positivist agency theory in developing the theoretical framework, as it is more 
appropriate to the research problem, which addresses the EG issue at a corporate 
level. The principal-agent model is less relevant to this study as it is more abstract and 
less accessible to organisational theory research (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
3.2.1 The Agency Problem 
Agency theory addresses the problem that arises from separation of ownership and 
control in which one party (principal) delegates work to another (agent), who 
performs that work (Jensen and Mcling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). The agency problem 
arises from the conflict of interest between principal and agent, given the difficulty of 
verifying what the agent is doing by the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). Different 
interests and goals may cause other problems such as, moral hazard, and adverse 
selection problems (Jensen and Mcling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Additionally, the 
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difficult and expensive monitoring of the agent causes risk-sharing problems 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Moral hazard denotes a situation where an opportunistic agent may take sub-optimal 
decisions because of an imperfect contract between the agent and the principal. 
Adverse selection denotes the problem of hiring agents who do not have the necessary 
skills to deliver expected returns because of an imperfect contract or information 
asymmetry between the agent and the principal (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007). 
Risk-sharing problems happen when the principal and the agent have different attitudes 
towards risk, which makes them prefer different actions (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Table 3.1: Agency Theory Overview 
Key Idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organisation 
of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of Analysis  Contract between principal and agent 
Human Assumptions  Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Organisational 
Assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants  
Efficiency as an effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information as a purchasable commodity 
Information Assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting Problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem Domain Relationships in which principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, regulation, 
leadership, impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical 
integration, transfer pricing) 
 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989, p. 59) 
Agency theory assumes that the agency problem can be resolved through identifying 
the most efficient contract that administrates the agency relationship between the 
principal and the agent, given some assumptions (see table 3.1) about people, 
organisations and information (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency costs should be incurred to 
resolve the agency problem and minimise divergence in the interests of the principal 
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and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency costs are the sum of monitoring costs 
(observing and measuring the agent’s behaviour costs), bonding costs (costs incurred 
by the agent to adhere to contract terms and residual loss (reduction in the principal’s 
benefit due to divergence in interests) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
3.2.2 Agency Theory in Management Accounting 
“Agency theory has been one of the most important theoretical paradigms in 
accounting during the last 25 years” (Lambert, 2007: p.247). The basic attribute of  
agency theory that has made it appealing to accounting researchers is that it permits 
the explicit incorporation of conflicts of interest, incentive problems and mechanisms 
of controlling incentive problems into accounting models (Lambert, 2007). This is 
important because much of the motivation for accounting has to do with the control of 
incentive problems. 
Management accounting is concerned with measuring and providing information that 
can help to evaluate past decisions and to improve future decisions, such as 
compensation and incentives decisions. Information can be provided in different 
ways, such as performance measurement (including both financial and non-financial 
measures) (Lambert, 2007). Agency theory has been used in management accounting 
research to answer two main questions: “how do characteristics of information and 
compensation systems affect incentive problems and how does the existence of 
incentive problems affect the design and structure of information and compensation 
systems?” (Lambert, 2007: p. 247). 
Agency theorists (e.g. Hart, 1995) argue that the agency contract between 
shareholders and managers is likely to be incomplete due to the cost of thinking and 
planning all the different eventualities, cost of negotiation and cost of writing down 
the contract. One solution to this problem is to grant managers a contingent long term 
incentive contract ex-ante, to align their interests with those of shareholders. This 
contract can take the form of shared ownership and stock options (Jensen and 
Meekling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, in the VBM literature, a 
number of studies (e.g. Dodd and Chen, 1996; Chen and Dodd, 1997; Biddle et al., 
1997; Ryan and Trahan, 2007) examine the effect of linking value-based measures to 
the incentive and compensation system on minimising agency costs and maximising 
stock returns. 
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3.2.3 Agency Theory in Corporate Governance 
Agency theory has become dominant in the CG discipline, not only because of its 
impact on the literature, but also on the policy and practice level (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Lan and Heracleous, 2010). For instance, CG codes of best practice, director 
training and composition of corporate boards have been affected by the agency theory 
doctrine (Lan and Heracleous, 2010). 
A number of governance mechanisms have been proposed to align the managers and 
shareholders’ interests and resolve the agency problem. According to Eisenhardt 
(1989), two governance mechanisms can be used effectively to control management 
opportunism. The first mechanism is the use of outcome-based contracts, as rewards 
for both managers and shareholders will depend on the same actions; therefore, 
conflict of interests can be minimised. The second mechanism is the use of 
information systems that inform shareholders about management actions, so that the 
information asymmetry can be reduced and management opportunism is minimised.  
However, agency theorists argue that “the governance mechanisms are designed to 
ensure agent-principal interest alignment, protect shareholder interests and thus 
minimise agency costs” (Davis et al., 1997: p.23). Therefore, agency theory provides 
a basis for the governance of firms through various CG mechanisms (Weir et al., 
2002). These mechanisms in general and the board of directors in particular play an 
important role in monitoring managers and mitigating agency conflicts (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a).  
CG mechanisms can be classified into internal and external mechanisms. Internal 
mechanisms include management ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
independent board of directors that mainly consist of non-executive directors, board 
committees and the separation of CEO and chair positions to ensure the effectiveness 
of the board oversight role (Dalton et al., 1998; Daily et al., 2003). External 
mechanisms include competitive labour market (Fama, 1980) and market for 
corporate control (Kosnik, 1987). The literature suggests that CG mechanisms reduce 
agency costs and contribute to resolving the agency problem (Dey, 2008; McKnight 
and Weir, 2009). 
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3.2.4 Agency Theory in Corporate Entrepreneurship 
As discussed earlier, agency problem can result in agents acting differently, because 
they have different risk preferences or they tend to act opportunistically. Both 
opportunism (moral hazard) and risk preferences are problems only under uncertain 
environments. The agency problem becomes clearer in the entrepreneurship context 
as entrepreneurial behaviour, in its simple form, is the action in the context of 
uncertainty, which makes it impossible or prohibitively expensive to assess the 
effectiveness of an agent’s behaviour (Jones and Butler, 1992). 
Agency theory assumes that agents are risk averse as they have to bear the uncertainty 
of entrepreneurial activities and are only rewarded on undertaking risks on the basis 
of salary, while the principal is the residual claimant of profits (Jones and Butler, 
1992). Given this reward scheme, agents will have no incentive to behave 
entrepreneurially or to undertake highly uncertain entrepreneurial projects, but instead 
low risk projects will be preferred (Jones and Butler, 1992). While risk aversion 
encourages managers to select less risky projects that provide normal rate of return, 
opportunism encourages managers not to undertake their responsibilities putting 
below normal effort that does not result in even normal returns. 
Therefore, “if agents are not rewarded for the entrepreneurial efforts in the form of 
profits rather than salary, they will have less incentive to perform entrepreneurially 
and will have positive incentive to shrink, reduce their performance and pursue their 
interests” (Jones and Butler, 1992: p. 738). In other words, the main problem is 
applying the incentive scheme for entrepreneurial agents to act as principals or more 
generally, for managers to act as entrepreneurs (Jones and Butler, 1992).  
To solve the agency problem firms must first identify the organisational factors that 
promote the agency problem (e.g. organisational size, age and complexity) and try to 
address these problems through designing the entrepreneurial context that align the 
interests of principals and agents. Innovations in organisational structure and 
organisational control and reward systems can help to solve the agency problem 
(Jones and Butler, 1992). For instance, moving from the functional structure to a 
product structure or multidivisional structure can reduce agency problems resulting 
from the increased size and complexity of a firm.  
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3.2.5 Agency Theory and Contingency Theory 
This study gains insights from the agency theory and contingency theory to develop a 
theoretical model of EG. Most empirical studies have endeavoured to understand CG 
using the agency theory lens and investigate links between CG mechanisms and firm 
performance (Aguilera et al., 2008). These studies assume that by managing the 
agency problem between shareholders and managers through CG mechanisms firms 
will operate more efficiently and perform better (Aguilera et al., 2008).  
However, the agency theory perspective has been criticised for its under-contextual 
nature and the closed system assumption of the firm, which conjectures a universal set 
of relationships between CG mechanisms and performance, paying little attention to 
the contexts in which firms operate (Aguilera et al., 2008). These critiques threaten 
the ability of agency theory to accurately compare and explain CG mechanisms across 
different institutional contexts (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2008). 
By contrast, contingency theory advocates an open systems perspective and rejects the 
view of universal best practices (Donaldson, 2001). This view suggests that various 
CG mechanisms may be more or less effective in different organisational 
environments (Scott, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2008). It also suggests that a one-size-fits-
all approach is inappropriate; instead, effective policies should take into consideration 
the possible range of governance mechanisms dealing with important contingencies 
(Aguilera et al., 2008). 
Contingency theory can be used to examine the effect of fit between CG mechanisms 
and contingencies such as task uncertainty, task interdependence or task size on 
organisational effectiveness (Donaldson, 2001; Aguilera et al., 2008). “Although CG 
might be considered a structural characteristic within this framework, contingency 
theory as it relates to the effectiveness of corporate governance has not been fully 
examined” (Aguilera et al., 2008: p.481).  
Although agency theory seems to be different from organisational theory, it has 
several links to mainstream organisation perspectives (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, 
agency theory shares some common characteristics and assumptions (see table 3.2) 
with the information processing approach to contingency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
However, the main difference between the two theories is their focus. While  
contingency theory focuses on identifying the best structuring of reporting 
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relationships and decision making responsibilities, agency theory focuses on 
identifying the best structuring of control relationships resulting from these reporting 
and decision making patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, contingency theory 
can be used to identify whether a firm is organised in a divisional or matrix structure, 
whereas agency theory can be used to identify how managers within the chosen 
structure are compensated by performance incentives (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Therefore, integrating agency theory and contingency theory has the potential to 
address the criticism levelled at agency theory, due to not considering the context in 
which the principal and the agent contracts. Future contingency-based studies can be 
advanced by integrating insights from alternate theoretical perspectives, such as 
agency theory, into organisational adaptation and functioning (Chenhall, 2007). 
Table 3.2: Comparison of Contingency Theory and Agency Theory Assumptions 
Assumptions Contingency Theory Agency Theory 
Self-interest  X 
Goal Conflict  X 
Bounded Rationality X X 
Information Asymmetry X X 
Predominance of Efficiency X X 
Risk Aversion  X 
Information as Commodity  X 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989, p. 63) 
3.3 Contingency Theory 
The contingency theory of organisations is an important theoretical lens used to view 
organisations as it gives many insights and has significant empirical support 
(Donaldson, 2001). Contingency theory was developed in the early 1960s from the 
seminal work by Burns and Stalker (1961) and Woodward (1965), and posits that the 
effectiveness of an organisational structure depends on a number of contextual 
variables (Otley, 1980). Eventually, contingency theory was introduced in the 
accounting literature by the mid-1970s (Otley, 1980) since the early work of Watson 
(1975) and Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978). 
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Most of the contingency theory research in accounting has studied organisational 
structure (Donaldson, 2001), which is known as structural contingency theory 
(Pfeffer, 1982). The core of the structural contingency theory paradigm is that 
organisational effectiveness (organisational performance) results from fitting 
characteristics of the organisation (e.g. structure) to contingencies that reflect the 
situation of the organisation (Donaldson, 2001). In other words, organisational 
performance depends on the degree of matching (fit) between the structure of the 
organisation and the existing contingencies (Ezzamel and Hart, 1987). 
The literature suggests that environment, organisational size and organisational 
strategy, technology are important contingencies (Otley, 1980; Donaldson, 2001). 
According to contingency theory, organisations are seeking to fit their organisational 
characteristics (e.g. structure) to contingencies to achieve high performance and to 
avoid any losses resulting from the misfit when contingencies change (Donaldson, 
2001). Therefore, organisations are seen to be shaped by the contingencies as they 
need to fit them to avoid loss of performance through adapting over time to the 
changing contingencies to maintain effectiveness (Donaldson, 2001). 
3.3.1 Key Terms and Concepts in Contingency Theory 
The continuous stream of contingency-based studies indicates the importance and 
strength of this research area (Gerdina and Greveb, 2004). Although there has been a 
rapid rise and wide acceptance of contingency theory (Otley, 1980), the results of 
empirical studies are conflicting and fragmented (Tosi and Slocum, 1984) and the 
state of the art of this research area is not very clear (Gerdina and Greveb, 2004). 
The literature suggets some causes for the problem of the fragmentary and 
contradictory results, such as using different definitions of variables (unclear 
concepts), inadequate data, under-specified models (under-specified relationships 
between concepts) and the different ways of applying the concept of fit (Otley, 1980; 
Tosi and Slocum, 1984; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Gerdina and Greveb, 2004). In 
addition, there is no structural contingency theory of organisations, instead a loose 
group of unrelated theories exists, each of which makes a connection between its 
contingency and some aspects of organisational structure (Donaldson, 2001).  
One way to overcome the problems of the confusing results in the contingency 
research is to understand the key issues and concepts of contingency theory (Tosi and 
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Slocum, 1984) such as the concepts of fit (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Gerdina and 
Greveb, 2004) and organisational effectiveness (Tosi and Slocum, 1984). 
3.3.1.1 The Concept of Fit 
The fit concept is at the heart of contingency theory; contingency theorists endeavour 
to identify what constitutes fit and how fit affects performance (Donaldson, 2001). 
Therefore, the definition of fit is vital to the theory development, data collection and 
statistical analysis of propositions (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985).  
In an attempt to illuminate a good deal of the confusion in the contingency theory 
literature, Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) distinguish between three different 
approaches to the fit: selection, interaction and systems. Similarly, Gerdina and 
Greveb (2004) distinguish between cartesian vs configuration approaches, congruence 
vs contingency approaches and moderation vs mediation forms). 
3.3.1.1.1 The Selection Approach 
The selection approach simply hypothesises that organisational context (e.g. 
environment, technology) is related to structure (e.g. centralisation, formalisation) 
without testing the effect of the context-structure relationship on performance (Drazin 
and Van de Ven, 1985). The association between organisational context and structure, 
without any link to organisational performance, can be described as congruence 
(Donaldson, 2001; Gerdina and Greveb, 2004).  
Natural selection and managerial selection perspectives have been used to justify 
viewing fit as congruence of organisational context and structure (Drazin and Van de 
Ven, 1985). Natural selection assumes that organisations need to adapt to the context 
through selecting the appropriate structure in order to survive; fit is the result of the 
adaptation process that ensures that only the best performing organisations survive.  
However, the natural selection perspective has been criticised as a misfit between 
context and structure, which can lead only to underperformance, rather than 
bankruptcy (Donaldson, 2001). Therefore, for some organisations, the correlation 
between organisational context and structure can be caused by managerial selection 
(Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985) or managerial decisions (Donaldson, 2001), rather 
than natural selection.  
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Although the selection approach is a simple approach and many early studies 
examined the association between organisational context and structure, this approach 
has been criticised for the non-existence of performance construct in the congruence 
models (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985) and the inaccurate assumption of survival of 
the fittest (Gerdina and Greveb, 2004).  
3.3.1.1.2 The Interaction Approach 
The interaction approach is a second approach for defining fit concept (Pennings, 
1987). According to this approach, fit can be viewed as interaction between 
contingency and structure to yield a high performance (Donaldson, 2001). Unlike the 
selection approach the interaction approach explains variations in organisational 
performance as a result of  the interaction of structure and context, rather than just 
understanding the congruence between them (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). More 
specifically, fit between context and structure can be interpreted in a multiplicative 
term (multiplication of contingency variable by structure variable) or matching term 
(Schoonhoven, 1981). 
Alhough the interaction approach is very commmon and widespread in the 
contingency theory literature, the results of empirical studies are mixed with limited 
support for the interaction hypothesis (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). In addition, this 
approach only examines the interaction between one single contextual variable and 
one single structural variable and the effect of this interaction on performance (Drazin 
and Van de Ven, 1985) and does not take into consideration the interaction between 
multiple contingencies and structures simultaneously (Donaldson, 2001).  
3.3.1.1.3 The Systems Approach 
“Unlike the selection and interaction approaches to fit, the systems approach consists 
of several novel alternative methods characterising the patterns of interdependencies 
present in organisations (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985: p.519)”. One of the 
overriding characteristics of this approach is using multivariate analysis to study 
patterns of consistency among contextual, structural variables and performance 
(Miller, 1981). 
The systems approach assumes that to maintain a high level of organisational 
effectiveness, an organisation should not only select the appropriate pattern of 
organisational structure and process that matches the array of confronting 
contingencies, but also build up structures and processes that are internally consistent 
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(Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). The main issue with the systems approach in 
organisations that face multiple and sometimes conflicting contingencies is whether 
these organisations should adopt organisation structures and processes that match 
these contingencies and whether internal consistency exists between the selected 
structures and processes that correspond to the  conflicting contingencies (Drazin and 
Van de Ven, 1985). Another important issue with the systems approach is how 
multiple fits among contingencies and structures affect organisational performance 
(Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985).  
In summary, Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) argue that the three forms of fit 
(selection, interaction and systems) are not mutually exclusive and more than one 
form of fit can be examined in one study to get a better understanding for the 
competing approaches and theory development.    
3.3.1.2 Cartesian VS Configuration Approach 
The main difference between the Cartesian and configuration forms of fit is that the 
Cartesian approach is characterised by reductionism, while the configuration approach 
is characterised by the holistic view (Gerdina and Greveb, 2004). The Cartesisan 
approach is similar to the interaction approach suggested by Drazin and Van de Ven 
(1985) as it focuses on the interaction effect between a single contingency and a 
single structure on performance. The configuration approach is similar to the systems 
approach suggested by Drazin and Van de Ven (1985), as it examines the multiple 
relationships between contingencies and structures simultaneously. A summary of 
differences between Cartesian and configuration approaches is illustrated in table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Cartesian Approach and Configuration Approach 
 Cartesian  Approach Configuration Approach 
Variables Few Many 
Relations Continuous and General across 
Contexts 
System States and Context-
Specific 
Change Continuous and Incremental Episodic and Quantum Jumps 
   Source: Gerdina and Greveb (2004, p. 305) 
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3.3.1.3 Congruence VS Contingency Approach 
Congruence is similar to the selection approach suggested by Drazin and Van de Ven 
(1985), as it assumes that structure is shaped by context and there is no need to 
investigate the effect of association between contingency and structural variables, as 
long as only high performing organisations survive (Gerdina and Greveb, 2004). 
Conversely, the contingency approach examines the effect of association between 
context and structure on performance  and assumes that both high performing and less 
performaing organisations survive and exist as a result of more or less succesful 
combination between context and structure (Gerdina and Greveb, 2004).  
3.3.1.4 Mediation VS Moderation Forms 
In the Cartesian approach for contingency, the relationships between different 
variables can be presented in models using different forms; the most common forms 
are moderation and mediation (Gerdina and Greveb, 2004). The moderation form (see 
figure 3.3a) assumes that “the impact of an independent variable on the dependent 
variable is contingent on the level of third variable, the so-called moderator” (Gerdina 
and Greveb, 2004: p.309).  
The mediation form (see figure 3.3b) assumes that beside the direct effect an 
independent variable has on the dependent variable, the independent variable 
indirectly affects the dependent variable through its effect on a third variable (the 
mediator) which, in turn, affects the dependent variable. However, the two forms of 
models “represent two different theoretical forms of fit. Both models are valid, but in 
particular situations only one model can give the true picture” (Gerdina and Greveb, 
2004: p.310). 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 3.1a: Moderation Form                        Figure 3.1b: Mediation Form 
Source: Gerdina and Greveb (2004, p. 310) 
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3.3.1.5 Organisational Effectiveness (Performance) 
Organisational effectiveness (performance) is a central concept in contingency theory. 
Contingency-based studies that have not investigated the effect on performance have 
been criticised for inconsistent results (Tosi and Slocum, 1984; Pennings, 1992). 
There has been a sizeable debate in organisational studies about the definition of 
organisational effectiveness (performance) (Donaldson, 2001). Effectiveness or 
performance can be defined in different ways from different perspectives. For 
instance, it can be defined as the degree of achieving the organisation goals (Price, 
1972), or the degree of getting hold of extremely desirable outcomes (Tosi and 
Slocum, 1984), or the ability to acquire critical resources for goals attainment (Mohr, 
1973). Performance definitions vary from narrow perspectives focusing on 
profitability (Tosi and Slocum, 1984) to wide perspectives that consider the goals of 
different stakeholders (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
However, performance is a multi-dimensional construct and multiple measures are 
needed to capture the different dimensions of this construct (Tosi and Slocum, 1984; 
Donaldson, 2001). For instance, Tosi and Slocum (1984) argue that at least three 
measures should be used to capture the different dimensions of effectiveness construct 
in the contingency research. These measures include efficiency (the way resources are 
used to yield a unit of output), outcomes as recognised by employees (job satisfaction, 
quality of work environments) and socially responsible outcomes (being a good 
citizen).  
In summary, assessing organisational effectiveness is crucial to contingency-based 
studies. Organisational effectiveness is a multidimensional construct and it is not an 
easy task to define or operationalise it as it can be viewed from different perspectives. 
Therefore, it is important to explicitly identify from which perspective organisational 
effectiveness is assessed to avoid misunderstanding and vagueness about the meaning 
of effectiveness (Cameron and Whetten, 1983). 
3.3.2 Contingency Theory in Management Accounting 
Contingency theory has been an important approach to the study of organisations and 
the role of management accounting within organisations (Chenhall, 2003, 2007). 
Contingency theory has become a dominant paradigm in empirical management 
accounting research (Otley, 1980; Fisher, 1995; Cadez and Guilding, 2008) despite 
the criticisms of inconsistencies in the findings (Chenhall, 2003, 2007; Abdel-Kader 
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and Luther, 2008) and the wide range of definitions of variables and underspecified 
models used in these studies (Otley, 1980; Fisher 1995; Langfield-Smith, 1997; 
Gredin and Greve, 2004). 
The contingency approach in management accounting is based on the notion that there 
is no universally appropriate accounting system that is applicable to all organisations 
(Emmanuel et al., 1990). Alternatively, the characteristics of the appropriate 
accounting system depend on the context and the circumstances in which an 
organisation operates. In turn, the effectiveness of the design of this system also 
depends on its ability to adapt to changes in contextual factors (Haldma and Laats, 
2002; Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). 
Contingency-based research has focused on a variety of aspects of Management 
Control Systems (MCSs) and Management Accounting Practices (MAPs). These 
include practices such as Activity-based Costing (ABC), Activity-based Management 
(ABM) (Anderson and Young, 1999; Gosselin, 1997), non-financial performance 
measures (Ittner and Larcker, 1998), balanced scorecard (Davis and Albright, 2004; 
Hoque and James, 2000) and variance analysis (Emsley, 2000). 
However, research concerning the advantages of value-based measures is limited and 
the results are equivocal (Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Chenhall, 2006). Besides, there is 
no clear evidence if organisations that use value-based measures, as internal 
performance measures for performance measurement and compensation purposes, can 
outperform organisations that use PMSs based on other performance measures 
(Zimmerman, 1997; Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Francis and Minchington, 2002).  
The mixed results of previous studies have been partially explained by a deficiency in 
the implementation of VBM (Slater and Olson, 1996; Bannister and Jesuthasan, 1997; 
Armour and Mankins, 2001; Haspeslagh et al., 2001; Morisawa and Kurosaki, 2002). 
However, the lack of evidence on the superiority of value-based measures and the 
mixed results raise some important questions. For instance, do value-based measures 
best suit different contextual settings? Is contingency theory an appropriate 
perspective to address this issue? (Chenhall, 2006).  
 
The use of contingency theory in management accounting has been justified as a 
means of interpreting the results of empirical research (Otley, 1980). This study 
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argues that contingency factors can play an important role in explaining such mixed 
results. This argument is supported with the results of previous studies (e.g. Anderson 
and Young, 1999), which conclude that success or failure of sophisticated accounting 
techniques may not only be related to implementation-related factors (e.g. top 
management support and training employees), but also to more general contingent 
factors related to the organisation characteristics and its environment. Accordingly, 
the enhanced performance outcomes depend on how different types of PMSs best suit 
or fit with an organisation’s specific context (Tillema, 2005, Chenhall, 2006).  
This argument has been supported by a call from many scholars (e.g. Ittner and 
Larcker 1998; Chenhall 2006; Lueg and Shaffer 2010) to develop a contingency 
framework to explain the mixed results of VBM studies. For instance, Ittner and 
Larcker (1998), contend that “Researchers can attempt to determine the factors 
explaining cross-sectional differences in the predictive ability of alternative economic 
value measures. Structural and environmental variables such as: firm strategy, 
competitive environment and product life cycle are likely important determinants of 
the relative explanatory power of different economic value measures” (Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998, p.214). 
Similarly, Chenhall (2006) contends that existing research into the effects of 
contingencies on performance measures, in general, is limited. More specifically, 
there is little direct evidence on contingency effects related to economic value 
measures. However, there are sufficient clues to suggest that the external 
environment, strategy, technology, structure and size are likely to be important when 
considering the suitability of different performance measures.  
3.3.3 Contingency Theory in Corporate Governance  
Most studies in the CG literature are dominated by agency theory to address the 
relationship between CG mechanisms and performance (Aguilera et al., 2008). 
However, the mixed results of empirical studies in the field of CG cast doubt on the 
notion of a direct and universal link between CG mechanisms and performance 
(Aguilera et al., 2008). 
The inconsistency and ambiguity in the findings of CG studies can be explained by 
the fact that governance-performance relationship seems to vary with respect to 
organisational contexts (Aguilera et al., 2008). The results of some empirical studies 
support this argument, for instance Dey (2008) concludes that the governance 
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structures vary across companies, as a result of variation in the level of agency 
conflicts and higher levels of agency conflicts give rise to stronger CG structures.  
The literature also emphasises CG’s role and structure change over the company life 
cycle (Filatotchev and Wright, 2005). Some CG mechanisms demonstrate opposite 
effects in different countries or even in the same country, from one period to another 
(Aguilera et al., 2008). Therefore, using the contingency theory perspective to address 
the governance-performance relationship can contribute to developing a better 
understanding of this relationship and answer some unanswered questions in the 
governance literature. 
3.3.4 Contingency Theory in Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Contingency theory suggests that fit among key variables such as environment, 
strategy and structure is crucial for obtaining optimal performance (Miller, 1988).The 
literature suggests that the relationship between CE and performance is contingent 
upon external environment factors such as dynamism (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Dess 
et al., 1997; Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001), technological opportunities (Zahra, 1993a; 
Rauch et al., 2009), industry growth (Zahra, 1993a; Antoncic and Hisrich, 2004), 
demand for new products (Zahra, 1993a) and organisational factors such as size of 
business (Rauch et al., 2009), strategy (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Dess et al., 1997), 
structure (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  
However, past research has been criticised for being more focused on examining 
correlational relationship between one or more of organisational and environmental 
factors and CE rather than building and exploring CE model (Antoncic and Hisrich, 
2004). Consequently, there is no consensus on what constitute suitable moderators or 
contingency factors and more research in this area is needed (Rauch et al., 2009). 
3.4 Theoretical Model 
The present study develops a contingency model for EG by proposing a VBM 
approach to address the gap in the performance dimension and to keep the balance 
between conformance and performance. The conformance dimension has been 
extensively covered in the literature and can be addressed with CG codes and/or 
standards, providing they are subject to assurance/audit (Connell, 2004; Lees, 2005, 
2010) and well established oversight mechanisms and tools (e.g. audit committees and 
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non-executive directors) can be used to ensure accountability (Lees, 2005, 2010; 
Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2005). 
Performance dimension relates to strategy and value creation (Lees, 2005, 2010), 
where assurance, by means of standards and audit is not easy or feasible (Bhimani and 
Soonawalla, 2005; Lees, 2005, 2010). Alternatively, companies can rely on best 
practice tools and techniques to address the oversight gap in the performance 
dimension (Connell, 2004; Lees, 2005, 2010). Performance oversight mechanisms 
include strategic committee at board level (Connell, 2004, Lees, 2005, 2010), strategic 
scorecard (Connell, 2004, Lees, 2005, 2010) and PMSs such as balanced scorecard 
(Busco et al., 2006) and EVA (Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2005). However, little is 
known about the best practices that can be used to address the performance oversight 
gap and/or to keep the balance between conformance and performance. This study 
proposes the VBM approach to address the oversight gap in the performance and 
achieve balance between conformance and performance.  
Unlike Connell (2004) who defines the performance dimension in terms of strategy 
and strategic decision-making and management (Lees, 2005, 2010), this model 
operationally defines the performance dimension in terms of entrepreneurial activities 
(CE) necessary to increase the wealth of the business (Zahra, 1996). CE is as 
important as strategic management and, arguably, they complement each other in 
creating wealth (Ireland et al., 2001, 2003). While strategic management focuses on 
developing sustainable competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2003). CE focuses on the 
process that leads to venture creation (Cooper et al., 2000). 
This theoretical model builds on the notion that organisational performance represents 
the outcome of interaction between accountability and enterprise (Short et al., 1999). 
To achieve a greater performance the company should adopt a set of CG mechanisms 
to ensure accountability (Connell, 2004); meanwhile, the management of the company 
should engage in entrepreneurial activities that lead to value creation (Zahra, 1996). 
Accordingly, a VBM approach can be assessed in terms of its ability to improve both 
CG and CE as important drivers (mediators) of organisational performance.  
The theoretical model also draws on the premise of contingency theory and prior 
literature in management accounting (Chenhall, 2007; Abdel-Kader and Luther, 
2008), CE (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009) and CG (Dey, 2008) to 
develop a theoretical model of EG. Following Gerdin and Greve’s (2004) hierarchical 
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taxonomy of forms of fit, a Cartesian-contingency-mediation form of fit is used. The 
theoretical model posits that under certain circumstances, VBM, CG and CE 
contribute to a greater organisational performance when these practices fit the context. 
Further, the theoretical model proposes an indirect effect of VBM implementation on 
organisational performance through influencing CG mechanisms and CE as mediating 
factors (see figure 3.2). 
Prior VBM studies suggest some contingency factors (e.g. environmental uncertainty, 
strategy, company size and structure) that may influence a company decision to 
implement VBM (Chenhall, 2006). Similarly, in the CE literature, some key 
contingencies have been suggested (e.g. environmental uncertainty, strategy, company 
size and structure) (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Limited numbers of contingencies 
have been suggested (e.g. company size and agency conflicts) in CG studies (Dey, 
2008). 
The theoretical model developed in the current study (see figure 3.2) comprises five 
key contingencies (agency conflicts, company size, environmental uncertainty, 
strategy and decentralisation) that would influence VBM, CG and CE practices in 
common. While investigating the inter-relationships between these contingency 
factors is beyond the objectives of this study, these contingencies are related to each 
other and selecting these contingency factors in this study can be justified as follows: 
First, given the research problem that embarks on the existence of the agency 
problem, as a result of the separation of ownership and control, agency conflicts can 
be considered as an important contingency factor affecting VBM, CG and CE 
practices.  
Second, company size causes agency problems in different ways (Jones and Butler, 
1992). For instance, when the company grows, managers tend to reduce risk through 
focusing more on control functions at the expense of income producing functions 
(Ettlie, 1983) and developing more bureaucratic procedures (Jones and Butler 1992). 
In addition, the increased size leads to increase in the moral hazard problem, as the 
number of agents involved in the entrepreneurship process increases (Jones and 
Butler, 1992). 
Third, it has been argued that agency problems resulting from separation between 
ownership and management, such as moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
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risk aversion (Jensen, 1986) are problems only under uncertainty conditions (Jones 
and Butler, 1992). Besides, uncertainty adds some difficulties to the process of 
evaluating management performance (Jones and Butler, 1992). Therefore, uncertainty 
is considered a “powerful contextual variable that is at the foundation of contingency 
based research” (Chenhall, 2007: p.172). 
Fourth, strategy and uncertainty are closely related (Chenhall, 2006). Possibly, the 
most important new stream of literature in the contingency theory is that related to the 
role of strategy in designing PMS (Chenhall, 2007). PMS endeavours to align strategy 
with operations by interpreting official goals into operative goals to be cascaded down 
through the organisation (Chenhall, 2007). Moreover, strategy is one of the most 
important determinants of the level of CE (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Zahra, 1991).            
Fifth, organisational structure is also closely related to uncertainty and strategy, as the 
choice of the organisational structure, including decentralisation, should fit the level 
of uncertainty in the environment and strategy (Chenhall, 2007). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: A contingency model of EG and VBM 
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3.5 Research Hypotheses 
 
Based on the developed theoretical model, a number of hypotheses were developed 
and classified into four groups. The first group of hypotheses relates to the 
contingency relationships between agency conflicts, company size, uncertainty, 
strategy, decentralisation and VBM, in addition to the association between VBM and 
organisational performance. The second group of hypotheses relates to the 
contingency relationships between agency conflicts, company size and CG, in 
addition to the association between CG and organisational performance. The third 
group of hypotheses relates to the contingency relationships between agency conflicts, 
company size, uncertainty, strategy, decentralisation and CE, in addition to the 
association between CE and organisational performance. The fourth group of 
hypotheses relates to the inter-relationships between VBM, CG, CE and 
organisational performance. 
3.5.1 The First Group of Hypotheses 
3.5.1.1 VBM and Organisational Performance  
It has been argued that contingency-based management accounting studies should use 
organisational performance as the dependent variable (Chenhall, 2003, 2007; Cadez et 
al., 2008). Arguably, VBM is “a theory of organisational performance, including 
accounting-related issues as a mechanism of explaining outcomes” (Malmi and 
Granlund, 2009: p.605). VBM literature explains the mechanism by which better 
performance is about to emerge, which can help not only to explain but also to predict 
performance (Malmi and Granlund 2009).  
Advocates of VBM argue that it can lead to greater performance and shareholder 
value creation (Stewart, 1991). The perceived benefits of VBM include improvements 
in financial performance (e.g. improvements to share price and reduction in capital 
employed) and decision making (e.g. better planning, better resource allocation and 
better portfolio management) (Cooper et al., 2001). The literature also suggests that 
value-based measures (especially EVA) are more correlated to share price than 
traditional accounting measures (e.g.  EPS, ROI). Therefore, they are better used as 
predictors of stock returns (Ittner and Larcker, 1998; 2001; Elali, 2006).  
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However, the results of prior studies that examined the effect of using value-based 
measures in performance measurement and compensation on organisational 
performance are mixed and contradictory (Zimmerman, 1997; Ittner and Larcker, 
2001; Francis and Minchington, 2002). While the results in general tend to assume 
that VBM improves organisational performance (Lueg and Schäﬀer, 2010), “the 
literature as a whole does not agree with this. But most studies do neither possess the 
methodological scope nor sufficient data to make a clear statement on performance 
effects” (Lueg and Schäﬀer, 2010: p.29). Based on this a priori reasoning, it is 
proposed that VBM implementation is likely to have a positive effect on 
organisational performance. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H1: VBM is positively associated with organisational performance. 
 
3.5.1.2 Agency Conflicts and VBM  
Agency conflicts arise from misalignment between the interests of owners and 
managers of a company as a result of the separation between ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Different sources of agency 
conflicts have been identified including moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
earning retention, risk aversion (Jensen, 1986) and time horizon (Healy, 1985). The 
literature suggests some variables that can be used to proxy the magnitude of agency 
conflicts, such as ownership structure (Lovata and Costigan, 2002), company size 
(Dey, 2008) and financial leverage (Hogan and Lewis, 2005). The higher the agency 
conflicts the greater the demand for oversight and control mechanisms to align 
conflicting interests (Dey, 2008). 
The literature also suggests that VBM can be used as an effective tool to reduce the 
moral hazard problem, align the managers and shareholders’ interests (Stewart, 1991; 
Lovata and Costigan, 2002) and lead to the creation of shareholder value (Crowther, 
2003). VBM better aligns the interests of managers and shareholders through linking 
their compensations to shareholder value (Ryan and Trahan, 2007) and aligning CG 
practices with the main objective of creating shareholder value (Armour and Mankins, 
2001). 
The results of empirical studies support this notion. For instance, McLaren (2000) 
suggests that the main reason for implementing VBM in companies in New Zealand is 
to align managerial and shareholder interests. Lovata and Costigan (2002) conclude 
that companies using EVA exhibit a higher percentage of institutional ownership and 
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lower percentage of insider ownership (higher level of agency conflicts) in 
comparison with non-adopter companies. Further, Hogan and Lewis (2005) argue that 
shareholders and/or the boards of companies with high agency conflicts may pressure 
top management to adopt economic profit plans if they believe that the plans more 
effectively align the interests of managers and shareholders. 
Therefore, agency conflicts are likely to influence the decision of adopting VBM.  In 
other words, the higher the potential agency conflicts in a company, the more likely 
the company is to use the VBM approach. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can 
be developed: 
H2: VBM implementation is positively associated with agency conflicts. 
 
3.5.1.3 Company Size and VBM  
The findings of the contingency-based studies indicate that company size is positively 
related to accounting and control systems sophistication. For instance, Merchant 
(1981, 1984), Bruns and Waterhouse (1975),  Ezzamel (1990), Libby and Waterhouse 
(1996) and Haldma and Laats (2002) suggest that as a company increases in size, the 
accounting and control systems (e.g. the budgetary control system) tend to be more 
sophisticated. Furthermore, Guilding (1999) concludes that company size is one of the 
factors that have a significant contingent impact on competitor-focused accounting 
(CFA) usage.  
Similarly, the findings of Hoque and James’s (2000) study support the proposed 
positive relationship between company size and balanced scorecard adoption as one 
of the sophisticated PMSs. More recently, the findings of some studies suggest that 
large companies are more likely to adopt more sophisticated MAPs in general (Abdel-
Kader and Luther, 2008) and strategic management accounting in specific (Cadez et 
al., 2008). 
The VBM literature also suggests that the larger the company size, the more likely 
that financial performance becomes more complicated and consequently the company 
tends to utilise a more sophisticated PMS to provide information for decision making 
and to determine shareholder wealth (Cooper and Petry, 1994; Ryan and Trahan, 
1999). In addition, the implementation of VBM is very costly, time consuming, 
requires enormous senior managerial commitment and most companies that adopt 
VBM employ consultants and invest heavily in education and training that cover the 
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majority of managers and employees (Arnold, 2008; Conell, 2004; Boulos et al., 
2001). Thus, implementing VBM requires significant resources, which makes it only 
affordable for large companies. Moreover, the results of the empirical studies 
conducted by Ryan and Trahan (1999, 2007) support the claims of positive 
association between company size and VBM implementation. Based on this a priori 
reasoning, VBM implementation is likely to take place in large companies and the 
following hypothesis can be derived. 
H3: VBM implementation is positively associated with company size. 
 
3.5.1.4 Environmental Uncertainty and VBM  
External environment is one of the early and important contextual factors that have 
been examined at the foundation of contingency based research (Chenhall, 2007; 
Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). Different taxonomies have been used in the literature 
to capture the multiple aspects of external environment (Chenhall, 2007). For 
instance, Khandwalla (1977) uses turbulence, hostility, diversity and complexity 
taxonomy. Other taxonomies include complexity and dynamism (Duncan, 1972), 
ambiguity (Outchi, 1979), intensity of competition, dynamism, unpredictability of 
external environment (Gordon and Narayanan, 1984) and lack of information 
(Chenhall and Morris, 1986).  
However, care should be exercised in interpreting the results of different studies that 
examine the effect of external environment on management accounting system, as 
different measures for uncertainty are used for external environment (Abdel-Kader 
and Luther, 2008). For instance, Gordon and Narayanan (1984) use competition, 
dynamism and unpredictability of external environment to measure uncertainty. 
Further, Chenhall and Morris (1986) use lack of information on environmental factors 
to measure the same construct. 
Uncertainty, the most widely researched aspect of environment (Chenhall, 2007), 
represents a situation where the organisation faces difficulties in planning the future 
as events cannot be identified or the impact of events on operation is unknown 
(Chenhall, 2006). In MCS research, uncertainty has been related to difficulties in 
making accurate predictions (Gul and Chia, 1994) and evaluating performance, as 
managers’ performance depends on events over which they have little control 
(Chenhall, 2006). 
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High levels of uncertainty makes performance evaluation more subjective 
(Govindarajan, 1984). Therefore, non-accounting style, rather than budget or profit 
constrained style, becomes more appropriate (Ross, 1995). Furthermore, the decision 
makers are likely to seek external, non-financial and ex ante information (Gordon and 
Narayanan, 1984) and more sophisticated management accounting systems (MASs) 
(Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). More sophisticated reports from MASs can help to 
reduce uncertainty and improve managerial decision-making (Chong and Chong, 
1997). 
In this regard, the literature suggests that the VBM approach is one of the highly 
sophisticated MASs (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008) and represents the fourth (latest) 
stage of management accounting evolution (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). In addition, it 
has been argued that competitive environment is one of the important driving forces 
behind VBM implementation (Athanassakos, 2007). Therefore, VBM implementation 
is likely to be more appropriate when the level of uncertainty is relatively high. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H4: VBM implementation is positively associated with environmental uncertainty 
3.5.1.5 Strategy and VBM  
There has been a growing interest in studying the contingent relationship between 
strategy and MCS in general (Langfield-Smith, 1997) and PMS in particular (Ittner 
and Larcker, 1997). For instance, some studies examine the effect of strategy on 
budgetary usage (Collins et al. 1997), budget emphasis (Van der Stede, 2000), 
budgetary slack (Van der Stede, 2000, 2001), structure and PMS (Abernethy and 
Lillis, 2001). 
Different categorisations for strategy have been suggested to study this contingent 
relationship. For instance, Miles and Snow (1978) use the taxonomy of 
prospectors/analysers/defenders. Gupta and Goviandarajan (1984) use the 
build/hold/harvest taxonomy. Porter (1980) uses a product differentiation/cost 
leadership classification of strategy. However, it has been argued that these 
classifications are very similar and the prospectors/product differentiators/builders 
taxonomy that can be used anonymously at one end of a continuum and 
defenders/cost leaders/harvesters at the other end (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). 
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Contingency-based studies suggest that prospectors/product differentiators/builders 
tend to create innovation and look for new products and market opportunities (Cadez 
and Guilding, 2008). These strategies are linked to outcome oriented evaluation, 
flexible structures, lack of standardised procedures (Chenhall, 2003, 2007) and more 
sophisticated MASs (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). Defenders/cost 
leaders/harvesters are less dynamic and more focused on efficiency as a key for 
success (Cadez and Guilding, 2008). These strategies are linked to centralised control 
systems, specialised and formalised work (Chenhall, 2003, 2007) and less 
sophisticated MASs (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). 
Therefore, strategies characterised by an entrepreneurial orientation 
(prospectors/product differentiators/builders) are likely to be more appropriate to 
VBM as a sophisticated MAS than conservative strategies (defenders/cost 
leaders/harvesters). Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H5: VBM implementation is positively associated with prospectors/product 
differentiators/builders strategies and negatively associated with defenders/cost 
leaders/harvesters.                                                                                                                                        
3.5.1.6 Decentralisation and VBM  
Organisational structure in general and decentralisation in specific is likely to 
influence the extent to which value-based measures can be used effectively 
throughout organisations. As an organisation becomes larger, the managers need to 
handle greater quantities of information to determine where they have to institute 
controls such as rules, documentation, extended hierarchies and greater 
decentralisation down hierarchical structures. 
 
Child and Mansfield (1972) and Khandwalla (1972, 1977) suggest that large 
decentralised firms utilise mass production, more sophisticated controls and high 
participation levels. In addition, the findings of Merchant’s (1981) study support the 
previous argument that large companies are more decentralised, use more 
sophisticated controls and depend heavily on participation in using budgets. 
Moreover, Abdel-Kader and Luther (2008) contend that decentralised firms are likely 
to adopt more sophisticated MAPs. 
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VBM literature suggests that VBM can work only if decision making is decentralised 
(Bannister and Jesuthasan, 1997) and business units are empowered (Boulos et al., 
2001). Empowering business units has a significant importance in the VBM 
environment (Bannister and Jesuthasan, 1997) as one of the key success factors in 
VBM implementation (Boulos et al., 2001).  
Value-based measures have the advantage of being flexible, as they can be calculated 
at the divisional or business unit levels, which make these measures appropriate to 
decentralised organisations (Hogan and Lewis, 2005). So, if these measures are to be 
applied at the level of operational managers, the authority over decisions related to 
value drivers should be delegated to those managers (Chenhall, 2006). Therefore, 
VBM implementation is likely to be more appropriate for decentralised organisational 
structures. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H6: VBM implementation is positively associated with decentralisation. 
3.5.2 The Second Group of Hypotheses 
3.5.2.1 CG and Performance (H7) 
CG is one of the important factors in determining firm value and the development of 
financial markets across countries (La porta et al., 2000). However, reviewing the 
literature on the relationship between various CG mechanisms and corporate 
performance shows mixed results (Hanifa and Hudaib, 2006). Most prior research 
examines a small subset of CG characteristics (factors), yielding results that suggest 
that some characteristics are linked to firm performance, while others are not (Brown 
and Caylor, 2008). The results of these empirical studies with regard to the 
relationship between CG and performance are not clear (Larcker et al., 2007; Bebchuk 
and Weisbach, 2010). 
To overcome this problem some recent studies have examined the impact of a 
summary measure of governance on firm performance. For instance, Gompers et al. 
(2003) investigate the impact of CG on firm performance during the 1990s in the US 
and conclude that firms with lower shareholder rights (weak CG structure) exhibit 
lower firm valuation. Similarly, Bebchuck and Cohen (2005) and Cremers and Nair 
(2005) conclude that CG indices impede firm valuation. However, the results of other 
studies (e.g. Core et al., 2006) could not find any support for these results, even for 
the same sample of companies used in Gompers et al. (2003), in a different period of 
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time. The contradictory results have been attributed to period-specifc results and/or 
the inadequate risk-ajustment and/or the endogenity in governance-performance 
relationship (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
However, in the policy domain, the proponents of CG have notably cited the results of 
Gompers et al. (2003) as evidence that good CG has a positive impact on corporate 
performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Based on this a priori reasoning, it is 
proposed that companies that have a strong CG structure are likely to have a greater 
performance. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H7:  The strength of CG structure is positively associated with organisation 
performance. 
 
3.5.2.2 Agency Conflicts and CG  
The governance structure of a company comprises a number of mechanisms to 
minimise the agency conflicts, align the interests of owners and managers (Dey, 2008; 
McKnight and Weir, 2009) and create value (La Porta et al., 2000). The higher the 
agency conflicts in a company, the greater the demand for governance mechanisms 
that can mitigate these conflicts (Dey, 2008).  
The literature suggests that the effectiveness of CG mechanisms differs from one 
context to another (Ting et al., 2006). For instance, Mitton (2002) analyses the CG 
mechanisms during the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 and concludes that 
strong CG structure becomes more important during crisis time. Similarly, Ting et al. 
(2006) and Dey (2008) suggest that agency conflicts are important in explaining CG 
effectiveness. 
Further, agency conflicts vary between companies, depending on the ability of 
managers to exercise their own preferences rather than value maximisation and the 
complexity of the operating environment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dey, 2008). 
Thus, the governance structure required to tackle agency conflicts varies across 
companies (Dey, 2008). Accordingly, agency conflicts are likely to be positively 
related to the strength of CG structure. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be 
developed: 
H8: The strength of CG structure is positively associated with agency conflicts. 
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3.5.2.3 Company Size and CG  
Company size triggers agency problems in different ways (Jones and Butler, 1992). 
For instance, when the company grows, the managers of the company tend to reduce 
risk through focusing more on control functions at the expense of income producing 
functions (Ettlie, 1983) and developing more bureaucratic procedures (Jones and 
Butler, 1992). In addition, the increased size leads to an increase in the moral hazard 
problem, as the number of agents involved in the entrepreneurship process increases 
(Jones and Butler, 1992). Therefore, increased company size demands strong CG 
structure to mitigate agency conflicts.   
Company size is related to the strength of CG structure and the level of compliance 
with CG codes. For instance, Gompers et al. (2003) conclude that there is a positive 
association between company size and CG index. There is some evidence that 
company size has a significant positive influence on the relationship between CG and 
performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  
Further, the rationale behind the “comply or explain” approach for CG codes is that  
no single CG structure fits all (Arcot et al., 2010). For instance, The CCCG in the UK 
allows smaller listed companies (below FTSE 350) not to comply with some 
provisions (Combined Code, 2003). Compliance with some CG provisions (e.g. 
proportion of non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors) 
sometimes is costly and small companies cannot afford it (Arcot et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, large size companies are likely to have a stronger CG structure. 
Therefore, large size companies are likely to be more compliant with CG codes. 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses can be derived: 
H9:  The strength of CG structure is positively associated with company size. 
3.5.3 The Third Group of Hypotheses 
3.5.3.1 CE and Performance  
Prior theory and research have proposed that CE is a key element for organisational 
success (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). In a rapidly changing environment, where future 
profit streams are uncertain and companies need to persistently look for new 
opportunities, adopting CE can benefit companies (Rauch et al., 2009) and result in 
strong and improved organisational performance (Ireland et al., 2003) in terms of 
growth and profitability (Coivin and Slevin, 1991). 
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However, the significance of the relationship between CE and business success varies 
among studies (Rauch et al., 2009). While some studies (e.g. Hult et al., 2003; 
Avlonitis and Salavou, 2007) conclude that companies that are highly entrepreneurial 
outperform companies that are less entrepreneurial, other studies (e.g. Zahra, 1991; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 2001) have found a lower correlation between CE and 
performance  or even no significant relationship at all between CE and performance 
(e.g. Covin et al., 1994).  
A recent study by Rauch et al. (2009) involved a meta-analysis exploring the 
magnitude of the relationship between CE and performance in more than 50 studies 
from the literature. The results in general support the argument of having positive 
performance implications for CE. Based on this a priori reasoning, it is proposed that 
companies that have a strong CG structure are likely to have a greater performance. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H10: CE is positively associated with organisational performance. 
 
3.5.3.2 Agency Conflicts and CE  
From the agency theory perspective, the agency problem in an entrepreneurial context 
arises because “entrepreneurial behaviour, by definition, is action in the context of 
uncertainty so that it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to evaluate the 
effectiveness of an agent’s behaviour” (Jones and Butler 1992: p. 736). Further, 
agents (managers) are risk averse (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and do not have an 
incentive to perform entrepreneurially (Jones and Butler, 1992). 
Agency conflicts and information asymmetries between managers and shareholders 
cause agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency costs, in turn, exhaust 
company resources and may constrain innovation and CE (Miller, 2011), especially 
when the board is conservative (Morck et al., 2005). Accordingly, CE is likely to be 
negatively related to agency conflicts and the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H11: CE is negatively associated with agency conflicts. 
 
3.5.3.3 Company Size and CE  
Though company size is mostly used as a control variable (Rauch et al., 2009), there 
are some clues in the literature that suggest that it would affect the CE. For instance, 
Hit et al. (1996) suggest that company size is negatively associated with internal 
innovation. Moreover, Covin and Covin (1990) suggest that competitive 
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aggressiveness could be an effective strategic posture in a hostile environment for 
small companies with at least 30 employees. Similarly, Barringer and Bludorn (1999) 
provide evidence of a negative association between company size and CE.  
Rauch et al. (2009) argue that smaller companies are more flexible, can quickly adapt 
to changes in the environment to take new opportunities, and direct influence can be 
practiced by top management. Therefore, there is rationale to suppose that the effect 
of CE on performance is greater in small organisations (Rauch et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, CE is likely to be negatively related to company size and the following 
hypothesis can be developed: 
H12: CE is negatively associated with company size. 
 
3.5.3.4 Environmental Uncertainty and CE  
In CE research, external environment has been suggested as an important determinant 
of entrepreneurial activities at an organisational level (Covin and Slevin, 1991) and 
intrapreneurship (entrepreneurship within existing companies) (Miller, 1983; Covin 
and Slevin, 1991).  
The literature suggests that environmental uncertainty is positively associated with 
product innovation (Miller and Friesen, 1982). Dynamism relates to the perceived 
instability and continuing changes in the company’s markets (Zahra, 1991; Antoncic 
and Hisrich, 2001, 2004) or the rate of unpredictable change in a company’s 
environment (Duncan, 1972; Lumpkin and Dess, 2001). Increased dynamism creates 
opportunities in the market and stimulates the pursuit of CE (Zahra, 1991). Further, 
companies respond to challenging conditions in dynamic environments through 
innovative behaviour, risk taking and proactiveness (Khandwalla, 1987). Based on 
previous results, CE is likely to be positively related to the level of environmental 
uncertainty and the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H13: CE is positively associated with environmental uncertainty. 
 
3.5.3.5 Strategy and CE  
From an entrepreneurial perspective, strategy has been considered an important 
predictor of innovation decisions (Covin and Slevin, 1991) and CE activities (Zahra, 
1991), as it provides a framework within which the company identifies possible 
means for achieving goals (Zahra, 1993b). Accordingly, a fit between strategy and CE 
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has been argued to be an important predictor of business success and improved 
performance (Miller, 1986; Zahra, 1991). 
Dess et al. (1997) use two of the generic strategies proposed by Porter (1980), cost 
leadership and differentiation. Two distinct types of differentiation strategies were 
suggested: product innovation and marketing differentiation (Miller, 1986). 
Differentiation through product innovation or pioneering (Miller, 1992) involves 
creating and development of new products, up-to-date innovations, quality design and 
using new technologies (Miller, 1988; Dess et al., 1997). Marketing differentiation 
strategy attempts to create a unique image for a product through extensive advertising, 
image marketing and intensive marketing (Miller, 1988; Dess et al., 1997). 
Accordingly, differentiation strategies in general seem to fit better in a more 
entrepreneurial context and the results of empirical studies support this argument (e.g. 
Dess et al., 1997; Chenhall, 2007). 
Cost leadership strategies require companies to focus more on cost control and 
efficiency to be the lowest cost producer in an industry, so that excess returns can be 
obtained even with low prices (Miller, 1988). However, cost savings can be achieved 
in some situations by means of cutting innovation and advertising cost and offering 
cheap products to customers looking for cost savings rather than brand image (Dess et 
al., 1997).  
Therefore, it has been argued that cost leadership strategy is not positively associated 
with new product development and higher performance (Zahra and Covin, 1993; Dess 
et al., 1997). Interestingly, the results of the two empirical studies of Zahra and Covin 
(1993) and Dess et al. (1997) challenge this argument. These findings can be partly 
interpreted as competing on the basis of cost may necessitate proactive monitoring of 
the environment, risk taking and innovation, including the use of up-to-date 
technologies that lower costs and improve quality (Dess et al., 1997). Based on 
previous results, CE is likely to be positively related to prospectors/product 
differentiators/builders’ strategies and the following hypotheses can be developed: 
H14: CE is positively associated with prospectors/product/builders strategies and 
negatively associated with defenders/cost leaders/harvesters strategies. 
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3.5.3.6 Decentralisation and CE  
The literature suggests contingency relationships between structural factors, such as 
decentralisation of decision making and performance of organisations with 
entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). For instance, Khandwalla 
(1977) argues that the organic organisation type is more appropriate than mechanistic 
organisation type for the structure of organisations with entrepreneurial orientation. 
The organic organisation type is more decentralised and informal; in addition, it 
emphasises lateral interaction and sharing of knowledge throughout the organisation 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996: p.156). Besides, delegating decision making authority to 
lower organisational levels enables well-informed people to contribute to the 
company ability to adapt and innovate (Miller, 1983). 
The mechanistic organisation type is highly centralised, formal and place more 
emphasis on vertical interaction and specialised differentiation between functions 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996: p.156-157). The results of empirical studies also support 
this argument. For instance, the findings of Covin and Slevin (1991) suggest that CE 
is associated with decentralisation. The results of empirical studies also suggest that 
organic structure moderates the relationship between CE and performance (Covin and 
Slevin, 1988). Accordingly, CE is likely to be associated with decentralisation of 
decision making and the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H15: CE is positively associated with decentralisation. 
 
3.5.4 The Fourth Group of Hypotheses 
3.5.4.1 VBM and CG  
VBM provides an integrated management strategy and financial control system that 
can be used to mitigate agency conflicts and create shareholder value through 
providing a set of decision making tools (metrics), which can be used to measure and 
reward management performance (Ryan and Trahan, 2007). However, there is some 
evidence that incentive contracts alone may not be enough to tackle the agency 
problem, even if compensations are based on VBM metrics (Healy, 1985; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Dey, 2008). The literature suggests some complementary tools to  
incentive contracts such as increasing management ownership (Audretsch et al., 
2009). In that regard, VBM and CG practices have common objectives including 
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mitigating agency cost and creating shareholder value. Thus, VBM can be seen as a 
form of CG (Lander and Reinstein, 2005). 
The advocates of VBM ascertain that VBM is a holistic management approach that 
comprises a set of CG mechanisms aligned with the corporate mission, strategy, 
management process, PMS and reward system (Arnold, 2000; Armour and Mankins, 
2001). Thus, VBM, as a holistic management approach, is likely to stimulate 
strengthening the CG structure to be aligned with the objective of shareholder 
maximisation. The results of a recent study by Larcker et al. (2011) support this 
argument and conclude that value-maximising contracts determine the observed 
governance choices of companies in the USA. 
Despite the importance of linking VBM implementation to CG mechanisms, very few 
studies have examined this relationship. For instance, in a survey of listed companies 
in Japan, Morisawa and Kurosaki (2002) conclude that integrating CG into the VBM 
system, to be aligned with management orientation and decision making process, is 
one of the key success factors in increasing corporate value. In addition, a cross-
sectional study by El-Mir and Seboui (2008) concludes that EVA, as a performance 
measure, does not outperform other accounting measures in explaining the created 
shareholder value; however, the convergence or the divergence between EVA and the 
created shareholder value is largely explained by CG practices.  
Based on this a priori reasoning, it is proposed that companies that adopt the VBM 
approach are likely to have a strong CG structure, to ensure accountability of 
management to shareholders. This implies that VBM implementation is likely to 
indirectly affect organisational performance acting through CG structure as an 
intervening variable. Accordingly, the following hypotheses can be developed: 
H16:  VBM implementation is positively associated with the strength of CG structure. 
 
H16a: CG structure mediates the positive relationship between VBM implementation 
and organisational performance. 
 
3.5.4.2 VBM and CE  
From the EG perspective, the performance dimension (operationalised in this model 
as CE) is as important as conformance to business success and value creation 
(Connell, 2004). PMSs such as balance scorecard and EVA (Bhimani and 
Soonawalla, 2005) can be used to address the oversight gap in the performance 
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dimension. Arguably, strategic PMSs, including balanced scorecard and VBM, better 
align PMS with organisational objectives (Ittner et al., 2003).  
Advocates of VBM argue that VBM can better align the VBM metrics and strategic 
objectives (creating shareholder value) through identifying internal objectives, 
strategies, value drivers and action plans that lead to shareholder value creation 
(Copeland et al., 2000; Ittner et al., 2003). In addition, a VBM approach ties 
compensation to shareholder return performance (Rappaport, 1986), to motivate and 
reward the shareholder value creation behaviour throughout the organisation (Slater 
and Olson, 1996). 
CE is an organisational process that is central to the value-creation process (Jones and 
Butler, 1992). As CE “can enhance shareholders’ value by creating a work 
environment that supports individual and corporate growth, giving employees an 
opportunity to use their creative skills, quickening a company’s response to the 
market and creating an organisational culture that fosters cross-functional 
collaboration ” (Zahra, 1996: p.1715). Therefore, to achieve the objective of creating 
shareholder value, VBM adopters are expected to be more engaged in innovation, 
renewal and venturing necessary for value creation. However, little is known about 
the relationship between VBM and CE. 
Based on this a priori reasoning, it is proposed that companies that adopt the VBM 
approach are likely to be more engaged in CE to achieve the ultimate objective of 
creating shareholder value. This implies that VBM implementation is likely to 
indirectly affect organisational performance acting through CE as an intervening 
variable. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be developed. 
H17:  VBM implementation is positively associated with CE. 
H17a: CE mediates the positive relationship between VBM and organisational 
performance 
3.5.4.3 CG and CE  
Understanding the link between CE and CG is important because strategic 
competitive advantages may not be created when CG mechanisms do not encourage 
and monitor management to undertake the necessary actions to recognise 
opportunities (Phan et al., 2009). Directors can play an important role in identifying 
opportunities of growth by giving more attention to CE and innovation activity that 
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allow the company to sustain its competitive advantage (Zahra et al., 2009). Boards 
can encourage wealth-creating CE by providing resources and political support (Huse, 
2007).  
While CG mechanisms aim to minimise agency costs and improve company 
performance, employing these mechanisms have not only direct cost of 
implementation, but also indirect opportunity costs (Aguilera et al., 2008). Indirect or 
opportunity costs “relate to the impact of governance on strategic priorities and, 
consequently, the exploitation of business opportunities. For example, managing 
relationships with institutional investors can create opportunity costs by diverting 
managers’ attention from strategic and operating decisions toward anticipating short-
term expectations about share prices” (Aguilera et al., 2008: p. 480).  
Although the CG system could have a significant influence on CE, surprisingly the 
research on the structures and routines necessary for CE has been neglected to a large 
extent (Phan et al., 2009). The results of Zahra (1996) suggest that some CG 
mechanisms, such as high ratio of non-executive directors on the board and short-term 
institutional ownership, have a negative impact on CE. Similarly, Hitt et al. (1996) 
conclude that the market for corporate control, as a corporate governance mechanism, 
negatively affects internal innovation. However, other mechanisms, such as stock 
ownership by outside directors and long term institutional ownership, are positively 
associated with CE (Zahra, 1996). Meanwhile, the outside directors have less negative 
impact on CE when they own stock in the company (Zahra, 1996).  
In summary, CG mechanisms are influencing CE in different ways. Some of these 
mechanisms (e.g. outside directors) may negatively affect CE and other (e.g. stock 
ownership by outside directors) may have a positive impact on CE and can, to some 
extent mitigate the negative impact of other mechanisms (Zahra, 1996). However, the 
literature tends to assume that more focus on control and accountability is negatively 
associated with enterprise and innovation (Hitt et al., 1996; O'Sullivan, 2000). 
Accordingly, strong CG structure is likely to be associated with less entrepreneurial 
orientation and the following hypothesis can be developed: 
H18: The strength of CG structure is negatively associated with CE. 
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3.5.4.4 The Interaction between VBM and CG 
The literature suggests that VBM seeks to mitigate agency conflicts through providing 
a set of metrics that measure and reward management performance to align managers 
and shareholder interests (Ryan and Trahan, 2007). Arguably, VBM acts as a CG 
mechanism that works with other CG mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts 
(Garvey and Milbourn, 2000; Lander and Reinstein, 2005; Ryan and Trahan, 2007).  
The literature also suggests a complementarily relationship between different CG 
mechanisms, which makes the interaction effects of particular combinations of CG 
mechanisms more effective than others (Aguilera et al., 2008). Therefore, combining 
VBM with other CG mechanisms can result in interaction effects in addition to their 
original effects if they worked separately. Therefore, this study investigates the 
interaction effects resulting from combining VBM and CG mechanisms on CE and 
performance. For instance, if VBM implementation is associated with strong CG 
structure, this may lead to overemphasis on control and accountability at the expense 
of CE. On the other hand, this association can align shareholders and management’s 
interests, minimise agency costs resulting from agency conflicts and lead to improved 
performance.   
Accordingly, this study proposes that the association between VBM and strong CG 
structure is likely to be positively associated with organisational performance and 
negatively associated with CE. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be developed.   
H19: The interaction term of CG structure multiplied by VBM practices is negatively 
associated with CE 
H20: The interaction term of CG structure multiplied by VBM practices is positively 
associated with organisational performance. 
 
3.6 Summary 
This study sets out to address the tension between conformance and performance in 
the governance context, through developing a theoretical model of EG based on 
integrating the agency theory and contingency theory perspectives. In addition, the 
theoretical model investigates the role of VBM in achieving the objectives of EG 
through keeping a balance between conformance and performance. 
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VBM has the potential to achieve the EG objectives in different ways. VBM, as a 
PMS, aligns the interests of managers and shareholders and mitigates agency conflicts 
through monitoring their performance and using incentive contracts based on VBM 
metrics. This can ensure accountability of management to shareholders and contribute 
to the conformance dimension. Meanwhile, the incentive contracts motivate and 
reward managers to create value contributing to the performance dimension. Besides, 
VBM as a holistic management approach potentially stimulates adopting a set of CG 
mechanisms that are aligned with the objective of maximising shareholder value; 
meanwhile, it stimulates the entrepreneurial orientation necessary for value creation.  
Drawing on the premise of contingency theory, the present study examines the fit 
between five contingency factors (agency conflicts, company size, environmental 
uncertainty, strategy and decentralisation) on the one hand and VBM, CG and CE on 
the other hand. Moreover, it examines the implications of this fit on organisational 
performance. Unlike other EG frameworks, the present study uses the contingency 
theory lens to develop a theoretical model that operationalises the conformance and 
performance dimensions using CG and CE respectively.  In addition, it proposes the 
VBM approach to achieve EG objectives. The theoretical model develops testable 
hypotheses using five contingency factors with possible influences on VBM, CG and 
CE in common. It also adopts a holistic approach, assuming that organisational 
performance is the final outcome of interaction among contingency factors, VBM, CG 
and CE that may complement or conflict with each other. Studying the effect of each 
practice individually on organisational performance may lead to misleading 
conclusions. 
The theoretical model provides insights into the potential relationships between five 
contingency factors, VBM, CG and CE, as important predictors of organisational 
performance. For instance, the model suggests that VBM implementation is likely to 
be associated with high levels of uncertainty, prospectors/product 
differentiators/builders’ strategies, large size of companies and high agency conflicts. 
Similarly, strong CG structure is likely to be associated with large size companies and 
high agency conflicts. CE is likely to be associated with high levels of uncertainty, 
prospectors/product differentiators/builders’ strategies, small size companies and low 
agency conflicts. In addition, this model suggests that VBM implementation is likely 
to have a strong CG structure and high level of CE.  
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Developing the contingency model of EG in the previous chapter represents an initial 
step towards the development of the theory through using the appropriate 
methodology to test the research hypotheses. This chapter endeavours to explain the 
adopted research methodology in the current study and the rationale for adopting this 
methodology. 
This chapter is divided into eight sections. The second section will explain the main 
paradigms used in research in general and in accounting research in particular and the 
rationale of adopting a positivist paradigm in this study. The third section will discuss 
the research methodology, including the rationale of adopting a cross-sectional survey 
methodology in the current study. The fourth section will examine the context of the 
study, including the rationale of selecting the UK to conduct the empirical study. 
Additionally, this section will explain in detail the research population and the 
sampling process. The fifth section will discuss the data collection methods including 
questionnaire, content analysis and archive data. The sixth section will explain the 
statistical techniques used in data analysis and the last section will provide a summary 
of the chapter. 
4.2 Research Paradigms 
A research paradigm is a philosophical framework that guides the implementation of 
scientific research (Collis and Hussey, 2009). According to Saunders et al. (2009), the 
research paradigm (philosophy) adopted in a research embeds important assumptions 
about the researcher’s view of the world. These assumptions underpin the research 
strategy (methodology) and the research methods used by a researcher as part of that 
strategy.  
Two main research paradigms are commonly used to conduct research and acquire 
knowledge in social sciences in general, which are “positivism" and “interpretivism” 
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(Collis and Hussey, 2009). The two paradigms represent two extremes of a continuum 
of paradigms and along this continuum many other paradigms exist with different 
philosophical assumptions (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Table 4.1 summarises the 
assumptions of both the positivist and interpretivist paradigms. 
Table 4.1: Assumptions of the Main Paradigms 
Philosophical Assumption Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontological Assumption 
(The nature of reality) 
Reality is objective and singular, 
separate from the researcher 
Reality is subjective and multiple, as 
seen by participants 
Epistemological Assumption 
(What constitutes valid 
knowledge) 
Research is independent of that 
being researched 
Researcher interacts with that being 
researched 
Axiological Assumption  
(The role of values) 
Research is value-free and 
unbiased 
Researcher acknowledges that 
research is value-laden and biases are 
present 
Rhetorical Assumption 
(The language of research) 
Researcher writes in a formal 
style and uses the passive voice, 
accepted quantitative words and 
set definitions. 
Researcher writes in an informal style 
and uses the personal voice, accepted 
qualitative terms and limited 
definitions. 
Methodological Assumption 
(The process of research) 
Process is deductive. 
 
Study of cause and effect with a 
static design (categories are 
isolated beforehand). 
 
Research is context free. 
 
Generalizations lead to 
prediction, explanation and 
understanding. 
 
Results are accurate and reliable 
through validity and reliability. 
Process is inductive. 
 
Study of mutual simultaneous shaping 
of factors with an emerging design 
(categories are identified during the 
process). 
Research is context bound. 
 
Patterns and/or theories are developed 
for understanding. 
 
 
Findings are accurate and reliable 
through verification. 
 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 58) 
4.2.1 Positivism 
Positivism is “an epistemological position that advocates the application of the 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond” (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007: p.16). Positivism is underlined by the assumption of reality 
independent from the researcher (Collis and Hussey, 2009), knowledge is acquired by 
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gathering facts that provide the foundation for laws and the purpose of theory is to 
generate testable hypotheses (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
Positivism is normally linked to the use of the deductive approach, in which theory 
and hypotheses are developed first and data are collected to test these hypotheses 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Positivists tend to use a highly structured methodology to 
assist replication and verification of their studies (Gill and Johnson, 2002). In 
addition, positivists use quantifiable data from large samples that allow statistical 
analysis (Saunders et al., 2009).  
4.2.2 Interpretivism 
Interpretivism advocates that it is important for the researcher to understand 
differences between humans and objects of the natural sciences, which requires the 
researcher to grip the subjective nature of social action (Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Saunders et al., 2009). Interpretivism is underlined by the assumption of the 
subjective social reality shaped by the researcher’s perception (Collis and Hussey, 
2009). Unlike positivists, interpretivists contend that the social world of business is 
too complex to allow theorising using definite ‘laws’, as in the case of physical 
sciences (Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, getting useful insights into this complex 
world can be sacrificed if this complexity is reduced to a series of law-like 
generalisations (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Unlike positivism, which concentrates on measuring social phenomena, interpretivism 
emphasises exploring the complexity of social phenomena to gain interpretive 
understanding (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Therefore, instead of employing 
quantitative methods used by positivists to identify the occurrence frequency of 
phenomena in the social world, interpretivists tend to use a set of methods to describe 
and interpret these phenomena (Collis and Hussey, 2009). In other words, 
interpretivism is normally linked to the use of the inductive approach, where data are 
collected and used in developing theory (Saunders et al., 2009). Consequently, theory 
is the result of research and the processes of induction that involve drawing general 
conclusions from specific observations (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
However, it is worth noting that, in general, there is no paradigm better than another 
and preferring one paradigm depends, to a large extent, on the research problem and 
objectives, or even the traditions in a discipline (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Therefore, 
it is important to know the traditions in accounting research in general and 
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management accounting research in particular, so that the appropriate paradigm can 
be adopted in the current research.   
4.2.3 Research Paradigms in Accounting Research 
Hopper and Powell (1985) provide a taxonomy for accounting research based on 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) classification for organisational research, which is 
closely related to management accounting, according to its principal theoretical and 
philosophical assumptions. Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework comprises two 
independent dimensions based on assumptions concerning the nature of social science 
and the nature of society (Hopper and Powell, 1985).  
 Radical Change  
Radical humanism Radical structuralism  
   
Subjectivism Objectivism 
    
 
Interpretive Functionalism  
Regulation  
 
Figure 4.1: Taxonomy of Accounting Research 
Source: Hopper and Powell (1985, p. 432) in Ryan et al. (2002, p. 40) 
The first dimension (social science dimension) contains four related factors: 
assumptions concerning ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. 
These assumptions can be integrated into a single “objective-subjective” continuum to 
categorise the different approaches to social sciences (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Ryan 
et al., 2002).  
The second dimension (society dimension) defines two alternative and fundamentally 
different approaches to society on a continuum: at one extreme, the focus on 
regulation, order and stability, to explain why society tends to hold together. At the 
other extreme, the focus on the fundamental conflict of interests and unequal 
Critical accounting 
research 
Mainstream 
accounting research 
Interpretive 
research 
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distributions of power that provide the potential for radical change (Hopper and 
Powell, 1985; Ryan et al., 2002). 
Table 4.2: Comparison between Mainstream, Interpretive and Critical 
Accounting Research 
 Mainstream accounting 
research 
Interpretative 
accounting research 
Critical accounting 
research 
Beliefs 
about 
knowledge 
Theory and observation 
are independent of each 
other, and quantitative 
methods of data 
collection are favoured to 
provide a basis for 
generalisation 
 
Theory is used to provide 
explanations of human 
intentions. Its adequacy is 
accessed via logical 
consistency, subjective 
interpretation. 
Criteria for judging theories 
are always temporal and 
context bound. Social 
objects can only be 
understood through a study 
of their historical 
development and change 
within the totality of 
relations. 
Beliefs 
about 
physical and 
social reality 
Empirical reality is 
objective and external to 
the researcher. Human 
actors are essentially 
passive objects, who 
rationally pursue their 
goals.  
 
 
Reality is socially created 
and objectified through 
human interaction. 
Human action is 
intentional and has 
meaning grounded in the 
social and historical 
context.  
Empirical reality as 
characterised by objective, 
real relations, but is 
transformed and reproduced 
through subjective 
interpretation.  
Relationship 
between 
accounting 
theory and 
practice 
Accounting is concerned 
with means, not ends-it is 
value natural, and 
existing institutional 
structures are taken for 
granted.  
 
Accounting theory seeks 
to explain action and to 
understand how social 
order is produced and 
reproduced. 
Theory has a critical 
imperative, in particular the 
identification and removal 
of domination and 
ideological practices. 
 
Source: Chua (1986, pp. 611- 622) in Ryan et al. (2002, pp. 41- 43) 
Hopper and Powell (1985) combine the two independent dimensions of social science 
and society to form four mutually exclusive frames of reference that can be used as 
taxonomy for accounting research: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and 
radical structuralist (see figure 1). According to this taxonomy, there are three main 
categories of accounting research, namely: mainstream research, interpretative 
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research and critical research (Chua, 1986, Ryan et al., 2002). A summary of the 
underlying ontological and epistemological differences between mainstream, 
interpretive and critical accounting research is presented in table 4.2. 
4.2.4 Traditions of Research in Management Accounting 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was growing concern over the gap between 
theory and practice in management accounting research (Scapens, 1984) and the lost 
relevance of management accounting information to process control, product costing 
and performance management (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). The identification of this 
gap has contributed to developments in management accounting research, which has 
focused on exploring the nature of MAPs (Ryan et al., 2002).  
As a result, management accounting research, which remained within the neoclassical 
economics convention, developed a more positive standpoint. The researchers became 
more interested in positive theories to unearth explanations for the observed MAPs 
(Ryan et al., 2002). While normative theories that were dominant to the management 
accounting research in the 1950s and 1960s focus on prescription, positive theories 
focus on explanation and prediction (Ryan et al., 2002).  
However, the positive research in management accounting, informed by neoclassical 
economics, has been criticised for the unrealistic assumptions of certainty, costless 
information and a single owner or decision-maker that underpins the conventional 
wisdom of management accounting research (Ryan et al., 2002). While subsequent 
developments in information economics and agency theory have contributed to 
relaxing these assumptions, these developments did not change the underlying 
economic basis of the mainstream research (Ryan et al., 2002). 
Therefore, a number of alternative approaches have emerged in management 
accounting research such as behavioural, organisational and social theories (Ryan et 
al., 2002). One of these developments uses the organisational theories in management 
accounting to explain the MAPs (Ryan et al., 2002). Using contingency theory in 
management accounting research is a good example of the connection between 
organisation theory and management accounting (Otley, 1980). Although it 
contributes to extending the discipline base of the subject, it has remained a part of 
mainstream research (Ryan et al., 2002).  
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4.2.5 Rationale of Adopting a Positivist Paradigm 
This study draws on the premise of contingency theory in management accounting 
research to develop a contingency model of EG and VBM, so that it can help to 
understand, explain and predict VBM practices in relation with CG, CE and 
performance. In line with previous contingency theory-based management accounting 
research, this study adopts the positivist paradigm for the following reasons:  
First: the ontological assumptions of the positivist paradigm “objectivism” better 
match the assumptions that this study already has regarding reality. Objectivism 
depicts the situation that social entities exist in reality, external and independent of 
social actors concerned with their existence (Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman and Bell, 
2007). This study assumes that a phenomenon such as compliance with the CCCG is 
an external reality that exists in a social world composed of different realities, laws 
and propositions. This view emphasises the formal and structural aspects of 
organisations in responding to the context in which they operate, rather than 
emphasising their beliefs, values and culture.  
Second, the epistemological assumptions of the positivist paradigm better match the 
assumptions that this study already has regarding what constitutes knowledge and 
how knowledge can be gained. This study assumes that a phenomenon such as 
compliance with the CCCG, as a social reality, can be observed independently 
searching for regularities and causal relationships between this phenomenon and other 
elements of the phenomenon under study to conclude with “law-like generalisations 
similar to those produced by the physical and natural scientists’ (Remenyi et al. 1998: 
p.32).  
Third, it enables use of the adopted theories (e.g. agency theory and contingency 
theory) to address the research problem and develop hypotheses. Besides, observing 
the phenomenon by means of questionnaires, content analysis and archive data, can 
lead to production of credible data that can be used in testing the developed 
hypotheses. 
Fourth, positivist approach is relevant to the research topic and objectives, as this 
research attempts to develop empirically-based theoretical framework of VBM 
practices to explain these practices through identifying general and significant 
relationships between VBM practices and environmental and organisational factors, 
which can be generalised to a large number of organisations. The positivist paradigm 
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enables the researcher to test the adopted theory against a unique and large sample of 
observations that makes findings more generalisable to the entire population of study. 
Fifth, the theoretical framework developed in the current study is based on 
contingency theory. It has been argued that the positivist paradigm is an appropriate 
and commonly used paradigm in contingency theory research within the management 
accounting discipline (Otley, 1984; Ryan et al., 2002).  
Sixth, the current study is multidisciplinary and contains constructs (e.g. VBM, CG 
and CE) from different disciplines (e.g. management accounting, CG and 
entrepreneurship). The literature suggests that the positivist paradigm is dominant in 
VBM (Lueg and Schaffer, 2010), CG (Clark, 2004) and CE (Rauch et al., 2009) 
literature. 
Seventh, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge no previous studies have used the 
positivist paradigm in addressing the EG framework. Only a few studies (Connell, 
2004; Busco et al., 2005) have used the interpretivist paradigm based on case studies. 
Therefore, generalisable findings in this area of research are needed using the 
positivist paradigm.  
4.3 Research Methodology 
After identifying the research paradigm, it is important to decide the research strategy 
or methodology, which corresponds to the philosophical assumptions of the adopted 
paradigm (Collis and Hussey, 2009). A number of appropriate research methodologies 
can be used within the positivist paradigm such as: experiment, survey and 
longitudinal studies (Collis and Hussey, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009).  
In line with the positivist approach adopted in the current study and similar to most of 
the management accounting studies that are based on contingency theory (Ryan et al., 
2002), this study adopts a cross-sectional survey methodology for a large number of 
companies, to test the study hypotheses permitting a greater generalisability of the 
study findings. For practical reasons, including time limitation and getting access to 
confidential information of quoted companies, other methodologies such as 
longitudinal study and case study were not possible or efficient.   
The survey is a common methodology in business and management research and is 
normally connected to the deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2009). It is also a 
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commonly used methodology for theory testing within the management accounting 
discipline (Van der Stede et al., 2007). The main purposes of using survey in 
management accounting research include description (discovering the characteristics 
of a population) and explanation (theory testing through investigating relationships 
among MAPs and other variables guided by theoretical expectations about how they 
are connected) (Van der Stede et al., 2007). 
The popularity of surveys can be attributed to a number of reasons, including the 
possibility of collecting a large amount of data from a considerable population, in an 
economic way (Saunders et al., 2009). In addition, using a survey methodology allows 
more control over the research process, especially when sampling is used to generate 
results that can be applied to the entire population (generalisation), at a lower cost 
than collecting data from the entire population (Saunders et al., 2009).  
An important reason for deciding a cross-sectional survey based on questionnaires in 
the current study is that the survey provides a balance between, and combines the 
advantages of, large sample analysis and clinical studies (Graham and Harvey, 2001; 
Ryan and Trahan, 2007), which can contribute to the VBM literature. The state of art 
in VBM literature indicates that large sample analysis is a dominant methodology 
compared with other methodologies such as survey, case study and longitudinal study 
(Lueg and Schaffer, 2010). The majority of these studies use secondary data (basically 
databases and financial statements analysis) to identify VBM adopters based on 
reported value-based measures (such as EVA and CFROI) (Lueg and Schaffer, 2010). 
This methodology has been criticised as the “top performers in terms of stock returns 
may accidentally have a high key financial ratio without even having VBM fully 
implemented” (Lueg and Schaffer, 2010: p. 18). This methodological misspecification 
can explain the inconclusive results of these studies (Lueg and Schaffer, 2010).  
The few in-depth case studies conducted indicate that VBM practices are complicated 
and implementing VBM varies significantly across organisations in terms of the 
comprehensiveness and the organisational level of implementation (Malmi and 
Ikaheima, 2003). While these studies provide insights into the sophisticated nature of 
VBM practices, their findings lack generalisability due to the limited number of 
companies in these empirical studies. Therefore, this study uses the survey 
methodology for more generalisable findings using questionnaires in an attempt to  
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capture the sophistication of VBM practices, through developing a scale for VBM 
implementation that takes into consideration the comprehensiveness and the 
organisational level of implementation. 
However, cross sectional studies in general are challenged by selecting a large sample 
representative to the entire population and isolating the studied phenomenon from  
other confounding factors (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The generalisability of findings 
is bounded by selecting a representative sample for the entire population (Saunders et 
al., 2009). Selecting the study sample and the data collection method is critical for the 
success of cross-sectional studies (Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, the following 
section will discuss in detail how this study addresses this problem. 
4.4 Research Context 
Careful site selection is critical for successful theory testing in the field (Anderson 
and Widener, 2007). “Selecting a site suitable for theory testing occurs 
simultaneously with the practicalities of ensuring that data exist to allow the proposed 
hypotheses to be tested” (Anderson and Widener, 2007: p.329). Therefore, researchers 
who are engaged in a quantitative field research study must consider various issues 
when selecting an appropriate site including data availability, the appropriateness of 
companies for the study, appropriateness of the unit of analysis and whether adequate 
statistical power is used in testing the theory (Anderson and Widener, 2007). 
To address the research questions of the current study the UK was selected to conduct 
the empirical study. The UK is considered an appropriate context to the empirical 
study for a number of reasons. 
First, given the research problem that rests on the existence of the agency problem, as 
a result of the separation of ownership and control, the UK business environment is a 
good example where the agency problem is persistent. “Although the ownership 
structure underlying the traditional agency problem was prevalent in the USA, the 
situation was extremely similar in the UK, where share ownership flourished 
following the introduction of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and the Limited 
Liability Act of 1855” (Solomon, 2010: p. 5). According to Florence (1961), both the 
UK and the USA share agency problems in common, where two-thirds of large 
companies were not controlled by their owners.  
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Second, while the VBM approach was originated under the Anglo-American (Anglo-
Saxon) system of CG, most of the VBM studies have been conducted in the USA and 
very little is known about its application in the UK. Though there are some 
similarities between the USA and the UK, significant differences still exist such as the 
regulatory framework of CG and the listing rules (Aguilera et al., 2006), 
organisational and cultural differences (Hofstede, 2001), the concentration of 
institutional ownership and the balance of insiders and outsiders in board structures 
(Short et al., 1999). These differences may make the results of empirical studies 
conducted in the US not applicable to the UK (Short et al., 1999). 
Third, the UK has one of the largest and most developed capital markets in the world, 
with a large number of companies listed in the LSE. This provides a good opportunity 
to assess VBM and governance practices in these companies. 
Fourth, the UK is generally recognised as a world leader in CG reforms (Solomon, 
2010). Unlike the regulated (rules-based) approach adopted by the US to CG reforms, 
a more principles-based approach has been adopted in the UK to persuade companies 
to comply more in substance than in form (Solomon, 2010). The flexibility in 
compliance with the CCCG permits different levels of compliance with the code 
provisions to take place among companies. This variation in level of compliance 
enables capturing different levels of CG practices to be related to other constructs in 
the theoretical model. 
Fifth, the lack of empirical evidence in general, and the UK in particular, regarding 
VBM, CG and CE practices is an important motivation for conducting the empirical 
study in the UK. 
Sixth, for practical reasons, as the researcher is already based in the UK, it is easier to 
administrate the empirical study and to be aware of the country’s legislation, culture 
and business environment. 
4.4.1 Research Population 
A population is “the universe of units from which the sample is to be selected” 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 182). The population for this study is the medium and 
large quoted non-financial companies in the UK. Only medium and large companies 
(more than 50 employees) were selected, as small companies (up to 50 employees) are 
unlikely to adopt sophisticated MAPs or PMS such as VBM. In addition, VBM 
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implementation is very costly, time consuming and most companies that adopt VBM 
employ consultants and invest heavily in education and training (Arnold, 2000; 
Boulos et al., 2001; Starovic et al., 2004). Therefore, the literature suggests that the 
larger the company size, the more likely the company to utilise more sophisticated 
PMS (e.g. Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). 
Only quoted companies are selected because the underlying assumption of a VBM 
approach (the focal construct in this study) is that maximising shareholder value is the 
ultimate objective of a company. Therefore, quoted companies with publicly held 
shares are the relevant form of companies to adopt this approach. Financial companies 
were excluded due to the special nature of the financial sector as a highly regulated 
sector, especially after the latest global financial crisis and reform. 
4.4.2  Sampling 
Sampling is a good alternative to a census when it is unfeasible to survey the entire 
population due to budget or time constraints (Saunders et al., 2009). A sample is “the 
segment of population that is selected for investigation” (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 
182). Two main sampling techniques can be used, probability (representative) 
sampling and non-probability (judgemental) sampling (Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Saunders et al., 2009).  
A probability sample is “a sample that has been selected using random selection so 
that each unit in the population has a known chance of being selected...., the aim of 
probability sampling is to keep sampling error to a minimum “(Bryman and Bell, 
2007: p.182). Consequently, it is possible to answer research questions and achieve 
research objectives based on statistical estimates to the characteristics of the 
population from the probability sample (Saunders et al., 2009). Different forms of 
probability samples can be used such as simple random, systematic, stratified and 
cluster samples (Saunders et al., 2009). 
A non-probability sample “is a sample that has not been selected using a random 
selection method, essentially, this implies that some units in the population are more 
likely to be selected than others” (Bryman and Bell, 2007: p. 182). Therefore, the 
findings of non-probability samples are less generalisable to the population (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Different forms of non-probability samples can be used such as quota, 
purposive, snowball, self selection and convenience samples (Saunders et al., 2009).  
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Because of the lack of information available from companies about the characteristics 
of their PMSs and the difficulty of getting access to this confidential information in 
large quoted companies, this study used a convenience sample of companies who 
positively responded to the survey questionnaire. However, the survey has targeted 
the entire population of the study and followed the Total Design Method (TDM) 
suggested by Dilman (2007) to improve the response rate and obtain a representative 
sample to the entire population. 
After identifying the research population it is important to identify the sampling 
frame. Sampling frame is “the listing of all units in the population from which it is 
selected” (Bryman and Bell, 2007: p. 182). Having a complete and accurate list of 
population is crucial for getting a representative sample (De Vaus, 1993). In the 
current study the FAME database was used to identify the list of all companies in the 
population. The list included all medium and large (more than 50 employees) non-
financial quoted companies that are incorporated in the UK and listed in the LSE. In 
addition, the details of the key informants (Chief Financial Officers CFOs) in these 
companies, including their names, titles and addresses were obtained from the FAME 
database. To make sure that the information provided in FAME is accurate, the 
information was double checked and updated with the information available from the 
companies’ websites.  
4.5  Data Collection Methods  
Questionnaires and interviews are the two main data collection methods that are 
commonly used in positivist studies in general and within survey methodology in 
particular (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Often, questionnaires “are used to collect data 
that can be tied to established constructs that are relatively easy to communicate, 
while interviews allow for broader coverage of concepts that are ill-defined or 
difficult to explicate” (Anderson and Widener, 2007: p.335).  
To answer the research question, the researcher can either use a single data collection 
method and matching analysis techniques (mono method), or more than one data 
collection method and analysis technique (multiple methods) (Saunders et al., 2009). 
According to Ittner and Larcker (2001), using multiple data sources can help to 
provide a consistent body of evidence that increases the reader’s confidence in the 
results.  
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Given the complexity of the theoretical model in this study and the large amount of 
data required to test the hypotheses, using one method for data collection was not 
practical. Therefore, this study adopts multiple methods for data collection. The main 
method used for data collection in this study was a postal questionnaire, to gain 
confidential data which are not published or available from other sources, such as the 
characteristics of PMSs, perceived performance and some contingency factors 
(uncertainty, strategy and decentralisation). 
However, there is a limit to the number of questions to be included in any 
questionnaire to obtain reasonable responses, which is one of the limitations of this 
method (Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, secondary data (archive data) were used to 
complement the data collected from the questionnaire for the responding companies. 
The secondary data were collected from three databases (FAME, Thomson One 
Banker and DATASTREAM), including variables such as company size measured in 
number of employees, Total Shareholder Return (TSR) and Beta. Further, due to the 
lack of information about compliance with the CCCG, content analysis was used to 
identify the level of compliance with the CCCG for each of the corresponding 
companies. More details about the questionnaires and the content analysis are 
discussed in the following sections. 
4.5.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is one of the most commonly used data collection methods within 
the survey methodology, as each respondent answers the same set of questions 
provided in an efficient way from a large sample before conducting quantitative 
analysis (Saunders et al., 2009). In addition, it is cheaper and quicker to conduct, 
more convenient for participants than interviews, and allows respondents to answer 
questions freely, without the potential of interviewer bias (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
Therefore, this study adopted the self-completion questionnaire method for data 
collection to achieve the research objectives which require data from a large number 
of companies. Postal questionnaires were selected for this study, as it is more formal 
and relevant, especially when the target key informants are senior managers in quoted 
companies. 
4.5.1.1 Constructing the Questionnaire 
Designing and constructing a good questionnaire is not an easy task, as the researcher 
needs to make sure that the questionnaire accurately collects all the required data and 
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achieves the research objectives, especially as data ise collected only once (Saunders 
et al., 2009). The design of the questionnaire also has a significant influence on the 
response rate, validity and reliability of the collected data (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Some strategies are recommended to improve response rates, validity and reliability, 
including “careful design of questions, clear and pleasing layout of the questionnaire, 
lucid explanation of the purpose of the questionnaire, pilot testing, carefully planned 
and executed administration” (Saunders et al., 2009: p.362).  
Therefore, a considerable effort was exerted in selecting the appropriate measures for 
constructs, designing and pre-testing the questionnaire used in this study. The final 
draft of this questionnaire is designed for this study in six pages (A4 sized), including 
the front and back covers. According to Saunders et al. (2009), the acceptable length 
of self administrated questionnaire ranges from four to eight A4 pages. The shorter 
the questionnaire the better the response rate, given the salience of the topic (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007). The questionnaire comprises 10 questions in three sections. The 
questions of the first section cover the characteristics of the company’s PMS to 
identify the level of VBM implementation. The questions of the second section cover 
some contingency factors (uncertainty, strategy and decentralisation), CE and the 
perceived performance. The last section covers some personal information. For more 
details about the questionnaire please see Appendix 1.  
4.5.1.2 Question Types and Format 
Two main types of questions are commonly used in the questionnaire: open questions 
and closed questions (Saunders et al., 2009). However, closed questions, which permit 
choosing from predetermined answers, are commonly used in the positivist approach 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009). Closed questions are “quicker and easier to answer, as they 
require minimal writing. Responses are also easier to compare as they have been 
predetermined” (Saunders et al., 2009: p.375). 
In this study most questions are closed. A few open questions were used taking the 
form of “others (pleases specify)” at the end of some questions (e.g. questions 1, 2, 3, 
4 and 6), to give respondents the chance to express their opinions or to use their own 
words (Collis and Hussey, 2009), should the list of answers not be inclusive. Closed 
questions can be constructed using different formats; however, the questionnaire 
developed for the current study mostly used rating questions (e.g. questions 1, 2, 7, 8 
and 11) and some category questions (e.g. questions 3, 4, 5 and 6). 
105 
 
Rating questions are commonly used in questionnaires for opinion data collection and 
“most frequently use the Likert-style rating scale in which the respondent is asked 
how strongly she or he agrees or disagrees with a statement or series of statements, 
usually on a four, five, six or seven-point rating scale” (Saunders et al., 2009: p. 378). 
A seven-point Likert-scale was used in all rating questions to allow the respondents 
more choices and to add more sensitivity for the measurements (Roberts, 1999). The 
advantages of the rating questions include making economical use of the space 
through providing a number of different statements in one list, in addition to the ease 
of answering the questions by the respondent (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Rating 
questions in the questionnaire mainly use positive statements and some negative 
statements (e. g. question 10-n) to make sure that respondents read the statements 
carefully (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Another variant of rating questions used in this study is the semantic differential 
rating scale (e.g. question 10), where “the respondent is asked to rate a single object 
or idea on a series of bipolar rating scales. Each bipolar scale is described by a pair of 
opposite adjectives designed to anchor respondents’ attitudes towards service” 
(Saunders et al., 2009: p.378). The second type of question used in the questionnaire 
is category questions. They are designed in a way that makes each respondent’s 
answer fit only one category; however, the categories should be mutually exclusive 
and its number depends on the type of questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2009).  
4.5.1.3 Questionnaire Layout 
Questionnaire layout or design is important to achieve two objectives, which are 
reduction of non response and avoiding or reducing non-response error (Dilman, 
2007). Therefore, much effort is needed to design the questionnaires in a way that 
makes reading questions and filling in responses easy (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
questionnaire layout should be attractive to persuade the respondent to answer the 
questions (Saunders et al., 2009). According to Dillman (2007), constructing good 
questionnaires is not only about questions, it is also about other important aspects, 
such as general appearance, clear instructions and ordering the questions.  
Therefore, the questionnaire was printed out using high quality colour papers (A4), to 
make it more appealing and attractive to the respondents (Dillman, 2007). In addition, 
the printing was made on both sides of the page to make it look shorter (only three 
pages), which would motivate respondents to answer the questions (Dillman, 2007). 
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In addition, the matrix style for rating questions was used to save spaces (Saunders et 
al., 2009) and grid line format was adopted to make it easier for the reader to follow 
the questions. The message contained in the covering letter is an important 
determinant of the response rate (Dillman, 2007). Therefore, more attention was given 
to the covering letter design to gain the respondent’s interest in the survey. For 
instance, the Brunel University logo and name was printed in blue at the top right 
corner of the covering letter, followed by the title of the study and a summary of the 
study’s objectives. 
The second paragraph emphasised the importance of participation in the survey and 
offered sending a summary report of the findings as a motive for participation in the 
survey. The last paragraph assures the respondents that their answers or any 
information provided will be treated as strictly confidential and will be used only for 
academic purposes in the current study. The covering letter was personalised and 
individually signed, as recommended by Dilman (2007), to gain a better response rate. 
Additionally, the return address and researcher’s contact details were also included in 
the covering letter, to enable respondents to return the questionnaire or to contact the 
researcher for any questions.  
4.5.1.4 Ethical Consideration 
This study followed the Code of Research Ethics in Brunel University. According to 
this code, the university represented by the school’s research ethics committee, does 
not provide researchers with any letters of support for data collection outside its 
premises without ethical approval. Accordingly, the research ethics forms were 
completed and submitted to the research ethics committee in Brunel Business School, 
to obtain ethical approval before starting the process of data collection. 
The first step was reading the University’s Code of Research Ethics, which is 
available on the website of the Research Ethics Committee. The second step was 
downloading and completing the student part of the BBS research ethics form, which 
is available on U-Link. The third step was submitting the filled in forms, including the 
data collection plan to the research ethics committee via U-Link after being approved 
by the supervisor. In addition, the final version of the questionnaire was attached to 
the research ethics form.  
Based on the answers to the questions in the research ethics form, the research ethics 
committee decides the appropriate form(s) that should be used by the researcher to 
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collect data. For instance, provided that human participation is needed in data 
collection, the researcher may need to use one of these forms: 
1- Participant Information Sheet: all participants will need to receive written or 
verbal information about the nature of the research so they can provide 
consent. This sheet provides a template of such information and is only needed 
if the research involves direct data collection from people (e.g. survey). This 
sheet should be approved by the supervisor before disseminating it to potential 
participants and there is no need to get the participants’ consent to the research 
prior to receiving this information. 
2- Participant consent form: the researcher will need to provide participants with 
a form to sign for consent for the following situations (or similar): long term 
research where you will be asking the same participants to take part more than 
one time; research in organisations with gatekeepers (e.g. schools and 
prisons); participants who do not have the capacity to give their consent 
(mentally disabled); when dealing with vulnerable participants (e.g., children, 
people with learning disabilities, your own students); or discussing sensitive 
topics (e.g. sexual activity, drug use). 
3- Company confidentiality agreement form: only needed if your research 
involves a company that is concerned about information being public. 
Consequently, the questionnaire and the research ethics form were reviewed and 
approved by the Research Ethics Committee, which decided that only the participant 
information sheet was required for potential respondents. This sheet (see appendix 2) 
was attached to the questionnaire and showed the title of the research, the researcher’s 
details, the purpose of the research, what it involves and, finally, a statement ensuring 
confidentiality and the voluntary nature of participation.     
4.5.1.5 Questions Flow 
Questions flow is as important as the layout in constructing a questionnaire. 
According to Dilman (2007), to acquire clear responses to questions the simplicity of 
wording and visual appearance of questions is very important. The questionnaire 
should start with the most important questions, especially the first question, taking 
into consideration what has been explained to the respondent in the covering letter 
(Dilman, 2007).  
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Therefore, the questionnaire starts with questions about the characteristics of PMS in 
companies to measure the level of VBM implementation, which is the most salient 
theme in this study. The least important questions, like personal details, are left to the 
end of the questionnaire and answering these questions is optional. In addition, 
questions which are related to one theme are grouped under one section and in a 
logical order, to make it easier to the respondents to answer these questions (Dilman, 
2007).  
4.5.1.6 Questionnaire Pre-testing Procedures 
The pretesting of the questionnaire is an important step to obtain feedback about the 
questionnaire before starting an extended survey, for many reasons (Dilman, 2007). 
For instance, it helps to evaluate the procedures that should be made in the extended 
survey through sending some questionnaires to a small sample or several people to fill 
it out and discover whether any problems may arise. It helps also to detect any 
mistakes made in printing the questionnaire or any misunderstanding of questions by 
the respondents (Dilman, 2007). Moreover, it enables evaluating the questions’ 
validity and the likely reliability of the data that will be collected (Saunders et al., 
2009). 
This process requires exploring expert or a group of experts’ views on the 
representativeness and suitability of the questions to the purpose of the study, which 
allows suggestions to be made on the structure of the questionnaire before pilot 
testing or collecting the data from the final sample (Saunders et al., 2009). According 
to Dilman (2007), pre-testing the questionnaire normally starts with reviewing 
questions by knowledgeable colleagues and analysts. In the current study, the pre-
testing procedures were performed in three stages. 
In the first stage, feedback was received from ten PhD researchers in Brunel Business 
School on a first draft from the questionnaire. The first draft was distributed to PhD 
researchers from different academic backgrounds (e.g. accounting, marketing, 
information systems and management) to gain feedback from people with diverse 
expertise. Most of the PhD researchers had been involved in the process of 
constructing questionnaires for their research. The feedback received from the PhD 
researchers was very useful and resulted in some improvements in the question 
wording (such as rephrasing some questions, making them shorter and clearer) and 
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the questionnaire layout (such as using shaded grid lines) and the draft was amended 
accordingly. 
In the second stage, a second draft from the questionnaire was sent to five staff 
members from different academic backgrounds in Brunel Business School. Useful 
feedback was received from the academic staff including for instance, changing the 
wording of some unclear statements; adding titles and several statements to the 
covering letter, adding clear instructions to the respondents in some questions, leaving 
more spaces between questions and adding “other, please specify” to some questions. 
The second draft was amended accordingly and a third draft was prepared for the next 
stage. 
In the third stage feedback was received from persons who are similar to the real 
participants in the target sample on a third draft from the questionnaire. Feedback was 
received from two chartered management accountants working in two large quoted 
companies based in London. Changes were suggested to the wording of some 
questions. The questionnaire was amended accordingly and a final version was 
prepared. 
4.5.1.7 The Participants 
Chief Finance Officers (CFOs) or controllers were used in the current study as key 
participants. CFOs or controllers are responsible for designing PMSs in their 
companies (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998). Therefore, they are likely to 
provide precise and useful information concerning the characteristics of PMSs and the 
level of VBM implementation in their companies. Furthermore, new regulations and 
laws have been extending the regulatory framework for CG to the finance function 
and CFOs. These regulations added to their responsibilities, reassessing the nature of 
governance and compliance with governance regulations (Busco et al., 2005). 
4.5.1.8 Questionnaire Administration 
After the questionnaire was designed, pre-tested and amended, it was ready for 
collecting data at the final stage (administrating questionnaire) (Saunders et al., 2009). 
However, the questionnaire on its own is only one part of a well-designed survey. 
“Implementation procedures have a much greater influence on response rates. 
Multiple contacts, the contents of letters, appearance of envelopes, incentives, 
personalization, sponsorship and how it is explained, and other attributes of the 
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communication process have a significantly greater collective capability for 
influencing response rates than does questionnaire design” (Dilman, 2007: p.149). 
To improve the response rate this study follows the multiple contacts strategy, as a 
part of the Total Design Method (TDM) (Dilman, 2007). At the first stage, 750 
questionnaires were posted to the CFOs of 750 companies in the UK (all the 
companies that meet the sample selection criteria) on 23 September 2010, using the 
first class Royal Mail service. Each questionnaire was sent with the covering letter, 
participant information sheet and prepaid return envelope. Within the four weeks, 82 
valid responses and 30 non-valid responses had been received. The non-valid 
responses included unreachable participants and some companies that were out of 
scope (for example, no longer trading or not a quoted company), apologies for non-
participation due to lack of time or company policy, and incomplete questionnaires.  
At the second stage, after approximately  four weeks the first follow up was posted to 
the non- respondents including a reminder letter dated 23 October 2010 (see appendix 
3), a copy of the questionnaire and prepaid return envelope. As a result, during the 
following three weeks 25 valid responses were received and 14 non-valid responses as 
unreachable, refused to participate or ineligible. 
At the third stage, a second follow up by phone was undertaken for the majority of the 
non-respondents to emphasise the importance of responding to the questionnaire. 
However, the majority of participants were not accessible or were unable to 
participate because of lack of time or company policy. However, after the second 
follow up only six valid responses were received taking the total response rate up to 
15%. More details about the responding companies are presented in table 4.3. 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), in a recent examination for response rates of 
business surveys, the response rate is as low as 10-20% for postal questionnaires. 
Therefore, the response rate in the current study is acceptable, given the recent trend 
of decreasing response rate to mail questionnaires (Saunders et al., 2009), and the 
difficulty of business and organisation surveys compared with other forms of survey 
(Dilman, 2007), especially when the participants are very busy peopole, such as 
senior managers in large public companies. Further, low response rate is argued to be 
less significant in studies based on convenience sample (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
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Table 4.3: Response Rates 
 First 
Request 
Second and 
Third requests 
Total 
Usable Response 82 31 113 
Refusal Response 12 8 21 
Ineligibility (non-quoted/non-active/incomplete) 10 6 15 
Unreachable (non-location/non-contact) 8 - 8 
Total  112 45 157 
*Response rate 11% 4% 15% 
*Response rate = total number of responses/total number in sample - (ineligible + unreachable).  
4.5.1.9 Responding Companies 
The responding companies to the survey represent a wide range of business sectors. 
Table 4.4 outlines the classification of the responding companies into different 
sections, according to the standard industrial classification SIC (2007) in the UK.  
Table 4.4: Sample Classification by Business Sectors 
SIC (2007) Section Name  Frequency Percentage 
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5 4.4 % 
B Mining and quarrying 6 5.4 % 
C Manufacturing 21 18.6 % 
F Construction 11 9.7 % 
G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
12 10.6 % 
I Accommodation and food service activities 4 3.5 % 
H Transport and storage 5 4.4 % 
J Information and communication 7 6.2 % 
L Real estate activities  15 13.3 % 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 8 7.1 % 
N Administrative and support service activities 7 6.2 % 
Q Human health and social work activities 5 4.4 % 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 3 2.7 % 
S Other service activities 4 3.5 % 
 Total  113 100% 
 
The profile of the responding companies reveals that the sample represents the main 
sections (sectors), except some sections that have been excluded from the population, 
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such as the financial sector. The sample does not represent some other sectors with 
special nature or regulations or small size such as education, electricity, gas and water 
supply, public administration and defence. In addition, no single sector dominates the 
sample. Therefore, the sample, to a large extent, is representative to the population. 
Table 4.5 and 4.6 outline the classification of the responding companies, according to 
company size and type of stock market. 
Table 4.5: Sample Classification by Company Size 
Company size 
(Number of Employees) 
Number of Companies 
Frequency Percentage 
Medium (51-250) 43 38.1% 
Large (> 250) 70 61.9% 
Total 113 100% 
 
Table 4.6: Sample Classification by Stock Market 
Stock Exchange Number of Companies 
 Frequency Percentage 
Main Market 60 53% 
AIM 53 47% 
Total 113 100% 
 
4.5.1.10 Checking Non-Response Bias 
To be able to generalise findings from a survey, the sample should represent the entire 
population. However, non-response threatens the representativeness of samples and 
the generalisability of findings. “Non-response is a problem for any survey, because it 
raises the question of whether those who did respond are different in some important 
way from those who did not respond” (Churchill and Peter, 1995: p.662).  Non-
response may cause bias in findings as a result of respondents’ refusal to take part in 
the research or answer a question (Saunders et al., 2009). The best way to protect 
against non-response bias is minimising the non-response itself, through using 
appropriate procedures (Armstrong, 1977). However, non-response bias can be 
assessed using extrapolation methods, which assume that subjects who respond late 
are more like non respondents (Armstrong, 1977). The most frequently used type of 
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extrapolation is carried over successive waves (follow-up procedures) of a 
questionnaire (Armstrong, 1977). 
To assess the non-response bias, a t-test was used to identify whether there was any 
significant difference between early and late respondents in terms of some 
characteristics such as company size (number of employees), type of stock market, 
compliance with the CCCG and market-based performance (TSR). However, the 
results in table 4.7 show no significant differences between the two groups of 
respondents regarding any of these characteristics. Therefore, the results suggest that 
non-response bias is not applicable to the findings of the current study. 
Table 4.7: Check for Non response Bias 
Variables Groups N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error 
Levene’s 
test   for 
equality of  
variance 
      F Sig. 
No. of Employees Early respondents 82 13022 62266 6876.19 
1.201 0.275 
 Late respondents 31 7086 18400 3304.74 
Stock Market Early respondents 82 .524 .502 .055 
0.253 0.616 
 Late respondents 31 .548 .505 .090 
Compliance Early respondents 82 80.48 20.14 2.22 
2.023 0.158 
 Late respondents 31 79 24.20 4.34 
TSR Early respondents 82 .429 1.09 .120 
0.413 0.522 
 Late respondents 31 .135 .555 .099 
 
4.5.2 Content Analysis 
“Content analysis is an approach to the analysis of documents and texts (which may 
be printed or visual) that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined 
categories and in a systematic and replicable manner” (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 
p.302).Though it is originally an approach to analyse documents and texts and not to 
generate data, it is commonly used as a research method because of its unique 
approach to analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Furthermore, it is a flexible method so 
that it can be applied not only to documents and texts, but also to a wide range of 
media (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
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Content analysis can be defined as “a research technique for the objective, systematic 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berlson, 
1952: p.18). The most important feature of content analysis is to have predetermined 
clear rules for the assignment of the material examined to categories, so that  
transparency in the assignment process is achieved and the analyst’s bias is kept to a 
minimum (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In simple words, the content analysis is the 
process of applying the rules in questions in a systematic way (Bryman and Bell, 
2007).      
4.5.2.1 Documents and Unit of Analysis 
As a result of the lack of information about the level of compliance with the CCCG in 
the quoted companies in the UK, this study uses content analysis to examine the level 
of compliance of the study sample. To achieve this objective the CG report, as a part 
of a company’s annual report, was analysed as a main document to identify which 
provisions a company already complies with and which provisions are not. In 
addition, governance information available on a company’s website was used in some 
situations when the disclosure in the CG report was not clear or sufficient. The CG 
report was used as a main document in the analysis because the listing rules in the 
LSE require CG disclosure within the annual report. 
After identifying the documents used in the analysis it is important to identify the unit 
of analysis, which could be any of the following: word, sentence or page (Milne and 
Adler, 1999). However, the sentence has been selected as a unit of analysis, as it is far 
more reliable than the word and page size (Stiles, 2001). 
4.5.2.2 Sampling 
The sample used in the content analysis is the same sample used in the questionnaire 
survey. Therefore, the content of annual reports of all responding companies in the 
survey were analysed to complement the information provided in the questionnaire. 
The full annual reports (PDF) for the year ending 2010 were downloaded from the 
companies’ websites. The annual reports were selected for 2010, the period on which 
the survey was undertaken. 
The sample used in the current study includes companies either listed on the Main 
Market of the LSE or listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the LSE. 
However, the governance requirements are different in each category of companies. 
For instance, the listing rules of companies listed on the Main Market require these 
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companies to comply with the principles and provisions of the CCCG or to explain 
why they did not comply with any of its principles or provisions. A statement of 
compliance must be included in the annual report according to Paragraph 9.8.6 R of 
the Listing Rules (Combined Code, 2008). 
AIM is a leading sub-market of the LSE for smaller and growing companies. AIM 
allows smaller companies to float shares within a more flexible regulatory system 
than is applicable to the Main Market. The most important feature of AIM is the 
simplified regulatory environment designed to fit smaller companies (Mallin and Ow-
Yong, 2008). While compliance with the CCCG is mandatory for companies listed on 
the Main Market of the LSE, it is voluntary for AIM companies (LSE, 2010). 
However, compliance with the CCCG by AIM companies is broadly considered as 
good practice and has become expected, especially from larger AIM companies 
(Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2008; LSE, 2010). The main reason is the cost of full 
compliance with the CCCG, as for many AIM companies would outweigh the 
benefits to the average shareholder (LSE, 2010). Therefore, “some organisations, 
notably the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) and the National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF), have produced guidelines which are designed to help AIM 
companies to understand how to achieve code compliance within the scope of 
resources available to them, both are based on the provisions of the code” (LSE, 2010: 
p. 66).  
AIM companies are required to include in their annual reports statement of how they 
achieve good CG practices (LSE, 2010). According to Rule 26 of the AIM Rules, 
“AIM companies should publish or make available on their website the terms and 
conditions of appointment of non-executive directors and the terms of reference of the 
audit committee, remuneration committee and, if appropriate, the nominations 
committee” (LSE, 2010: p. 68). 
4.5.2.3 Coding and Coding Schedule 
Coding is a central stage in the content analysis process, on which two important 
elements should be designed, the coding schedule and the coding manual (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007). The coding schedule is the structure into which all the data relating to 
a coded item will be entered (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The coding manual is “a 
statement of instructions to codes that specifies that categories that will be used to 
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classify the text based on a set of written rules that define how the text will be 
classified” (Bryman and Bell, 2007: p. 312). 
Because the sample comprises two different groups of companies with different 
compliance requirements two sets of coding schedules are used in the content 
analysis. The first schedule is used for companies listed on the Main Market (see table 
4.8), based on the provisions of Section 1 from the CCCG issued in 2008, the 
applicable version to the period of the study (see appendix 4 for more details). The 
listed companies are required to provide a statement of how they apply the main 
principles set out in Section 1 of the Combined Code, in a way that would assist 
shareholders to evaluate how the principles have been applied (Combined Code, 
2008). 
The second schedule is used for AIM companies (see table 4.9), based on the QCA 
guidelines published by the QCA in 2007, the applicable version to the period of the 
study (see appendix 5 for more details). These guidelines are basically adapted from 
the CCCG to suit the small companies in AIM (QCA, 2007).Though compliance with 
these guidelines is not compulsory for AIM companies, shareholders expect these 
companies to comply with most if not all these guidelines to ensure that they are 
properly governed (QCA, 2007).  
The coding schedule and manual for each set are combined in one table as all 
provisions in the schedule have the same categories (compliance/non compliance). 
The coding process requires identification of decision rules or coding rules. The 
coding rules in this study are very simple and straightforward. Each provision is 
coded as either 0 or 1 in case of non-compliance or compliance with the provision, 
respectively. 
When the coding process is completed, the codes are added up for each company to 
obtain the total compliance score of this company. The maximum compliance score, 
in case of full compliance with all the provisions, is 49 for companies listed on the 
Main Market and 29 for AIM companies. Finally, to make the compliance scores 
comparable between companies in the two markets, a compliance percentage is 
calculated for each company. The compliance percentage relates the actual 
compliance score of each company to the maximum total score in case of full 
compliance. 
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Table 4.8: Coding Schedule of Compliance with the CCCG 
No. Features of the Provision 
Features of the provision 
Code Categories 
1-49   0/1 0 = No Compliance 
1= Compliance with 
Provision 
Maximum Total Score 49  
 
Table 4.9: Coding Schedule of Compliance with the QCA Guidelines 
No. Features of the Provision Code Categories 
1-28  0/1 0 = No Compliance 
1= Compliance with 
Provision 
Maximum total score 28  
 
4.5.3  Secondary Data  
Secondary data analysis is “the analysis of data by researchers who will probably not 
have been involved in the collection of those data” (Bryman and Bell, 2007: p. 326). 
Secondary data include both raw data and published summaries, which have been 
collected by other organisations (e.g. consumer research organisations), government 
departments and quality daily newspapers (Saunders et al., 2009). 
In certain types of studies, such as those including national or international 
comparisons, secondary data are primarily used as the main source to answer the 
research questions (Saunders et al., 2009). However, most research questions are 
answered using some combination of secondary and primary data (Saunders et al., 
2009). Secondary data offer high quality data at low cost and less time for data 
collection (Bryman and Bell, 2007). However, some problems may confront 
researchers using secondary data such as data complexity, lack of familiarity and 
control over data quality (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Different types of secondary data can be used in research, such as documentary 
secondary data and survey-based secondary analysis or both (Saunders et al., 2009). 
The current study uses archive data in databases such as (FAME, Thomson One 
Banker and DataStream). FAME and Thomson One Banker databases were used to 
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obtain some data (e.g. company size) regarding the participating companies in the 
survey for the financial year ending 2010. The two databases were used to 
complement each other should the data not be available in one, and as a check where 
data are available in both. Data available in only one database were checked against 
the company annual report to ensure accuracy and reliability. DataStream was used to 
collect data related to the market-based performance (e.g. TSR) for the year ending to 
2010, using the DataStream Return Index.  
4.6 Statistical Techniques 
The field of management accounting research has recently witnessed a significant 
development in using multiple disciplinary perspectives and methods to examine a 
wide range of research topics (Luft and Shields, 2007; Henri, 2007). However, these 
developments require better model specification that unequivocally represents 
relationships derived from the theory being tested (Ittner and Larcker, 2001) and more 
methodological rigour in instrument validation and model testing (Shields and 
Shields, 1998; Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Chenhall, 2003).  
One of the advances in statistical techniques used to enhance theory development and 
testing is Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) (Hair et al., 2010). SEM has been 
used more frequently in recent business research (Henri, 2007). Therefore, many 
studies in the field of management accounting (e.g. Shields et al., 2000; Ittner and 
Larcker, 2001; Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004; Henri, 2007) have called for more 
use of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to “provide simultaneous tests of 
measurement reliability and structural relations, which may overcome some of the 
limitations that have been levelled at the way that management accounting has used 
more traditional statistical techniques” (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004: p.49). 
However, very few studies in the field of management accounting (e. g. Sheilds et al., 
2000; Van der Stede, 2000, 2001; Davila, 2005) have used SEM compared with other 
disciplines in the social sciences (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). The low use of 
SEM in management accounting research has been attributed to the lack of awareness 
with the technique, the tradition of strict confirmatory approaches to research design 
and model testing and the large sample required to apply SEM (Smith and Langfield-
Smith, 2004). In an attempt to respond to the increasing number of calls for using 
SEM in testing models in the management accounting research, this study adopts 
SEM to test the conceptual model developed in the current study. 
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4.6.1 Structural Equation Modeling 
SEM was first used in marketing research in the early 1980s, but recently, its 
application has become quite common (Hair et al., 2011a). It can be defined as “a set 
of multivariate techniques that allow for the simultaneous study of the relationship 
between directly observable and/or unmeasured latent variables, while incorporating 
potential measurement errors” (Henri, 2007: p. 76). It is remarkably useful in 
developing and testing theories that contain multiple equations comprising 
dependence relationships, where a hypothesised dependent variable becomes an 
independent variable in a subsequent dependence relationship (Hair et al., 2010). 
None of the other multivariate techniques (e.g. multiple regression, factor analysis, 
analysis of variance and discriminant analysis) permit testing both measurement 
prosperities and the main theoretical relationships in one technique (Hair et al., 2010). 
Unlike traditional methods of data analysis (e.g. multiple regression and pathway 
analysis), SEM allows estimating the multiple and interrelated dependent 
relationships between variables simultaneously and estimating the measurement error 
for the latent variables involved in these relationships (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 
2004; Hair et al., 2010). SEM addresses the major limitations of multiple regression 
analysis in theory development and testing including the free-error measurement of 
constructs and the inability to test the interrelated dependent relationships between 
variables simultaneously (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). While path analysis 
addresses the second limitation through incorporating sets of relations in the analysis, 
it has at least two limitations (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). Path analysis, as 
multiple regression, assumes unidirectional flow of relations between variables and 
fails to examine reciprocal relations between variables. In addition, path analysis does 
not adjust the coefficient of independent variables for estimated measurement error.  
The measurement error is the degree to which the measured variables do not exactly 
describe the latent variable of interest (Hair et al., 2010). Potential sources of 
measurement errors range from simple errors in data entry to construct definition, 
choice of inappropriate set of measures of a latent variable and different 
interpretations between the researcher and respondent (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 
2004; Hair et al., 2010). However, failing to account for the measurement error can 
lead to bias in the estimate of the regression coefficients for both independent and 
dependent variables (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004; Hair et al., 2010). 
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One of the important features of SEM is that it includes both a measurement model 
and a structural model. While the measurement model identifies relations between 
observed variables and latent variables, the structural model tests relationships 
between latent variables, and incorporated identified measurement error variances 
(Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). The measurement model utilises the confirmatory 
factor analysis in identifying the loading of each observed variable on the latent 
variable and the reliability of the measurement of each latent variable (Smith and 
Langfield-Smith, 2004).  The structural model utilises regression analysis to test the 
hypothesised relationships between latent variables with explicit recognition of the 
error associated in measuring the observed variables (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 
2004). Similar to path analysis, a path diagram can be used to show the relations in 
the structural model (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). In this way, SEM comprises 
the features of factor analysis, regression analysis and path analysis in one technique. 
However, SEM can be regarded as a family of techniques (Smith and Langfield-
Smith, 2004), including covariance-based SEM (CB-SEM) and variance-based SEM 
or Partial Least Squares SEM (PLS-SEM). The main characteristics and differences 
between the two streams will be discussed in the following section. 
4.6.2 Comparison between CB-SEM and PLS-SEM 
SEM, for many academics, is equivalent to implementing CB-SEM analyses using 
well-known software, such as AMOS and LISREL (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2011a). 
However, SEM includes another unique and very useful but less popular approach, 
which is PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2011a). Though both techniques share the same roots, 
previous research, especially in marketing, focused principally on CB-SEM (Hair et 
al., 2011b). 
“PLS-SEM is a causal modelling approach aimed at maximising the explained 
variance of the dependent latent constructs. This is contrary to CB-SEM’s objective of 
reproducing the theoretical covariance matrix, without focusing on explained 
variance” (Hair et al., 2011a: p.139). The main focus of CB-SEM is on estimating a 
set of model parameters making the difference between the theoretical covariance 
matrix and the estimated covariance matrix at minimum (Hair et al., 2011a). 
Conversely, PLS-SEM aims at predicting the values of latent variables that minimise 
the variance of all dependent variables (Chin, 1998). In other words, the main 
objective of CB-SEM is to use the model for explaining the covariance of all the 
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indicators; however, under PLS-SEM the main objective is obtaining parameter 
estimates based on the ability to minimise the residual variances of dependent 
variables (latent and observed) (Chin, 1998). 
CB-SEM model estimation requires a set of assumptions to be satisfied, such as the 
multivariate normality of data and large sample size (Hair et al., 2011a). However, if 
these assumptions are not applicable or the research objective is prediction rather than 
confirmation of structural relationships, PLS-SEM is the preferred method of analysis 
because of the minimal demands on measurement scales, sample size and residual 
distributions (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2011a).  
Table 4.10: Rules of Thumb for Choosing between CB-SEM and PLS-SEM 
Criterion CB-SEM PLS-SEM 
Theory Strong 
 
Less developed 
Research Goals Theory testing and 
confirmation 
 
Theory development and 
prediction 
Sample Size Large (Minimum 5-10 times 
the number of indicators) 
Small  (Min.10 times the largest 
number of structural paths 
directed at a reflective construct)  
Distributional  
Assumption 
Parametric (normal 
distribution) 
 
Non-parametric (free 
distribution) 
Measurement 
 Model  
Basically reflective constructs. 
Large number of indicators per 
construct (at least 3) 
Reflective/formative constructs. 
Small and large number of 
indicators per construct (1 or 
more) 
Structural Model Less complex Complex (many constructs and 
many indicators) 
Global Goodness of  
Fit measures 
Yes No (new global measures were 
suggested but not recommended)   
Source: Adapted from Hair et al. (2011a, p. 144) 
In comparison with CB-SEM, PLS-SEM is more robust when there are identification 
issues; it can handle very small, as well as very large samples, and readily integrates 
formative, as well as reflective constructs in the model (Hair et al., 2011b). Unlike 
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CB-SEM, PLS-SEM avoids some critical problems, such as inadmissible solutions 
and factor indeterminacy (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982; Chin, 1998). This is mainly 
because the iterative algorithm used in PLS-SEM comprises a series of ordinary least 
squares, therefore, identification is neither a problem for recursive models nor does it 
assume any form of distribution for measured variables (Chin, 1998). 
According to Hair et al. (2011b), most researchers, including the founders of CB-
SEM and PLS-SEM (Joreskog and Wold, 1982) regard the two approaches to SEM as 
complementary because the weaknesses of one approach are the strengths of the other 
and none of the approaches is superior to the other. Rather, the choice between the 
two approaches depends on the research objective, sample size, model complexity and 
data characteristics (Hair et al., 2011b). For instance, “when CB-SEM assumptions 
are violated with regard to normality of distributions, minimum sample size, and 
maximum model complexity, or when related methodological matters emerge.... PLS-
SEM is a good methodological alternative for theory testing” (Hair et al., 2011a: 
p.143). 
Table 4.10 illustrates the rules of thumb that can be used to choose between the two 
approaches. The current study used PLS-SEM as a main approach for data analysis 
for the following reasons: the complexity of the theoretical model being tested, the 
relatively small sample size given the complexity of the model and the number of 
indicators used, and violating the normality assumption in measuring some constructs. 
4.6.3 PLS-SEM 
According to Hair et al. (2011b), PLS-SEM was initially developed by Wold (1975) 
under the name NIPALS (Non-linear Iterative Partial Least Squares), and was 
extended further by Lohmoller (1989), as an alternative to CB-SEM that focuses on 
prediction, meanwhile the requirements of data distribution and specification of 
relationships are relaxed. Though PLS-SEM is less popular than CB-SEM, its 
application has recently expanded in marketing research and other business 
disciplines (Henseler et al., 2009). The increasing application of PLS-SEM can be 
partly attributed to the recent improvement in the technique itself (Hair et al., 2011b), 
such as analysing moderating effects (Henseler and Chin, 2010), segmentation 
techniques such as Finite Mixture Partial Least Squares (FIMIX-PLS), and non-linear 
effects (Rigdon et al., 2010).  
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Despite the increasing popularity of PLS-SEM in other disciplines, very few studies 
in management accounting research utilise PLS-SEM. In two surveys regarding the 
application of SEM (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004; Henri, 2007) in management 
accounting research, only five studies (Ittner et al., 1997; Vandenbosch, 1999; 
Anderson et al., 2002; Chenhall, 2004, 2005) used PLS-SEM during the period from 
1980 to 2005. This is fairly surprising given the great advantages of PLS-SEM that 
seem to be tailor-made for management accounting research (Smith and Langfield-
Smith, 2004). 
PLS-SEM provides a good opportunity for statistical modelling to move forward 
without being restricted by large sample size, strong underlying theory and normally 
distributed data (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). Obviously, there are many areas 
in management accounting research where theory is underdeveloped or models being 
tested are very complex, which makes PLS-SEM the appropriate technique for this 
type of research (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). PLS-SEM is mainly designed for 
predicting causal relationships in situations of high complexity and low theoretical 
information (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004).  
4.6.3.1 Overview of PLS-SEM  
As the CB-SEM, the PLS-SEM comprises two components for testing models with 
latent variables, measurement (outer) model and structural (inner) model (Hair et al., 
2011a). The measurement model relates observed (manifest) indicators to their own 
latent variables, while the structural model relates the endogenous latent variables to 
other latent variables, including exogenous latent variables (Tennhaus et al., 2005). 
Endogenous latent variables refer to variables that are explained by other variables 
through structural model relationships, while exogenous latent variables represent 
variables that are not explained by any of the model variables and do not have any 
structural path relationships pointing at them (Hair et al., 2011a).  
The measurement model comprises the unidirectional predictive relationship between 
each latent variable (construct) and its associated observed measures (Hair et al., 
2011a). Two possible forms of measurement models can be used in PLS-SEM, 
reflective and formative models. “Reflective indicators are seen as functions of the 
latent variables and changes in the latent variable are reflected in changes in the 
indicator (manifest) variable.... In contrast, formative indicators are assumed to cause 
a latent variable, and changes in the indicators determine changes in the value of the 
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latent variable” (Hair et al., 2011a: p. 141). However, all indicators used in the current 
model are reflective, not formative, and the procedures followed in evaluating the 
reflective measurement models are used in this study. The PLS-SEM algorithm uses a 
two-stage approach in data analysis (Lohmoller, 1989; Hair et al., 2011a). In the first 
stage, the latent variables’ scores are estimated. In the second stage the outer weights 
and loadings are finally estimated (Hair et al., 2011a). 
4.6.3.2 Assessing the Measurement Model 
Before testing the structural model, the reflective measurement model should be first 
assessed in terms of reliability and validity. The literature suggests some important 
measures of reliability, such as internal consistency (composite reliability) and 
indicator (item) reliability (Hair et al., 2011a). Similarly, validity can be assessed 
through using nomoloigical, convergent and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2011a). 
These measures will be discussed in detail in the measurement model analysis 
(chapter 5). 
4.6.3.3 Assessing the Structural Model 
As the main goals of PLS-SEM are predicting and maximising the explained variance 
in the latent endogenous variable, the primary criteria of evaluating the structural 
model should be R2, path coefficients and the significance levels of path coefficients 
(Hair et al., 2011a). The significance of path coefficients can be assessed using 
resample techniques such as bootstrapping or jackknifing, as PLS-SEM puts no 
distribution assumption for the data used in the analysis. This study uses 
bootstrapping, as it is regarded as more efficient than jackknifing (Chin, 1998). 
Further, assessing the structural model entails assessing its ability to predict the 
endogenous latent variables (Hair et al., 2011a). One of the important measures used 
in assessing the predictive relevance in a model is the Stone-Geisser Q2 value 
(Geisser, 1974; Stone, 1974). This value can be calculated using the blindfolding 
technique, that omits part of the data in a systematic way and uses the resulting 
estimates in predicting the omitted part (Hair et al., 2011a).  
Further, assessing the heterogeneity of observations is an important step in evaluating 
the structural mode. Failure to assess the heterogeneity of data risk damaging the 
validity of the PLS-SEM results as different parameters estimates may be obtained for 
different subpopulations (Hair et al., 2011a). Several tools have been developed in  
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PLS-SEM to assess the unobserved heterogeneity, such as FIMIX-PLS (Ringle et al., 
2010).  
In contrast with CB-SEM, there is no overall goodness of fit measure in the PLS-
SEM, as its main objective is different from the CB-SEM (Hulland, 1999; Hair et al., 
2011b). Some scholars introduced global measures of fit (e.g. Tenenhaus et al., 2004). 
However, these measures are not widely accepted and thought to be inconsistent with 
PLS-SEM assumptions and objectives (Hulland, 1999; Hair et al., 2011b). 
4.6.3.4 PLS-SEM Software 
While the basic algorithms used in PLS-SEM were developed in the 1970s, the first 
software packages such as LVPLS (Lohmoller, 1984) and PLS Path (Sellin, 1989) 
were not publically available before the 1980s (Temme et al., 2010). The limited use 
of PLS-SEM in the last few decades can be partly attributed to the lack of progress 
concerning the software’s development in terms of availability, user-friendliness and 
methodological options (Temme et al., 2010). 
However, this situation has recently changed and many alternative software solutions 
are now available to choose from, such as PLS-GUI, Visual-PLS, PLS-Graph, Smart 
PLS, SPAD-PLS (Temme et al., 2010). Moreover, each software package has 
different features in terms of requirements, methodology, options and ease of use 
(Temme et al., 2010). This study uses both Warp-PLS and Smart-PLS, as each 
software package has its distinguished features. Warp-PLS is the most recent 
available software package (Kock, 2011). It offers a number of features, which are 
largely absent from most, if not all PLS-based SEM software packages currently 
available (Kock, 2011): 
1. It estimates p values for path coefficients automatically, instead of providing 
only standard errors or t values, and leaves the user to figure out what the 
corresponding p values are. 
2. It estimates several model fit indices, which have been designed to be 
meaningful in the context of PLS-based SEM analyses. 
3. It automatically builds the indicators’ product structure underlying moderating 
relationships, and goes a little further. It shows those moderating relationships, 
related path coefficients and related p values in a model graph as they should 
be shown. 
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4. It allows users to view scatter plots of each of the relationships among latent 
variables (when they are connected through arrows in the model), together 
with the regression curves that best approximate those relationships, and save 
those plots as .jpg files for inclusion in research reports. 
5. It calculates variance inflation factor (VIF) coefficients for latent variable 
predictors associated with each latent variable criterion. This allows users to 
check whether some predictors should be removed due to multicolinearity 
(this feature is particularly useful with latent variables that are measured based 
on only one or a few indicators). 
However, Warp-PLS does not include tools for assessing predictive relevance (such 
as blindfolding procedures) or unobserved heterogeneity (such as FIMIX-PLS). These 
tools are embedded in the Smart-PLS software. Therefore, this software was used in 
the current study for double checking the results obtained by Warp-PLS and using 
both the blindfolding procedure and FIMIX-PLS. 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter discussed in detail the research philosophy and methodology 
underpinning the current study. After exploring the research paradigms and 
methodologies used in social sciences in general and accounting research in specific, 
the study adopted the positivist paradigm and the cross-sectional survey methodology 
to test the research hypotheses that were previously developed based on the 
theoretical model in the previous chapter. The chapter also addressed the key issues 
related to identifying the research context and population, sampling process, data 
collection using different methods (questionnaire, content analysis and archive data) and, 
finally, the proposed statistical techniques to be used in the data analysis (e.g. SEM). 
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Chapter 5 
Measurement Model Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapter, the questionnaire was used as the main data 
collection method, complemented by content analysis and archive data analysis. 
Operationalising and measuring the theoretical constructs are crucial not only to 
achieve the research objectives, but also to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
results. However, measuring theoretical constructs normally entails measurement 
error, which threatens the validity of the used measures and the derived results. As 
failing to account for measurement error can lead to bias in the estimate of the 
regression coefficients for both independent and dependent variables (Smith and 
Langfield-Smith, 2004; Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, this study adopts PLS-SEM for 
data analysis to account for measurement error and to test relationships between 
constructs, taking into consideration the identified measurement error variances 
(Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). The measurement model used in PLS-SEM 
provides a thorough assessment of measurement reliability and validity, and control 
for measurement error. 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the indicators used in measuring the 
theoretical constructs, the development of the measurement model, and the procedures 
used to assess the measurement model, including validity and reliability testing. The 
second section will briefly outline the procedures of developing and assessing the 
measurement model, including a five-step approach to develop and assess the 
measurement model. The third section will discuss in detail the selected measures for 
each of the research constructs based on prior studies, in addition to the process of 
assessing the reliability and convergent validity of each construct. The discriminant 
and nomological validity for all constructs will be assessed in the fourth and fifth 
sections respectively. Finally, a summary will be provided in the sixth section.   
128 
 
5.2 Procedures of Measurement Model Assessment 
This study follows the two-step approach of the PLS-SEM, i.e. measurement (outer) 
model and structural (inner) model to test the theoretical framework. The 
measurement model identifies and relates the measures (indicators or observed 
variables) for each construct (latent variable) and assesses the validity and reliability 
of these constructs before estimating the structural model. According to Hair et al. 
(2010, 2011b), developing and assessing the measurement model comprises five main 
steps (see figure 5.1). These steps will be explained in detail in the following sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Procedures of Measurement Model Assessment 
Source: Adapted from Hair et al. (2010, 2011b) 
 
Assess the Construct Reliability                                              
(Item reliability, Cronbach’s alpha and Composite reliability) 
Use Latent Variable Measurement Model with Indicators in 
Estimating the Structural Model 
Assess the Unidimensionality of Constructs                      
(Exploratory Factor Analysis) 
Assess the Construct Validity                                            
(Convergent, Discriminant, and Nomological validity) 
Conceptual Definition and Assessing Content Validity of 
Constructs                                              
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5.2.1 Conceptual Definition and Content Validity                                               
The conceptual definition identifies the theoretical foundation of a construct by 
defining the concept being represented in terms relevant to the research context (Hair 
et al., 2010). In academic research theoretical definitions should be derived from prior 
research that defines the spirit and nature of a construct (Hair et al., 2010).  
Content (face) validity refers to the association of the measures (indicators) to be 
included in a construct and its conceptual definition (Hair et al., 2010). Content 
validity can be ensured “through ratings by expert judges, pre-tests with multiple 
subpopulations, or other means” (Hair et al., 2010: p. 125). The objective of this 
process is to ensure that the selection of measures extends past empirical studies and 
also to include theoretical and practical considerations (Hair et al., 2010). Addressing 
the content validity of the constructs used in the current study, including the detailed 
conceptual definitions and measures adopted for each construct will be discussed in 
detail in section (5.3).  
5.2.2 Assessing Construct Dimensionality 
The underlying assumption of creating a summated scale of a construct comprising 
multiple indicators, as used in SEM, is that the indicators are unidimensional, which 
means that the indicators are strongly associated with each other and represent a 
single construct (Hair et al., 2010). The unidimensionality of a construct can be 
assessed using either Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) or Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) (Hair et al., 2010). Factor analysis, in general, plays a crucial role in 
assessing the dimensionality of a set of indicators, by identifying the number of 
factors and the loading of each indicator on the factor(s) (Hair et al., 2010).  
This study uses EFA to assess the unidimensionality of the theoretical constructs, 
using the software package of SPSS. The results of EFA will be refined or confirmed, 
using the measurement model assessment procedures in PLS-SEM, which can be used 
as a CFA. These procedures will be explained in more detail in the following two 
steps. EFA is conducted using the principal component method for each construct, as 
it considers the total variance including common, specific and error variances (Hair et 
al., 2010). In addition, the Varimax orthogonal rotation method is used, as in most 
cases the un-rotated solutions are not sufficient (Hair et al., 2010). Orthogonal 
rotation methods are more widely and frequently used compared to oblique rotation 
methods (Hair et al., 2010). 
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Communalities (≥ 0.5), Eigen values (≥1) and variance extracted (≥ 0.5) are used to 
identify the number of factors to be extracted for each construct (Hair et al., 2010). 
After running the EFA, items exhibiting low factor loadings < 0.40 and/or high cross-
loadings > 0.40 and/or low communalities < 0.50 are removed (Hair et al., 2010). 
Factors are also assessed using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test of sampling 
adequacy, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity and Cronbach’s alpha (Hair et al., 2010).    
5.2.3 Assessing Construct Reliability                         
Reliability is an assessment of the extent of consistency between multiple 
measurements of a construct (Hair et al., 2010). Reliability also relates to “the degree 
to which the measures provide consistent results if used in different studies or 
contexts.... the degree to which a scale is free from measurement error” (Cooper and 
Schindler, 1998, p. 171). 
Reliability can be assessed using different methods (Hair et al., 2010). However, the 
most commonly used measure of reliability is internal consistency, which assesses the 
consistency among the multiple indicators used in measuring a construct (Hair et al., 
2010). Internal consistency can be assessed using different measures, such as 
indicators reliability, Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability. These measures can 
be explained as follows: 
5.2.3.1 Indicator Reliability 
Indicator (item) reliability is assessed by examining the loadings (correlations) of 
measures with their respective constructs (Hulland, 1999) or the standardised 
indicator loadings (Hair el., 2011b). This measure considers the correlation of an 
indicator to the summated scale score of construct and the correlation among 
indicators. While loadings of 0.5 or more is acceptable for exploratory studies (Hair et 
al., 2011b), the threshold of 0.7 or more is commonly used between researchers to 
assess the indicator’s reliability (Hulland, 1999). Having loadings of at least 0.5 
implies that 50% of the variance in the observed variable is due to the construct 
(Hulland, 1999). 
5.2.3.2 Cronbach’s alpha 
Cronbach’s alpha is the most commonly used reliability coefficient that assesses the 
consistency among multiple-measures of a construct (Hair et al., 2010). In general, the 
lower acceptable limit for this coefficient is 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010). The minimum 
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acceptable level could be lowered to 0.6 (Hair et al., 2010) or 0.5 (Nunnally, 1978), 
especially in exploratory research (Hair et al., 2010).  
However, Cronbach’s alpha has been criticised for being sensitive to the number of 
indicators used in measuring a construct, i.e. the value of Cronbach’s alpha increases 
with the increase in the number of indicators used in measuring a construct, even with 
the same degree of inter-correlation (Hair et al., 2010). Furthermore, it assumes that 
all indicators are equally reliable (Hair et al., 2011a). According to Hair et al. (2011), 
using Cronbach’s alpha to assess reliability in PLS-SEM is not recommended; instead 
composite reliability measure is preferred. 
5.2.3.3 Composite Reliability (Internal Consistency)  
Composite reliability has been developed by Froner and Larcker (1981) and is used to 
assess the reliability of a construct that comprises a number of indicators. “Unlike 
Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability does not assume that all indicators are equally 
reliable, making it more suitable for PLS-SEM, which prioritises indicators according 
to their reliability during model estimation” (Hair et al., 2011a). Composite reliability 
values between 0.6 and 0.7 can be accepted in exploratory research and values 
between 0.7 and 0.9 are satisfactory in more advanced research (Hair et al., 2011a: p. 
45).  
5.2.4 Assessing Construct Validity                       
After ensuring conformance between the conceptual definition of a construct and its 
measures, and ensuring construct reliability, one final assessment of validity should 
be performed (Hair et al., 2010). Construct validity can be defined as “the extent to 
which a scale or set of measures accurately represent the concept of interest” (Hair et 
al., 2010: p. 126), or “the extent to which the construct is successfully operationalised 
in the research” (Abernethy et al., 1999, p. 8). Different forms of construct validity 
can be measured and empirically examined including convergent validity, 
discriminate validity and nomological validity (Hair et al., 2010). 
Convergent validity confirms that each measure is correlated with other known 
measures of the same construct (Hair et al., 2010). Discriminant validity ensures that 
the measures used for each construct are sufficiently different and distinct from the 
other measures of other constructs (Hair et al., 2010). Nomological validity reveals 
whether the measures demonstrate the relationships shown to exist, based on theory or 
prior research (Hair et al., 2010). These forms of validity can be explained as follows:                            
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5.2.4.1 Convergent Validity 
Convergent validity assesses the extent to which indicators used in measuring a 
construct converge with each other in measuring that construct. Assessing the 
convergent validity is an important step when a construct is measured using multiple-
indicators as “the researcher should be concerned not only with individual indicator 
reliability, but also with the extent to which the measures demonstrate convergent 
validity” (Hulland, 1999: p.199). 
Convergent validity can be measured using Average Variance Extracted (AVE), 
which should be ≥ 0.5 to indicate a sufficient level of convergent validity (Hair et al., 
2011a). Keeping the AVE, as high as 0.5 or more, means that a construct or latent 
variable explains at least half of its indicator’s variance (Hair et al., 2011a).  
5.2.4.2 Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity assesses the degree to which measures of different concepts are 
distinct (Bagozzi, 1994, p. 20). According to Hair et al. (2011b), two criteria can be 
used to assess the discriminant validity: Fornell-Larcker’s criterion (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981) and the cross loadings criterion (Chin, 1998). 
Fornell-Larcker’s criterion requires the AVE for each construct to be higher than the 
squared inter-correlation between this construct and any other construct (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). Alternatively, comparison can be made between the square root of 
AVE for each construct and the inter-correlations with other constructs (Hair et al., 
2010). The second criterion is cross loadings. According to Chin (1998), a latent 
construct exhibits satisfactory discriminant validity when the loadings of items used 
in measuring this construct are higher than their loadings with all the remaining 
constructs (cross loadings).  
5.2.4.3 Nomological Validity 
Nomological validity denotes the extent to which the summated scale of a construct 
makes accurate predictions of other constructs in a theoretically based model (Hair et 
al., 2010). To ensure the nomological validity of constructs, the researcher must 
propose theoretically supported relationships from prior research or accepted 
principles and then assess whether the developed summated scale has corresponding 
relationships (Hair et al., 2010). In other words, “nomological validity examines 
whether the correlations between the constructs in measurement theory make sense. 
Construct correlation can be useful in this assessment” (Hair et al., 2010: p.691). 
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Nomological validity is different from content (face) validity. While face validity is 
established prior to any theoretical testing to ensure understanding of every 
construct’s meaning or content before using measurement theory, nomological 
validity is tested by examining whether the correlations among the constructs in  
measurement theory make sense (Hair et al., 2010). Nomological validity can be 
tested using the correlation matrix between constructs measured by multiple-
indicators developed in previous research (Hair et al., 2010).   
5.2.5 Estimating the Structural Model  
After checking the construct reliability and validity, and assessing the measurement 
model, a structural model can be estimated to test the structural relationships 
hypothesised in the theoretical model, providing the assessment of the measurement 
model provides satisfactory results. This step will be explained in detail in the next 
chapter.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
5.3 Development and Assessment of the Measurement Model 
This section presents in detail the instruments used in this study to measure the 
research constructs (VBM, contingency factors, CG, CE and organisational 
performance), and the procedures of assessing their reliability and validity. 
5.3.1 VBM 
A large number of previous studies (e.g. Stewart, 1991, 1994; Dodd and Chen, 1996; 
Grant, 1996; Chen and Dodd, 1997; Biddle et al., 1997; Lehn and Makhija, 1997; Bao 
and Bao, 1998; Ryan and Trahan, 1999, 2007; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Lovata and 
Costigan, 2002; Athanassakos, 2007; Rapp et al., 2011) classify companies into two 
groups, namely VBM adopters and non-adopters, for the purpose of comparing their 
performance.  
However, the results of some previous studies suggest that VBM practices are too 
complicated to be categorised into only two groups, i.e. VBM adopters and non 
adopters. For instance, companies can implement VBM differently in terms of the 
wide range of measures used, the comprehensiveness of the implementation process 
(all or part of the processes) and the depth of implementation (organisation-wide use 
or business unit use) (Malmi and Ikäheimo, 2003).  
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Therefore, some recent studies classify companies into more than two groups 
according to the VBM implementation stages, to capture the sophistication in VBM 
practices. For instance, Ittner et al. (2003) follow the Krumwiede’s (1998) taxonomy 
and measure VBM implementation, through classifying companies into six categories 
(not considered, implemented and abandoned, considering, implementing now, used 
and used extensively). 
5.3.1.1 Measures of VBM 
Unlike previous studies VBM implementation is measured in the current study on a 
continuum, rather than a categorical measure, based on the level of VBM 
implementation in five main areas, as suggested by Cooper et al. (2001). The five 
implementation areas include: the company mission, formulating strategy and 
objectives, strategic and significant decisions, performance measurements, and 
management rewarding schemes. 
Measuring VBM implementation on a continuum helps to capture the wide range of 
variation in VBM practices by assigning high scores for companies, which implement 
VBM comprehensively in different areas and at different organisational levels. 
Conversely, it assigns a lower score for companies which implement VBM less 
extensively or at a limited organisational scale. To capture the level of VBM 
implementation using the five main dimensions, the following measures are adapted 
from Cooper et al. (2001) and used in the current study (see table 5.1). These 
measures can be classified into five main dimensions. 
The first dimension relates to prioritising the shareholder’s interest compared to other 
stakeholders. This dimension contains only one measure, asking the respondents to 
rate the importance of shareholders to a company mission on a 7 point Likert-scale. 
The second dimension relates to the importance of value-based measures to a 
company strategy and objectives. This dimension comprises three measures, asking 
the respondents to rate the importance of each of the following items (EP/EVA, 
CFROI and TSR) to the formulation of a company strategy and objectives on a 7 
point Likert-scale. The average rating of these measures, ranging from 1 to 7, was 
used as the overall measure for the importance of value-based measures in 
formulating strategy and objectives. 
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The third dimension relates to the extent of using value-based measures in strategic 
and significant decisions, such as acquisition and investments. 
Table 5.1: Measures of VBM 
Construct Dimensions Dim. 
No. 
Source Measure 
No. 
Measure Description Scale 
VBM Mission 
 
VM1 Cooper    et 
al. (2001) 
VM11 Importance of shareholders to a 
company mission 
1-7 
 Strategy and 
objectives 
 
VM2 Cooper    et 
al. (2001) 
VM21 Importance of EP/EVA to a company 
strategy and objectives 
1-7 
    VM22 Importance of CFROI to a company 
strategy and objectives 
1-7 
    VM23 Importance of TSR to a company 
strategy and objectives 
1-7 
 Strategic  
decisions 
 
VM3 Cooper    et 
al. (2001) 
VM31, 
VM32 
Using DCF in strategic and 
significant decisions 
(corporate/business unit levels) 
0-1 
    VM33, 
VM34 
Using EP/EVA in strategic and 
significant decisions (corporate/ 
business unit levels) respectively 
0-1 
    VM35, 
VM36 
Using  CFROI in strategic and 
significant decisions 
(corporate/business unit levels 
0-1 
    VM37, 
VM38 
Using  TSR in strategic and 
significant decisions 
(corporate/business unit levels 
0-1 
 Performance 
measurement 
 
VM4 Cooper    et 
al. (2001) 
VM41, 
VM42 
Using  EP/ EVA in performance 
measurements (corporate/business 
unit levels respectively) 
0-1 
    VM43, 
VM44 
Using CFROI in performance 
measurements (corporate/business 
unit levels respectively) 
0-1 
    VM45, 
VM46 
Using TSR in performance 
measurements (corporate/business 
unit levels respectively) 
0-1 
 Management 
rewarding 
VM5 Cooper    et 
al. (2001) 
VM51, 
VM52 
Using  EP/ EVA in rewarding 
managers (corporate/business unit 
levels respectively) 
0-1 
    VM53, 
VM54 
Using CFROI in rewarding managers 
(corporate/business unit levels 
respectively) 
0-1 
    VM55, 
VM56 
Using TSR in rewarding managers 
(corporate/business unit levels 
respectively) 
0-1 
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This dimension comprises eight measures, asking the respondents to rate, on a 0-1 
scale, the extent of using each of the following items (Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), 
EP/EVA, CFROI and TSR) in taking strategic and significant decisions at both 
corporate and business unit levels. The sum of ratings of these measures, ranging 
from 0 to 8, was used as the overall measure of the extent of using the value-based 
measures in strategic and significant decisions. 
The fourth dimension relates to the extent of using the value-based measures in 
performance measurements. This dimension includes six measures, asking the 
respondents to rate, on a 0-1 scale, the extent of using each of the following measures 
(EP/EVA, CFROI and TSR) in evaluating and measuring performance at both 
corporate and business unit levels. The sum of ratings of these measures, ranging 
from 0 to 6, was used as the overall measure of the extent of using the value-based 
measures in performance measurement. 
The last dimension relates to the extent of using the value-based measures in 
management rewarding schemes. This dimension contains six measures, asking the 
respondents to rate, on a 0-1 scale, the extent of using each of the following measures 
(EP/EVA, CFROI and TSR) in rewarding managers at both corporate and business 
unit levels. The sum of ratings of these measures, ranging from 0 to 6, was used as the 
overall measure for the extent of using the value-based measures in management 
rewarding schemes. 
5.3.1.2 EFA of VBM 
EFA is implemented to assess the unidimensionality of VBM, using the principal 
component method (see table 5.2). The initial results of the EFA of VBM indicate a 
low level of communality (less than 0.5) for VM1 (Importance of shareholders to the 
company mission) and VM2 (Importance of value-based measures to company 
strategy and objectives). As a result, VM1 and VM2 were removed in the first two 
rounds of the analysis respectively. A third round of analysis was performed using the 
remaining variables (VM3, VM4 and VM5).  
The results of the EFA, as presented in table 5.2, confirm the unidimensionality of the 
VBM construct. One factor has emerged from this analysis, explaining 71.74% from 
variability in VBM. All loadings were high, greater than 0.40, ranging from 0.76 to 
0.91. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity (121.90, p ≤ 0.05) and Kaiser’s measure of 
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sampling adequacy (0.648) indicated that EFA is appropriate and within the 
acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010).  
Table 5.2: EFA of VBM  
Measures Communalities Final 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Value 
Variance 
Extracted 
KMO Bartlett’s 
Test (sig.) 
Construct 
VM3 
VM4 
VM5 
0.743 
0.823 
0.586 
0.862 
0.907 
0.765 
2.152 71.74% 0.648 0.00 VBM 
 
Excluding VM1 and VM2 for less communality with other measures can be explained 
as follows: while prioritising the shareholders’ interest in formulating the company 
mission and objectives is an essential pillar of the VBM approach, high rating of 
shareholder interest to a company mission does not necessarily mean that this 
company is adopting VBM. Many companies believe that other competing 
approaches and PMSs, such as balanced scorecard, are also consistent with this 
mission.  
Furthermore, many companies may think that VBM can be implemented by simply 
prioritising the shareholders’ interest to the company mission and objectives without 
real change to the decision making and performance measurement process (Cooper et 
al., 2001). This explanation can be supported with the high mean (over the average) of 
VM1 and VM2, in comparison with other measures (VM3-VM5), which implies that 
companies highly rate the importance of shareholders’ interest to their missions, 
objectives and strategies than their ratings of using  value-based measures in taking 
decisions, evaluating performance and rewarding managers.  
5.3.1.3 Reliability of VBM 
To assess the construct reliability of VBM, the indicator reliability was assessed by 
examining the outer loadings of the measures with their respective constructs using 
PLS-SEM. Exploring the results of indicator loadings in table 5.3 reveals that all 
measures have high reliability, as they highly load (greater than 0.7) on the VBM 
construct.  
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Table 5.3 Indicator Reliability of VBM Measures 
Measures Outer weight Loadings 
(outer 
Construct 
VM3 
VM4 
VM5 
0.401 
0.421 
0.356 
0.862 
0.907 
0.765 
VBM 
 
Further, to assess the construct reliability of VBM, Cronbach’s alpha and composite 
reliability were calculated using PLS-SEM (see table 5.4). Cronbach’s alpha was 
0.781, indicating an acceptable level of reliability (Hair et al., 2010). Exploring the 
composite reliability value (0.815) in table 5.4 reveals that the VBM construct is 
internally consistent in its measurement and has satisfactory reliability (greater than 
0.7). The results of the reliability tests in general suggest that VBM can be measured 
adequately using VM1, VM2 and VM3. 
Table 5.4: Reliability Coefficients of VBM 
Construct Cronbach’s alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted  
VBM 0.781 0.815 0.597 
 
5.3.1.4 Convergent Validity of VBM 
To assess the construct validity of VBM the convergent validity of the VBM construct 
AVE was examined, which should be ≥ 0.5, to indicate a sufficient level of 
convergent validity (Hair et al., 2011a). The results in table 5.4 reveal that the AVE of 
VBM (0.597) indicates a satisfactory level of convergent validity (AVE ≥ 0.5). 
Discriminant validity and nomological validity will be assessed for all constructs at 
the end of this chapter. 
5.3.2 Agency Conflicts 
Agency conflicts stem from separation of ownership and control and the possible 
conflict of interests between principal (shareholder) and agent (management). 
Potential sources of agency conflicts include moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), earning retention, risk aversion (Jensen, 1986) and time horizon (Healy, 1985). 
However, “measuring the agency conflicts in a firm is challenging because there 
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exists a variety of firm-specific situations where the managers have the incentives and 
the ability to engage in maximizing their own utilities at the cost of shareholders. 
Moreover, there is no widely accepted measure of agency conflicts” (Dey, 2008). 
The literature suggests different variables to be used as a proxy for the magnitude of 
agency conflicts. For instance, Lovata and Costigan (2002) use risk, insider ownership 
and the interaction effect between insider ownership and company size as surrogates 
for agency conflicts in relation to the use of EVA as a performance measure. In the 
governance context, Dey (2008) suggests six variables to proxy for agency conflicts, 
namely company size, organisational complexity, volatility in operating environment 
measured by risk, insider ownership, leverage and free cash flow. 
5.3.2.1 Measure of Agency Conflicts 
This study operationalises the agency conflicts in terms of risk, to be measured using 
Beta (see table 5.5) as suggested by Lovata and Costigan (2002). Using risk as a 
surrogate for agency conflicts is justified as the increased level of risk makes it 
difficult for the principal to decide whether changes in shareholder value are related to 
agent’s actions or outside reasons, thus the need for monitoring becomes imminent 
(Bloom and Milkovich,1998; Lovata and Costigan, 2002). Beta is adopted in this 
study, as the most commonly used measure of the systematic risk that cannot be 
eliminated through diversification (Cooper et al., 2001). Beta is provided by the 
DataStream database through conducting a least squares regression between adjusted 
prices of the stock and the related DataStream market index. 
Table 5.5: Measure of Agency Conflicts 
Construct Source Measure 
no. 
Description of the Measure 
Agency 
Conflicts 
(Cooper et al., 2001; 
Lovata and Costigan 
(2002) 
AG1 Beta (Risk Measure) 
 
None of the EFA, reliability and convergent validity tests have been performed for the 
construct of agency conflicts, as it has been measured using a single indicator. 
However, the discriminant and nomological validity of this construct, along with 
other constructs will be tested at the end of this chapter. 
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5.3.3 Company Size 
Company size has been an important factor in explaining VBM implementation 
(Cooper and Petry, 1994; Ryan and Trahan, 1999), CG structure (Gompers et al., 
2003) and CE (Rauch et al., 2009). Company size has been measured in the literature 
using different measures such as number of employees (Bruns and Waterhouse, 
1975), total sales (Ryan and Trahan, 1999, 2007), total assets (Lovata and Costigan, 
2002) and market capitalisation (Cooper et al., 2001).  
5.3.3.1 Measure of Company Size 
This study used the number of employees as a measure of company size (see table 
5.6), as it is the most common measure of size in organisational research (Bruns and 
Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant, 1981, 1984; Ezzamel, 1990; Libby and Waterhouse, 
1996). In addition, number of employees is an indication of organisational 
complexity.  As the number of employees is a continuous variable and comprises a 
wide range of values, it has been transformed using the logarithm term to minimise 
the variation in this variable and to avoid violations of some statistical assumptions 
(such as normality) underlying the multivariate techniques (Hair et al., 2010). 
Table 5.6: Measure of Company Size 
Construct Source Measure 
no. 
Description of the Measure 
Size (Bruns and Waterhouse, 
1975; Merchant, 1981, 
1984; Ezzamel, 1990) 
SZ1 Log (Number of Employees) 
 
None of the EFA, reliability and convergent validity tests have been performed for 
company size as it has been measured using a single indicator. However, the 
discriminant and nomological validity of this construct, along with other constructs 
will be tested at the end of this chapter.  
5.3.4 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty (PEU) 
Contingency theory research emphasises the importance of uncertainty as a critical 
factor in management control systems studies and the most commonly researched 
aspect of environment (Chenhall, 2007). The literature suggests several instruments to 
measure perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) in management control 
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contingency studies. For instance, Miles and Snow (1978) develop an instrument 
comprising 24 questions, on a seven-point Likert scale, to capture the changes in 
external environments including suppliers, competitors, customers, financial markets, 
governmental regulations, laws and policies and labour union actions.  
Similar to Miles and Snow's (1978), Govindarajan (1984) use an instrument to capture 
the changes in the main aspects of external environments using a smaller number of 
questions (only eight). On a five-point Likert scale, the instrument measures the 
predictability of changes in manufacturing technology, competitors' actions, market 
demand, product attributes, raw material availability, raw material price, government 
regulation and labour union actions. This instrument has also been used in other MC 
contingency studies (e.g. Gul, 1991; Gul and Chia, 1994). 
5.3.4.1 Measures of PEU 
This study measured PEU using the instrument of Govindarajan (1984) because it is 
concise, simple and covers the main aspects of the external environment (see table 
5.7). Unlike the five-point Likert scale used in the original instrument, this study 
adopted a seven-point Likert scale to allow a wide range of choices to the respondents 
and to ensure consistency with other scales used throughout the questionnaire. The 
respondents were asked to rate the unpredictability level of changes, from highly 
predictable to highly unpredictable rate of change, in the following aspects of the 
external environment: manufacturing technology, competitors' actions, market 
demand, product attributes and design, raw material availability and prices, 
government regulation and labour union actions. 
Table 5.7: Measures of PEU 
Construct Source Measure 
no. 
Description of the Measure 
(Predictability of change in ...) 
Perceived 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Govindarajan 
(1984) 
UN1 Customer’s demand and taste 
UN2 Product attributes and design 
UN3 Competitors’ actions 
UN4 Government regulations 
UN5 Labour union actions 
UN6 Manufacturing technology 
UN7 Raw material availability 
142 
 
5.3.4.2 EFA of PEU 
EFA is implemented to assess the unidimensionality of PEU, using the principal 
component method (see table 5.8) for the first four measures (UN1-UN4). The 
remaining measures (UN5-UN7) are removed from the analysis due to the high rate of 
missing data (more than 10%) to avoid measurement bias (Hair et al., 2010). Missing 
data analysis will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. However, the high level of 
missing data in these measures (UN5-UN7) can be explained, as these measures may 
not be applicable to some companies in the sample. For instance, manufacturing 
technology (UN6) and raw material availability (UN7) are basically related to 
manufacturing companies. However, the sample is not limited to manufacturing 
companies. 
The initial results of EFA for PEU indicate a low level of communality (less than 0.5) 
for UN4 (unpredictability of changes in government regulation). As a result, UN4 was 
removed from the analysis and another round of analysis was performed using the 
remaining variables (UN1, UN2 and UN3). The results of the second round of EFA 
presented in table 5.8 confirm the unidimensionality of PEU. One factor has emerged 
from this analysis, explaining 59.27% from the variability in the construct. All the 
factor loadings were high, greater than 0.40, ranging from 0.81 to 0.88. Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity (47.67, p ≤ 0.05) and Kaiser’s measure of sampling adequacy (0.634) 
indicate that EFA is appropriate and within acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010). 
Table 5.8: EFA of PEU 
Measures Communalities Final 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Value 
Variance 
Extracted 
KMO Bartlett’s 
Test (sig.) 
Construct 
UN1 
UN2 
UN3 
0.657 
0.782 
0.788 
0.811 
0.884 
0.888 
1.778 59.27% 0.634 0.00 PEU 
 
5.3.4.3 Reliability of PEU 
To assess the construct reliability the indicator reliability is assessed, through 
examining the outer loadings of the measures with their respective constructs using 
PLS-SEM. Exploring the results of indicators loadings in table 5.9 reveals that all 
measures have high reliability as they highly load (greater than 0.7) on the PEU 
construct.  
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Table 5.9: Indicator Reliability of PEU Measures 
Measures Outer weight Loadings  
(outer 
Construct 
UN1 
UN2 
UN3 
0.470 
0.425 
0.396 
0.842 
0.761 
0.708 
PEU 
 
Further, to assess the construct reliability of the PEU, Cronbach’s alpha and 
composite reliability were calculated using PLS-SEM (see table 5.10). Cronbach’s 
alpha was 0.65, indicating an acceptable level of reliability (Nunnaly, 1978; Hair et 
al., 2010). Exploring the composite reliability value in table 5.10 reveals that PEU is 
internally consistent in its measurement and has satisfactory reliability (greater than 
0.7). The results of the reliability tests in general suggest that PEU can be measured 
adequately using UN1, UN2 and UN3. 
Table 5.10: Reliability Coefficients of PEU  
Construct Cronbach’s alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted  
PEU 0.659 0.815 0.597 
 
5.3.4.4 Convergent Validity of PEU 
To assess the construct validity the convergent validity of the PEU construct AVE is 
examined, which should be ≥ 0.5 to indicate a sufficient level of convergent validity 
(Hair et al., 2011a).The results in table 5.10 reveal that the AVE of PEU (0.597) 
indicates a satisfactory level of convergent validity (AVE ≥ 0.5). In addition, 
discriminant validity and nomological validity will be assessed for all the constructs at 
the end of this chapter. 
5.3.5 Strategy 
The role of strategy is critical in MCS studies, as it tackles the criticism levelled at the 
assumption of the contingency-based research that MCS is determined by context and 
managers are constrained by their operating circumstances (Chenhall, 2007). 
“Corporate strategy is concerned with decisions about the types of businesses to 
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operate in, including what businesses to acquire or divest, and how best to structure 
and finance the company” (Johnson and Scholes, 1989, p. 9). 
Three common taxonomies have been used in studying the strategy-MCS relationship:  
prospectors/analysts/defenders (Miles and Snow, 1978), build/hold/harvest (Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 1984) and product differentiation/cost leadership (Porter, 1980). 
Arguably, these taxonomies are not significantly different and can be reconciled with 
prospectors/builders/product differentiators at one end of a continuum, and 
defenders/harvesters/cost-leaders at the other (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). 
Different instruments have been used to capture the different aspects of strategies in 
MCS empirical studies. One approach uses instruments that measure strategies 
through directly asking respondents if they use differentiation/cost-leadership 
strategies. For instance, Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) use an instrument asking 
respondents to indicate the percentage of their business unit’s total sales accounted for 
by products representing use of either cost-leadership or differentiation. Similarly, 
Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) use self-typing instruments asking respondents to read a 
short unlabelled description of  four strategic types, based on Miles and Snow's 
(1978) typology of prospector and defender, and to select the paragraph which best 
describes their strategies. 
Another approach uses instruments that indirectly infer the strategy type through 
asking respondents to position their companies in comparison with competitors. For 
instance, Govindarajan (1988) used an instrument to measure strategy based on 
Porter's (1980) typology of differentiation and low cost strategies, asking respondents 
to position their companies relative to leading competitors in different areas, including 
product-selling price, percentage of sales spent on research and development and 
marketing expenses, product quality, brand image and product features.  
5.3.5.1 Measures of Strategy 
This study adopts the indirect approach suggested by Govindarajan (1988). This 
instrument (see table 5.11) allows strategy to be measured based on a continuum, 
whereas a high score on the continuum reflects differentiation strategies and a low 
score reflects cost leadership strategies. Using a continuum allows respondents to 
flexibly position their companies on the continuum, as it is not necessary for 
companies to be positioned at one of the extremes. On a seven-point Likert scale 
ranging from significantly lower to significantly higher, respondents were asked to 
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position their companies, relative to their leading competitors in product-selling price, 
percentage of sales spent on research and development, percentage of sales spent on 
marketing expenses, product quality, brand image and product features.  
Table 5.11: Measures of Strategy  
Construct Source Measure no. Description of the Measure 
(Company relative position to competitors in ...) 
Strategy Govindarajan 
(1988) 
ST1 Brand image 
ST2 Product features 
ST3 Product quality 
ST4 Product sales price 
ST5 Percentage of sales spent on research and 
development (R&D) 
ST6 Percentage of sales spent on marketing expenses 
 
5.3.5.2 EFA of Strategy 
To assess the unidimensionality of the strategy construct, EFA was implemented 
using the principal component method (see table 5.12) for the first four measures 
ST1-ST4. The rest of measures (ST5-ST6) were removed from the analysis due to the 
high rate of missing data (more than 10%), to avoid measurement bias (Hair et al., 
2010). Missing data analysis will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. However, 
the high level of missing data in these measures (ST5-ST6) can be attributed to the 
wide range of companies represented in the sample, for which some costs, such as 
research and development, may not be applicable. 
The initial results of EFA for strategy indicate a low level of communality (less than 
0.5) for ST4 (company relative position to competitors in sales price). As a result, 
ST4 was removed from the analysis and another round of analysis was performed 
using the remaining variables (ST1, ST2 and ST3). The results of the EFA presented 
in table 5.12 confirm the unidimensionality of the strategy construct. One factor has 
emerged from this analysis, explaining 74.22% from the variability of strategy. All 
loadings were high, greater than 0.40, ranging from 0.85 to 0.91. Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity (128.77, p ≤ 0.05) and Kaiser’s measure of sampling adequacy (0.719) 
indicate that EFA is appropriate and within acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010). 
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Table 5.12: EFA of strategy  
Measures Communalities Final 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Value 
Variance 
Extracted 
KMO Bartlett’s 
Test (sig.) 
Construct 
ST1 
ST2 
ST3 
0.719 
0.825 
0.830 
0.848 
0.908 
0.911 
2.227 74.22% 0.719 0.00 Strategy 
 
5.3.5.3 Reliability of Strategy 
To assess the construct reliability of strategy, indicator reliability was assessed by 
examining the outer loadings of the measures with their respective constructs using 
PLS-SEM. Exploring the results of indicator loadings in table 5.13 reveals that all 
measures have high reliability as they highly load (greater than 0.7) on the strategy 
construct.  
Table 5.13: Indicator Reliability of Strategy Measures 
Measures Outer weight Loadings  
(outer 
Construct 
ST1 
ST2 
ST3 
0.357 
0.388 
0.384 
0.848 
0.908 
0.911 
Strategy 
 
Furthermore, Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability were calculated using PLS-
SEM (see table 5.14). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.817, indicating an acceptable level of 
reliability (Hair et al., 2010). The composite reliability value (0.919) in table 5.14 
reveals that the strategy construct is internally consistent in its measurement and has 
satisfactory reliability (greater than 0.7). The results of the reliability tests, in general, 
suggest that the strategy can be measured adequately using ST1, ST2 and ST3. 
Table 5.14: Reliability Coefficients of Strategy 
Construct Cronbach’s alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted  
Strategy 0.817 0.919 0.791 
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5.3.5.4 The Construct Validity of Strategy 
To assess the construct validity of strategy the convergent validity of the strategy 
construct was examined using AVE, which should be ≥ 0.5 to indicate a sufficient 
level of convergent validity (Hair et al., 2011a). The results in table 5.14 reveal that 
the AVE value of strategy (0.791) indicates a satisfactory level of convergent validity 
(AVE ≥ 0.5). However, discriminant validity and nomological validity will be 
assessed for all constructs at the end of this chapter. 
5.3.6 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation, as an important feature of organisation structure, relates to the extent 
to which authority for taking decisions is delegated to relatively low levels in the 
organisation. Similar to other aspects of context in contemporary settings, structure is 
an important factor in understanding MCS design (Chenhall, 2007). 
Decentralisation can be defined as the degree of autonomy delegated to managers 
(Chenhall and Morris, 1986). It provides business unit managers with greater 
responsibility over planning and control actions and greater access to information not 
available to the centre (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). 
5.3.6.1 Measures of Decentralisation 
To capture the level of delegating decision making authority in a company, this study 
adopts the instrument developed by Gordon and Narayanan (1984). On a seven-point 
Likert scale, ranging from no delegation at all to full delegation, the instrument (see 
table 5.15) includes five questions. 
Table 5.15: Measures of Decentralisation 
Construct Source Measure 
no. 
Description of the Measure 
 (Delegation of authority in .....) 
Decentralisation Gordon and 
Narayanan 
(1984) 
DC1 Development of new products 
DC2 Hiring and firing personnel 
DC3 Pricing of new products and significant price 
changes 
DC4 Selection of large new investments 
DC5 Budget setting 
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The respondents were asked to indicate the degree of authority delegated by the chief 
executives of their firms to make decisions related to development of new products, 
hiring and firing of managerial personnel, pricing of new products and significant 
price changes, selection of large new investments and budget setting. 
5.3.6.2 EFA of Decentralisation 
To assess the unidimensionality of the decentralisation construct EFA was 
implemented using the principal component method (see table 5.16). The initial 
results of EFA for decentralisation indicate a low level of communality (less than 0.5) 
for DC4 (delegating decision making in selection of large new investments) and DC5 
(delegating decision making in budget setting). As a result, DC4 and DC5 were 
removed in the first two rounds from the analysis respectively. Another round of 
analysis was run using the remaining variables (DC1, DC2 and DC3). 
The results of the EFA presented in table 5.16 confirm the unidimensionality of the 
decentralisations construct. One factor has emerged from this analysis, explaining 
76.79% from variability in decentralisation. All loadings were high, greater than 0.40, 
ranging from 0.75 to 0.86. Bartlett’s test of sphericity (89.61, p ≤ 0.05) and Kaiser’s 
measure of sampling adequacy (0.664) indicate that EFA is appropriate and within 
acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010). 
Table 5.16: EFA of Decentralisation 
Measures Communalities Final 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Value 
Variance 
Extracted 
KMO Bartlett’s 
Test (sig.) 
Construct 
DC1 
DC2 
DC3 
0.730 
0.561 
0.743 
0.855 
0.749 
0.862 
2.034 76.79% 0.664 0.00 Decent. 
 
5.3.6.3 Reliability of Decentralisation 
To assess the construct reliability of decentralisation, indicator reliability was 
assessed by examining the outer loadings of the measures with their respective 
construct using PLS-SEM. Exploring the results of indicator loadings in table 5.17 
reveals that all the measures have high reliability as they highly load (greater than 0.7) 
on the decentralisation construct.  
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Table 5.17: Indicator Reliability of Decentralisation Measures 
Measures Outer weight Loadings  
(outer 
Construct 
DC1 
DC2 
DC3 
0.420 
0.368 
0.424 
0.855 
0.749 
0.862 
Decentralisation 
 
Additionally, to assess the construct reliability of decentralisation Cronbach’s alpha 
and composite reliability were calculated using PLS-SEM (see table 5.18). 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.760, indicating an acceptable level of reliability (Hair et al., 
2010). The composite reliability value was 0.760, revealing that the decentralisation 
construct is internally consistent in its measurement and has satisfactory reliability 
(greater than 0.7). The results of the reliability tests in general suggest that 
decentralisation can be measured adequately using DC1, DC2 and DC3. 
Table 5.18: Reliability Coefficients of Decentralisation 
Construct Cronbach’s alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted  
Decentralisation 0.760 0.760 0.678 
 
5.3.6.4 Convergent Validity of Decentralisation 
To consider the construct validity the convergent validity of the decentralisation 
construct was examined using AVE, which should be ≥ 0.5 to indicate a sufficient 
level of convergent validity (Hair et al., 2011a). The results in table 5.18 reveal that 
the AVE of decentralisation (0.678) indicates a satisfactory level of convergent 
validity (AVE ≥ 0.5). However, discriminant validity and nomological validity will be 
assessed for all constructs at the end of this chapter. 
5.3.7 Compliance with the CCCG 
CG codes aim at “improving the quality of companies’ board governance and 
increasing the accountability of companies to shareholders while maximizing 
shareholder or stakeholder value” (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004: p.420). 
Therefore, compliance with CG codes has the potential to improve organisational 
performance. The literature suggests different approaches to measure the level of 
compliance with CG codes. One approach is to classify companies into compliant and 
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non-compliant with some provisions, separated by box-ticking (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004). Another approach is to develop a CG index to proxy for the overall 
level of compliance with the code provisions, similar to Gompers et al. (2003) 
methodology. 
5.3.7.1 Measure of Compliance with the CCCG 
This study adopts the methodology of Gompers et al. (2003) in developing the CG 
index (see table 5.19). The CG index approach, as a holistic approach, has the 
advantage of capturing multiple CG mechanisms rather than focusing on a single or 
small subset of CG mechanisms, taking into consideration the complementarities 
between these mechanisms. Due to the lack of information regarding the overall level 
of compliance with the CCCG in the quoted companies in the UK, this study uses 
content analysis to assess the level of compliance with the code provisions in the 
sampled companies.  
The CG report, as a part of the annual report, has been analysed to identify which 
provisions a company has complied with and which provisions has not. To develop a 
compliance index for a company, the level of compliance to each provision in the 
code has been assessed and a value has been assigned to each provision accordingly. 
Each provision is to be rated 1 if a company complies with it and 0 if not. The total 
compliance score is to be calculated as a summation of values assigned to all 
provisions with equal weights given. 
Table 5.19: Measure of Compliance with the CCCG 
Construct Source Measure no. Description of the Measure 
Compliance with 
the CCCG 
Content analysis 
developed by this study 
following Gompers et al. 
(2003) methodology 
CM Percentage of compliance 
with the CCCG provisions 
 
Because the sample comprises two different groups of companies with different 
compliance requirements, two sets of provisions have been examined. The first set is 
used for the companies listed on the Main Market, based on the provisions of section 
1 from the CCCG (Combined Code, 2008). The second set is used for AIM 
companies, based on QCA guidelines (QCA, 2007). The maximum score on the 
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compliance index, in case of full compliance with all provisions, is 49 for companies 
listed on the Main Market and 29 for AIM companies. 
However, to achieve comparability to the compliance scores for companies in the two 
markets a compliance percentage is calculated for each company. The compliance 
percentage relates the total compliance score for each company to the respected 
maximum score in the case of full compliance. 
None of the EFA, reliability and convergent validity tests have been performed for 
compliance with the CCCG, as it has been measured using a single indicator. 
However, the discriminant and nomological validity of this construct, along with 
other constructs will be tested at the end of this chapter.  
5.3.8 Corporate Entrepreneurship 
CE has been recognised in the literature as an important element of successful 
companies, as it can help in the acquisition of new capabilities, development of new 
venture streams and improving performance (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 
2009). CE is a multi-dimensional construct; therefore different typologies have been 
used in the literature to capture the different dimensions of entrepreneurship (Miller, 
1983; Covin and Slevin, 1989; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Short et al., 2010). 
One of the earliest and the most commonly used typologies in the literature was 
developed by Miller (1983), which assumes three dimensions of CE namely, 
innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness. More recently, Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) suggest autonomy and competitive aggressiveness dimensions as additional 
components of the CE construct. However, there is no agreement in the literature on 
what constitutes CE. The lack of consensus has encouraged researches towards 
building and testing a broader theory of entrepreneurship, which makes it difficult for 
them to investigate the relationship between entrepreneurship and performance 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  
5.3.8.1 Measures of CE 
This study adopts a comprehensive instrument that contains the five main dimensions 
of CE (see table 5.20). These dimensions include three dimensions (innovativeness, 
risk-taking and proactiveness), based on Miller’s (1983) conceptualisation of CE, and 
the two dimensions (autonomy and competitive aggressiveness), as suggested by 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996).  
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Table 5.20: Measures of CE 
Construct Dimensions Dimension 
no. 
Source Measure 
No. 
Description of measure 
CE Innovation  
 
CE1 Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
CE11 Emphasis on R&D and innovation 
    CE12 New lines of products 
    CE13 Change in product lines 
 Proactiveness  
 
CE2 Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
CE21 Initiatives in dealing with 
competitors 
    CE22 Introducing new products, 
administrative techniques and 
operating technologies 
    CE23 Competitive posture 
 Competitive 
Aggressivenes
s 
CE3 Lumpkin and 
Dess (2001) 
CE31 Aggressiveness and intense 
competition 
 Risk taking  
 
CE4 Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
CE41 Tendency to accept high risk 
projects 
    CE42 Bold, wide-ranging acts to achieve 
firm’s objectives 
    CE43 Aggressive posture to exploit 
potential opportunities 
 Autonomy  
 
CE5 Lumpkin et 
al. (2009) 
CE51 Supporting individuals/teams to 
work autonomously 
    CE52 Individuals/teams decide 
themselves business opportunities 
    CE53 Individuals/team take decisions 
without constantly referring to 
supervisors 
    CE54 Employee initiatives and input play 
important role in deciding 
entrepreneurial opportunities 
 
Innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness have been measured in the current study 
using the most commonly used instrument in CE literature. The instrument was 
developed by Covin and Slevin (1989), based on previous instruments developed by 
Khandwalla (1977) and Miller and Friesen (1982). The instrument comprises a nine-
item scale that measures a company tendency toward innovation, proactiveness and 
risk-taking, using a seven-point semantic scale. The first three items of this instrument 
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measure a company’s tendency toward innovation, the second three items measure a 
company’s proactive orientation and the last three items measure a company’s risk-
taking tendency (Covin and Slevin, 1989). Competitive aggressiveness was measured 
using a one-item scale adopted from Lumpkin and Dess (2001), and autonomy was 
measured using four-item scale adopted from Lumpkin et al. (2009).  
5.3.8.2 EFA of CE 
To assess the unidimensionality of the CE construct EFA was implemented using the 
principal component method (see table 5.21). EFA for CE, as a second order latent 
variable comprising a number of first order latent variables was performed in two 
stages. At the first stage EFA was performed for each of the CE dimensions 
separately. Therefore, loadings of measures (CE11-C54) were checked for their 
respected first order latent variables or dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, 
competitive aggressiveness, risk taking and autonomy). 
Table 5.21: EFA of the CE Dimensions 
Measure Communalities Final 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Value 
Variance 
Extracted 
KMO Bartlett
’s Test 
(sig.) 
Cronbach
’s alpha 
Dimensions 
CE11 0.626 0.791 2.073 69.11% 0.690 0.00 0.774 Innovativeness 
CE12 0.726 0.852       
CE13 0.722 0.850       
CE21 0.633 0.796 1.935 64.49% 0.681 0.00 0.722 Proactiveness 
CE22 0.633 0.795       
CE23 0.639 0.818       
CE31 ― ―  ― ― ― ― Competitive 
aggressiveness 
(CE3) CE41 0.764 0.874 2.145 71.49% 0.698 0.00 0.80 Risk taking  
CE42 0.718 0.847       
CE43 0.663 0.814       
CE51 0.552 0.743 1.811 60.38% 0.651 0.00 0.671 Autonomy  
CE52 0.664 0.815       
CE53 0.595 0.771       
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The initial results of EFA indicate that all variables, as assumed, loaded highly on 
their respected first order latent variables except for CE54, which was removed for 
low communalities with other variables (CE51-CE53) in the autonomy dimension. 
Further, to assess the reliability of each dimension, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated 
using SPSS (see table 5.21). Cronbach’s alpha was greater than 0.70 for all 
dimensions except autonomy which was equal to 0.67, indicating an acceptable level 
of reliability (Hair et al., 2010).  
At the second stage, loadings of all first order latent variables (dimensions) were 
checked for the second order latent variable (CE). However, risk taking CE4 and 
autonomy CE5 were removed because of low communality (less than 0.5) and EFA 
was performed using the remaining first order latent variables or dimensions 
(Innovativeness (CE1), proactiveness (CE2) and competitive aggressiveness (CE3).  
The results of the EFA presented in table 5.22 confirm the unidimensionality of CE. 
One factor has emerged from this analysis explaining 69.11% from the variability of 
CE. All loadings were high, greater than 0.40, ranging from 0.79 to 0.85. Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity (111.90, p ≤ 0.05) and Kaiser’s measure of sampling adequacy (0.69) 
indicate that EFA is appropriate and within acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010).  
Table 5.22: EFA of the CE Construct 
Dimensions Measures Commu
nalities 
Final 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Value 
Variance 
Extracted 
KMO Bartlett’
s Test 
(sig.) 
Construct 
Innovativeness CE11 0.626 0.791 2.073 69.11% 0.690 0.00 CE 
Proactiveness CE12 0.726 0.852     
Competitive 
aggressiveness 
CE13 0.722 0.850     
 
5.3.8.3 Reliability of CE 
To assess the construct reliability of CE, indicator reliability was assessed by 
examining the outer loadings of the measures with their respective constructs using 
PLS-SEM. Exploring the results of indicator loadings in table 5.23 reveals that all 
measures have high reliability as they highly load (greater than 0.7) on the CE 
construct. 
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Table 5.23: Indicator Reliability of CE measures 
Measures Outer weight Loadings  
(outer 
Construct 
CE1 
CE2 
CE3 
0.355 
0.433 
0.409 
0.725 
0.904 
0.861 
Decentralisation 
 
To assess the construct reliability of CE, Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability 
were calculated using PLS-SEM (see table 5.24). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.776, 
indicating an acceptable level of reliability (Hair et al., 2010). The composite 
reliability value (0.871) in table 5.24 reveals that the CE construct is internally 
consistent in its measurement and has satisfactory reliability (greater than 0.7). The 
results of the reliability tests, in general, suggest that CE can be measured adequately 
using CE1, CE2 and CE3. 
Table 5.24: Reliability Coefficients of CE 
Construct Cronbach’s alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted  
CE 0.776 0.871 0.695 
 
5.3.8.4 Convergent Validity of CE 
To assess the construct validity, the convergent validity of the CE construct was 
examined using AVE, which should be ≥ 0.5 to indicate a sufficient level of 
convergent validity (Hair et al., 2011a). The results in table 5.24 reveal that the AVE 
of CE (0.695) indicates a satisfactory level of convergent validity (AVE ≥ 0.5). 
However, discriminant validity and nomological validity will be assessed for all 
constructs at the end of this chapter. 
5.3.9 Organisational Performance 
Performance is a multidimensional construct and it is not an easy task to find an 
instrument that captures the multiple-aspects of organisational performance. 
Generally speaking, organisational performance can be measured using objective or 
subjective measures. However, each set of measures has its advantages and 
disadvantages. 
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Objective performance measures (e.g. profit, ROI, market-based measures) are more 
reliable than subjective performance measures. However, these measures of 
performance have been criticised for narrow focus on some aspects of performance 
(e.g. financial performance) and ignoring other important aspects (e.g. non-financial 
performance). Furthermore, comparing these measures across different companies 
with different objectives and strategies could provide misleading results. Subjective 
performance measures are less reliable than objective performance. However, these 
measures of performance are multi-dimensional, contain financial and non-financial 
measures and can be compared across companies.  
5.3.9.1 Measures of Organisational Performance 
In order to capture the multiple-aspects of organisational performance this study 
adopts both subjective and objective performance measures. According to Ittner and 
Larcker (2001), combining survey data (subjective performance measures) with hard 
performance data (objective performance measures) from publicly available sources 
helps to enhance the credibility of performance tests. However, “objective and 
subjective performance measures perhaps cannot, and should not, be used 
interchangeably” (Van der Stede et al., 2005: p.675).   
The main type of performance measures used in this study is the perceived 
performance as it includes the main aspects of performance (financial and non-
financial). Besides, it is the most commonly used measure in survey studies in 
management accounting in general (Van der Stede et al., 2005) and in the 
contingency-based studies in particular. Because VBM and CG studies mainly depend 
on the market-based performance measures for shareholder value creation, this study 
adopted the market-based performance, as a complementary to the perceived 
performance measures. 
The perceived performance was measured using an instrument adopted from 
Khandwalla (1977, p.657) and modified. This instrument (see table 5.25) has been 
selected because it comprises the main financial measures (e.g. profitability and sales 
growth), as well as non financial measures (e.g. public image). On a seven-point 
Likert scale, ranging from significantly lower to significantly higher, the instrument 
has six questions asking respondents to rate their performance relative to the major 
competitors in the following areas: profitability (measured by ROI for example), sales 
growth, development of new products, customer satisfaction and public image. 
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Table 5.25: Measures of Perceived Performance 
Construct Source Measure no. Description of the measure 
(Company relative position to competitors in...) 
Perceived 
Performance 
adapted 
from 
Khandwalla  
(1977)  
PP1 Sales growth 
PP2 Development of new products 
PP3 Public image and goodwill 
PP4 Profitability 
PP5 Customer satisfaction 
 
In addition, this study adopted Total Shareholder Return (TSR) to proxy for  
shareholder value (see table 5.26), as TSR is the most popular and cited measure for 
shareholder wealth (Cooper et al., 2001; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004) and denotes 
“the change in capital value of a company over a one-year period, plus dividends, 
stated as a percentage of the stock value at the beginning of the year” (Ameels et al., 
2002). 
TSR captures the two sources of shareholder value creation, i.e. the increase in share 
price during the year and the dividends received in that year. Proponents of VBM 
(e.g. Rappaport, 1986) argue that stock price is the best measure of market 
expectations of a company’s future performance and TSR is a good measure for 
shareholder value creation, as it can be used to estimate the stock’s future value and 
the expected risk 
Table 5.26: Measure of Market-Based Performance 
Construct Source Measure no. Description of the Measure 
Market-based 
Performance 
(Cooper et al., 2001; 
Dulewicz and Herbert, 
2004) 
MP Total Shareholder Return (TSR) 
 
However, TSR is not without shortcomings. The main problems with this measure are 
being affected with unexpected and unexplained fluctuations in the stock market and 
failing to directly consider the efficiency of using assets to generate profits, regardless 
of how profits are delivered to shareholders in the forms of dividends or capital 
appreciation (Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004). 
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In the current study, to address these problems, TSR was not used as the only 
performance measure; perceived performance measures were used in addition to 
gauge the multiple-aspects of performance. TSR was measured using archive data 
rather than the perceived measure as asking the key informants of listed companies to 
estimate their actual stock returns ex-post while the historical data is publicly 
available from databases is questionable (Lueg and Schaffer, 2010). 
According to Ittner et al. (2003), ex-post perceptive performance measures are, 
apparently, unrelated to quantitative performance measures from capital markets and, 
therefore, may not be an appropriate surrogate. In the current study TSR was obtained 
using DataStream index to measure the growth in value of a shareholding over the 
year ending 2010 for the responding companies.     
None of the EFA, reliability and convergent validity tests have been performed for 
market-based performance, as it has been measured using a single indicator. However, 
the discriminant and nomological validity of this construct, along with other 
constructs, will be tested at the end of this chapter.                                                                                                                              
5.3.9.2 EFA of Perceived Performance 
To assess the unidimensionality of the perceived performance construct EFA was 
implemented using the principal component method (see table 5.27). The initial 
results of EFA for VBM indicate a low level of communality (less than 0.5) for PP4 
(profitability) and PP5 (customer satisfaction). As a result, PP4 and PP5 were 
removed in the first two rounds of the analysis respectively. Another round of analysis 
was carried out using the remaining variables, sales growth (PP1), development of 
new products (PP2) and public image and good will (PP3). 
Table 5.27: EFA of Perceived performance 
Measures Communalities Final 
Loadings 
Eigen 
Value 
Variance 
Extracted 
KMO Bartlett’s 
Test 
Construct 
PP1 
PP2 
PP3 
0.698 
0.742 
0.538 
0.835 
0.861 
0.734 
1.878 65.92% 0.652 0.00 Perceived 
performance 
The results of the EFA presented in table 5.27 confirm the unidimensionality of the 
perceived performance construct. One factor has emerged from this analysis, 
explaining 65.92% from variability in the perceived performance. All loadings were 
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high, greater than 0.40, ranging from 0.73 to 0.86. Bartlett’s test of sphericity (79.97, 
p ≤ 0.05) and Kaiser’s measure of sampling adequacy (0.652) indicated that EFA is 
appropriate and within acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010).  
5.3.9.3 Reliability of Perceived Performance 
To assess the construct reliability, the indicator reliability was assessed by examining 
the outer loadings of the measures with their respective constructs using PLS-SEM. 
Exploring the results of indicator loadings in table 5.28 reveals that all measures have 
high reliability as they highly load (greater than 0.7) on the perceived performance 
construct.  
Table 5.28: Indicator Reliability of Perceived Performance Measures 
Measures Outer weight Loadings 
(outer 
Construct 
PP1 
PP2 
PP3 
0.422 
0.371 
0.436 
0.835 
0.861 
0.734 
Perceived performance 
 
Further, to assess the construct reliability of the perceived performance, Cronbach’s 
alpha and composite reliability were calculated using PLS-SEM (see table 5.29). 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.739, indicating an acceptable level of reliability (Hair et al., 
2010). The composite reliability value (0.852) in table 5.29 reveals that the perceived 
performance construct is internally consistent in its measurement and has a 
satisfactory reliability (greater than 0.7). The results of the reliability tests, in general, 
suggest that the perceived performance can be measured adequately using PP1, PP2 
and PP3. 
Table 5.29: Reliability Coefficients of Perceived Performance 
Construct Cronbach’s alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted  
Perceived 
performance 
0.739 0.852 0.659 
5.3.9.4 Convergent Validity of Perceived Performance 
To assess the construct validity the convergent validity of the perceived performance 
construct was examined using AVE, which should be ≥ 0.5 to indicate a sufficient 
level of convergent validity (Hair et al., 2011a). The results in table 5.29 reveal that 
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the AVE value of the perceived performance (0.659) indicates a satisfactory level of 
convergent validity (AVE ≥ 0.5). However, discriminant validity and nomological 
validity of the perceived performance will be assessed for all constructs at the end of 
this chapter. 
5.4  Discriminant validity 
Discriminant validity assesses “the degree to which measures of different concepts are 
distinct” (Bagozzi, 1994, p. 20). According to Hair et al. (2011b), two criteria can be 
used to assess the discriminant validity: Fornell-Larcker’s criterion, developed by 
Fornell and Larcker (1981), and cross loadings criterion, developed by Chin (1998).  
5.4.1 Forner-Larcker’s Criterion 
The Fornell-Larcker criterion requires the AVE for each construct to be higher than 
the squared inter-correlation between this construct and any other constructs (Fornell 
and Larcker, 1981). Alternatively, comparison can be made between the square root 
of AVE for each construct and the inter-correlations with other constructs. 
Table 5.30: Correlation Matrix of Constructs and Square Roots of AVE 
 Size Agen. Uncert Strat. Dec. VBM Com. CE P. P. M.P. Com*
VBM 
Size 1           
Agen. 0.042 1          
Uncert 0.153 -0.055 0.773         
Strat. -0.049 -0.082 0.244 0.89        
Dec. 0.099 0.169 0.191 0.256 0.823       
VBM 0.046 0.269 -0.039 -0.178 0.157 0.847      
Comp 0.148 0.389 -0.026 -0.003 0.289 0.226 1     
CE 0.16 -0.002 0.325 0.525 0.258 -0.021 0.114 0.833    
P. P. 0.095 -0.114 0.254 0.759 0.216 -0.116 0.016 0.616 0.812   
M. P. 0.023 0.19 0.037 0.117 0.125 0.032 0.351 -0.048 0.068 1  
Com.*
VBM -0.053 -0.073 -0.005 0.073 -0.046 0.071 -0.251 -0.173 -0.043 -0.062 0.823 
        
To apply the Fornell-Larcker criterion a constructs correlation matrix was developed 
and average variances extracted (AVE's) were shown on the diagonal, as shown in 
table 5.30. The matrix shows the square roots of AVE on the diagonal and the inter-
correlation between constructs off diagonal.  
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Exploring the results indicates that the square root of AVE for any construct is greater 
than the correlation between this construct and any other construct in the same row or 
column. Accordingly, all the constructs have a satisfactory level of discriminant 
validity. 
5.4.2 Cross Loadings 
The second criterion of discriminant validity is cross loadings. According to Chin 
(1998), a latent construct exhibits satisfactory discriminant validity when the loadings 
of items used in measuring this construct are higher than their loadings with all the 
remaining constructs (cross loadings). 
To check if there are any cross loadings a correlation matrix is prepared between the 
latent constructs and the indicators (observed variables) used in measuring these 
constructs, as shown in table 5.31. The correlation matrix shows the correlations 
(loadings) of each indicator to their respected constructs and to all the other 
constructs.  
Exploring the results in table 5.31 indicates that all items have high loadings with 
their respected constructs compared with their loadings to the other constructs in the 
same row or column. In other words, there are no cross loadings for any of the 
measurement items. This means that all the constructs achieve satisfactory levels of 
discriminant validity and can be used in the structural model to test the hypothesised 
relationships between these constructs.  
5.5  Nomological Validity 
To ensure the nomological validity of constructs a theoretical support from prior 
research for the proposed relationships between the constructs has been provided in 
the theoretical framework chapter, to ensure that the correlations between the 
constructs in the measurement theory make sense. Further, the nomological validity 
has been examined based on the correlation matrix, as recommended by Hair et al. 
(2010). 
The correlation matrix provided in table 5.32 and the P values of correlations in table 
5.33 support the prediction that these constructs are related to each other and these 
relationships simply make sense.  
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Table 5.31: Correlation Matrix of Constructs and Indicators 
 Size Agen. Unc. Strat. Dec. VBM Comp CE P. P. M. P. 
Com.*
VBM 
SZ1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AG1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UN1 0.081 -0.127 0.708 0.383 -0.031 0.137 0.016 -0.053 -0.287 0.041 -0.102 
UN2 -0.049 0.043 0.761 -0.185 -0.046 -0.042 0.022 0.171 -0.017 0.013 0.141 
UN3 -0.024 0.068 0.842 -0.154 0.068 -0.077 -0.033 -0.109 0.257 -0.046 -0.042 
ST1 0.026 0.09 0.086 0.848 -0.17 0.051 -0.045 0.024 -0.088 0.077 -0.035 
ST2 -0.025 -0.117 -0.065 0.908 0.12 -0.047 0.021 0.073 -0.136 0.023 0.014 
ST3 0.001 0.033 -0.016 0.911 0.038 -0.001 0.02 -0.095 0.218 -0.095 0.019 
DC1 0.039 -0.01 0.049 -0.073 0.855 -0.103 -0.032 0.06 -0.005 0.069 -0.001 
DC2 -0.018 -0.017 -0.121 -0.024 0.749 0.091 0.071 0.186 -0.178 -0.003 0.048 
DC3 -0.023 0.024 0.056 0.093 0.862 0.023 -0.03 -0.221 0.159 -0.067 -0.041 
VM3 -0.105 -0.01 -0.034 -0.147 0.054 0.862 -0.156 0.085 0.05 0.057 -0.136 
VM4 0.057 0.087 -0.018 -0.048 0.049 0.907 -0.185 -0.075 0.041 0.005 -0.102 
VM5 0.051 -0.092 0.06 0.223 -0.119 0.765 0.396 -0.007 -0.106 -0.07 0.274 
CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
CE1 -0.107 -0.015 0.137 -0.056 -0.049 -0.037 -0.137 0.725 -0.193 0.101 -0.007 
CE2 0.094 0.049 -0.129 0.076 0.005 0.039 -0.017 0.904 0.147 0.013 -0.017 
CE3 -0.009 -0.038 0.021 -0.032 0.036 -0.009 0.134 0.861 0.008 -0.099 0.023 
PP1 0.074 -0.029 -0.019 -0.291 -0.087 -0.078 0.187 -0.063 0.835 -0.115 0.105 
PP2 -0.082 -0.025 0.003 -0.011 0.033 -0.057 0.017 0.152 0.861 0.108 0.012 
PP3 0.012 0.062 0.017 0.345 0.061 0.155 -0.233 -0.107 0.734 0.004 -0.133 
MP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
CM* 
VM3 
-0.036 0.064 0.005 -0.072 -0.095 -0.157 0.1 -0.061 0.135 -0.001 0.894 
CM* 
VM4 
-0.019 -0.039 -0.026 -0.186 0.06 -0.157 0.216 0.131 0.052 0.011 0.908 
CM* 
VM5 
0.078 -0.035 0.03 0.365 0.048 0.442 -0.446 -0.101 -0.263 -0.015 0.639 
 
Regarding the direction of the relationships between the constructs, the signs of the 
correlation between the research constructs support most of the proposed directions. 
For instance, VBM is positively and significantly correlated with agency conflicts and 
compliance with the CCCG. However, the correlation signs between some other 
constructs were not as expected (e.g. VBM and uncertainty), which will be discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter. This means that the constructs, in general, achieve a 
satisfactory level of nomological validity and can be used in the structural model to 
test the hypothesised relationships between constructs.  
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Table 5.32: Correlations between Constructs 
 Size Agen. Unc. Strat. Dec. VBM Com. CE P.P. M.P. Com.* 
VBM 
Size 1 0.042 0.153 -0.049 0.099 0.046 0.148 0.16 0.095 0.023 -0.053 
Agen. 0.042 1 -0.055 -0.082 0.169 0.269 0.389 -0.002 -0.114 0.19 -0.073 
Unc. 0.153 -0.055 1 0.244 0.191 -0.039 -0.026 0.325 0.254 0.037 -0.005 
Strat. -0.049 -0.082 0.244 1 0.256 -0.178 -0.003 0.525 0.759 0.117 0.073 
Dec. 0.099 0.169 0.191 0.256 1 0.157 0.289 0.258 0.216 0.125 -0.046 
VBM 0.046 0.269 -0.039 -0.178 0.157 1 0.226 -0.021 -0.116 0.032 0.071 
Com. 0.148 0.389 -0.026 -0.003 0.289 0.226 1 0.114 0.016 0.351 -0.251 
CE 0.16 -0.002 0.325 0.525 0.258 -0.021 0.114 1 0.616 -0.048 -0.173 
P. P. 0.095 -0.114 0.254 0.759 0.216 -0.116 0.016 0.616 1 0.068 -0.043 
M. P. 0.023 0.19 0.037 0.117 0.125 0.032 0.351 -0.048 0.068 1 -0.062 
Com.* 
VBM -0.053 -0.073 -0.005 0.073 -0.046 0.071 -0.251 -0.173 -0.043 -0.062 1 
 
Table 5.33: p values of Correlations between Constructs 
 Size Agen. Unc. Strat. Dec. VBM Comp CE Per.P M.P. Com* 
VBM 
Size 1 0.656 0.105 0.608 0.295 0.627 0.118 0.091 0.315 0.808 0.574 
Agenc 0.656 1 0.56 0.385 0.073 0.004 <.001 0.985 0.229 0.044 0.444 
Unc. 0.105 0.56 1 0.009 0.043 0.68 0.782 <.001 0.007 0.699 0.961 
Strat. 0.608 0.385 0.009 1 0.006 0.059 0.978 <.001 <.001 0.218 0.44 
Dec. 0.295 0.073 0.043 0.006 1 0.098 0.002 0.006 0.021 0.185 0.631 
VBM 0.627 0.004 0.68 0.059 0.098 1 0.016 0.825 0.22 0.733 0.458 
Comp 0.118 <.001 0.782 0.978 0.002 0.016 1 0.228 0.869 <.001 0.007 
CE 0.091 0.985 <.001 <.001 0.006 0.825 0.228 1 <.001 0.616 0.068 
Perc.P 0.315 0.229 0.007 <.001 0.021 0.22 0.869 <.001 1 0.472 0.648 
M.P 0.808 0.044 0.699 0.218 0.185 0.733 <.001 0.616 0.472 1 0.517 
Com* 
VBM 0.574 0.444 0.961 0.44 0.631 0.458 0.007 0.068 0.648 0.517 1 
 
5.6  Summary 
This chapter discussed in detail the measurements of the research constructs proposed 
in the theoretical framework, as an important step to test the hypothesised 
relationships in the structural model. To achieve this objective a five-step approach 
for developing and assessing the measurement model has been adopted. These steps 
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include conceptual definition and assessing content validity of constructs, assessing 
unidimensionality of constructs, assessing construct reliability, assessing construct 
validity, and finally using the measurement model to test the structural relationships 
between constructs as hypothesised in the theoretical model.  
The results, in general, confirm the unidimensionality of research constructs. The 
indicators used in measuring the research constructs exhibit acceptable levels of 
reliability. In addition, all the research constructs meet the criteria of the nomological, 
convergent and discriminant validity. These results suggest that that the measurement 
model can be adequately used in testing the structural model, as will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Structural model Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter the reliability and validity of the research 
constructs have been assured through assessing the measurement model, which 
ensured its adequacy to test the structural relationships proposed in the theoretical 
model. This chapter will present, in detail, the process of data analysis to assess the 
structural relationships between the research constructs, as a part of the hypotheses 
testing procedures. 
The second section in this chapter will discuss the results of data examination and 
screening including missing value analysis and detecting outliers. The third section 
will present the descriptive statistics and the normality testing of the research 
constructs. The fourth section will describe the procedures and measures used in 
assessing the structural model and hypotheses testing using PLS-SEM, including path 
coefficients, coefficient of determination (R2) and predictive relevance. The fifth 
section will present the results of hypotheses testing, based on path coefficients and 
their significance levels. In the sixth section the assessment of unobserved data 
heterogeneity and the multi-group analysis will be presented. The last section will 
include a summary of the chapter.   
6.2 Data Examination 
Data examination is a necessary initial step in data analysis to gain a better 
understanding of the data (Hair et al. 2010). According to Tabachnick and Fiddell 
(2007), data examination includes identifying and dealing with missing values, 
detecting outliers and testing the normality assumption of data. This section discusses 
in detail the procedures used in this study to screen and examine the data, including 
missing data analysis, procedures of detecting outliers and the normality testing. 
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6.2.1 Analysis of Missing Data  
Missing values occur when the respondents fail to provide answers to one or more of 
the survey questions. As a result, valid values for one or more variables will be 
missing from the analysis, which requires assessing the pattern and the extent of the 
missing data, to understand the process that caused the missing data (Hair et al., 
2010).  
Understanding the reasons behind the missing data helps in selecting the correct way 
to deal with it (Hair et al., 2010). According to Hair et al. (2010), there are two types 
of missing data. First, ignorable missing data expected as part of the research design 
and inherited in the technique used, which do not need specific remedies. Second, 
non-ignorable missing data expected as a result of some procedural factors or some 
other factors related to the respondents, which require some remedies. To decide 
whether the missing data is ignorable, Hair et al. (2010) suggest assessing the extent 
and patterns of the missing data. 
Generally speaking, missing data under 10% can be ignored (Hair et al. 2010). 
However, low levels of missing values between 10% and 15% are candidates for 
deletion to avoid biased measurement (Hair et al. 2010). “Ultimately the researcher 
must compromise between the gains from deleting variables and/or cases with 
missing data versus the reduction in sample size and variables to represent the 
concepts in the study” (Hair et al. 2010: p.48). 
Checking the extent of missing data in the current study using SPSS reveals that the 
missing data percentage, in general, is less than 10% (the ignoring limit according to 
Hair et al., 2010) for all variables except for five variables. These variables (three are 
related to PEU and two are related to strategy) have a higher percentage of missing 
data ranging from 10.6% to 15.9%. The variables related to PEU are labour union 
actions (UN5), manufacturing technology (UN6) and raw material availability (UN7). 
The variables related to strategy are the percentage of sales spent on research and 
development (ST5) and the percentage of sales spent on marketing expenses (ST6). 
One possible explanation of the relatively high percentage of missing data in these 
variables is that these variables might not be applicable to some companies (e.g. non-
manufacturing companies) in the sample, especially that some of these variables are 
basically related to manufacturing companies (e.g. manufacturing technology and raw 
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material availability). Therefore, the researcher decided to remove these five variables 
to avoid any measurement bias resulting from including thee variables in the data 
analysis (Hair et al., 2010), especially when the other variables can adequately 
measure their respected constructs. Similarly, checking the cases with missing values 
reveals that only four cases have missing values over 10%, ranging from 11.4% to 
22%, and they have been removed for the same reason. 
In addition, deciding whether missing data occur completely at random (MCAR) is 
rather important, to assess the patterns of missing data, and to ensure that there is no 
systematic error (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, Little’s MCAR test has been performed 
using SPSS to assess the patterns of missing data in all variables. The null hypothesis 
of this test is that the data are MCAR. The results of Little’s MCAR test (Chi-square 
3427, df.3806, sig. 1.00, p > 0.05) support the null hypothesis and ensure the 
randomness of missing data (missing completely at random MCAR). This implies that 
there is no systematic error in the data, which allows a wide range of options in 
treating the missing data (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, this study uses mean 
substitution for missing values, as one of the very common and best ways to impute 
missing values (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2010). This method is easily 
implemented using SPSS and, in general, is appropriate for relatively lower levels of 
missing data (Hair et al., 2010). 
6.2.2 Detecting Outliers 
Outliers represent “observations with a unique combination of characteristics 
identifiable as distinctly different from the other observations” (Hair et al., 2010: p. 
64). Outliers can be viewed as beneficial as indicative for some unique or odd 
characteristics of populations that cannot be revealed in the normal course of analysis; 
meanwhile, it could be problematic as it distorts statistical tests (Hair et al. 2010). 
In this study, both univariate and multivariate outliers were tested. Univariate outliers 
have been tested through transforming all the data into standardised scores. Typically, 
outliers are identified when the standard score is 2.5 or greater, for larger sample size 
(over 80) it can be extended up to 4 (Hair et al., 2010). In this study, the very common 
threshold value of 3 has been used (Hair et al. 2010) to detect outliers. The results 
revealed a few number of univariate outliers (e.g. PEU and some measures of VBM).  
To detect multivariate outliers Mahalanobis D2 analysis has been performed as a part 
of the regression analysis using SPSS. This analysis assesses the position of each 
168 
 
observation relative to the centre of all observations of a set of variables (Hair et al. 
2010). In this analysis, a case can be considered as a multivariate outlier if the 
probability associated with D2 is less than or equal to 0.001. After checking D2 and 
the associated probability, few cases were classified as multivariate outliers (e.g. 
TSR), which is acceptable and expected (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007), especially 
when the sample comprises a wide range of companies from different business sectors 
and sizes, as is the case in this study. 
According to Hair et al. (2010), outliers should be retained unless they are not 
representative for the population or seriously deviate from the normal. Therefore, this 
study retained the outliers, especially as the main statistical technique used for data 
analysis in this study (PLS-SEM) is not sensitive to the normality of data. 
6.2.3 Assessing Data Normality 
Normality is an essential assumption in multivariate analysis, especially in SEM (Hair 
et al., 2010). Violating the normal distribution assumption can make the resulting 
statistical tests invalid, especially when the variation from the normal distribution is 
sufficiently large (Hair et al., 2010). Skewness and kurtosis tests were used in this 
study to test the normality of data. These tests compare the distributions of the 
research data with the normal distribution (Hair et al., 2010).  
Kurtosis represents the “peakedness” or the “flatness” of distribution for a measure 
compared to the normal distribution (Hair et al., 2010). For a normal distribution, the 
value of the kurtosis statistic should be equal to zero. However, positive kurtosis 
values indicate a peaked distribution and negative kurtosis values indicate a flatter 
distribution (Hair et al., 2010). Skewness is a measure of the balance and asymmetry 
of distribution (Hair et al., 2010). Normal distribution is balanced, symmetric and has 
a skewness value of zero. If a distribution is unbalanced, it is skewed. Positive skew 
denotes a distribution shifted to the lift, whereas negative skewness reflects a shift to 
the right (Hair et al., 2010, p. 71). Skewness and kurtosis critical values can be 
identified from the Z distribution, based on the required significance level (Hair et al., 
2010). 
This study used the most commonly used critical value of ± 2.58 at the 0.01 
significance level (Hair et al., 2010). The details of these statistics to the constructs 
and their measures will be presented in detail in the next section as a part of the 
descriptive statistics.  
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6.3 Descriptive Statistics 
6.3.1 VBM  
According to the measurement model, as discussed in the previous chapter, three main 
dimensions have been suggested to capture the main aspects of VBM practices. These 
dimensions include using value-based measures in strategic and significant decision 
making (VM3), performance measurements (VM4) and rewarding managers (VM5). 
In addition, a number of variables (indicators) were used to measure each of these 
dimensions. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in measuring VBM, 
including minimum and maximum values, mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis are presented in table 6.1.  
The descriptive statistics indicate a below average score of the overall use of value-
based measures in strategic and significant decisions (2.84 out of 8). However, the 
results of the individual variables used in strategic and significant decisions indicate 
that DCF methods (such as the net present value method) are the most commonly 
used variables in strategic and significant decisions. The score of DCF was above the 
average (0.76 and 0.63 out of 1), at both corporate and business unit levels 
respectively. Other variables (such as CFROI and TSR) were less common in use 
(from 0.11 to 0.43 out of 1). Interestingly, EVA, the most popular value-based 
measure, was the least used measure (0.12 and 0.11 out of 1) at corporate and 
business unit levels respectively. 
The results also indicate a lower score (1.14 out of 6) of the overall use of value-based 
measures, in performance measurements, than the overall use of these measures in 
strategic and significant decision making (2.84 out of 8). The most commonly used 
value-based measure in performance measurements at the corporate level was TSR     
(0.44 out of 1) and CFROI at the business unit level (0.20 out of 1). However, the 
least used measure was EVA at the corporate level (0.09 out of 1), and TSR at the 
business unit level (0.04 out of 1). 
Finally, the results indicate, to a large extent, a lower score of the overall use of the 
value-based measures in management rewarding schemes (0.63 out of 6), than the 
overall use of these measures in performance measurements and strategic decision 
making. The most commonly used value-based measure in rewarding managers at the 
corporate level was TSR (0.44 out of 1) and CFROI at the business unit level (0.20 
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out of 1). However, the least used measure was EVA at the corporate level (0.09 out 
of 1) and TSR at the business unit level (0.04 out of 1). 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of VBM 
Constructs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
VBM* 1.534 1.205 0 6.33 0.227 0.451 
Strategic decision making (VM3) 2.84 1.830 0 8 .525 -.165 
DCF-Corporate level (VM31) 
 
.76 .428 0 1 -1.241 -.469 
DCF-Business unit level (VM32) 
 
.63 .485 0 1 -.538 -1.741 
EP/EVA- Corporate level (VM33) .12 .320 0 1 2.446 4.052 
EP/EVA-Business unit level (VM34) 
 
.11 .309 0 1 2.591 4.798 
CFROI-Corporate level (VM35) 
 
.39 .490 0 1 .460 -1.821 
CFROI-Business unit level (VM36) 
 
.28 .453 0 1 .975 -1.068 
TSR-Corporate level (VM37) 
 
.43 .498 0 1 .271 -1.961 
TSR-Business unit level (VM38) 
 
.12 .331 0 1 2.314 3.415 
Performance measurement (VM4) 1.14 1.375 0 6 1.335 1.399 
EP/EVA- Corporate level (VM41) .09 .285 0 1 2.937 6.744 
EP/EVA-Business unit level (VM42) 
 
.08 .272 0 1 3.147 8.046 
CFROI-Corporate level (VM43) 
 
.29 .457 0 1 .927 -1.161 
CFROI-Business unit level (VM43) 
 
.20 .404 0 1 1.493 .231 
TSR-Corporate level (VM45) 
 
.44 .499 0 1 .235 -1.980 
TSR-Business unit level (VM46) 
 
.04 .186 0 1 5.096 24.406 
Management rewarding (VM5) 0.63 1.009 0 6 2.215 6.976 
EP/EVA- Corporate level (VM51) .03 .161 0 1 5.970 34.243 
EP/EVA-Business unit level (VM52) 
 
.04 .186 0 1 5.096 24.406 
CFROI-Corporate level (VM53) 
 
.04 .207 0 1 4.492 18.508 
CFROI-Business unit level (VM54) 
 
.05 .225 0 1 4.040 14.579 
TSR-Corporate level (VM55) 
 
.31 .464 0 1 0.834 -1.328 
TSR-Business unit level (VM56) 
 
.12 .320 0 1 2.446 4.052 
*Descriptive data of VBM averaged across all measures for the sample (N=113) are shown in italic. Measures 
statistics are shown in regular font below the construct name. 
These results imply that the comprehensive implementation of VBM, as suggested in 
the literature, is not very common practice in UK companies and some of its 
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applications are more popular than others (Cooper et al., 2001; CIMA, 2009). For 
instance, using value-based measures, especially DCF, in strategic and significant 
decision making is very common practice in comparison with using these measures in 
performance measurements and rewarding managers. Thus, many companies may 
implement a VBM approach partially or from a narrow perspective, as they may only 
adopt some VBM practices and fail to adopt others.  
To assess the normality of the VBM construct the skewness and kurtosis statistics of 
VBM variables were examined. Though the skewness and kurtosis statistics of a 
number of variables (e.g. VM42, VM46) fall beyond the acceptable range ± 2.58 
(Hair et al. 2010), the skewness and kurtosis statistics of the main dimensions of 
VBM fall within the acceptable range ± 2.58 (Hair et al. 2010) except for the kurtosis 
of the management rewarding dimension. These results suggest that data related to 
VBM variables are close to normal distribution but not normally distributed. 
6.3.2 Contingency Factors 
Five contingency factors have been used in the current study, namely agency 
conflicts, company size, PEU, strategy and decentralisation. The details of the 
variables used in measuring these constructs have been discussed in the previous 
chapter. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in measuring these constructs, 
including minimum and maximum values, mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis are presented in table 6.2.  
The descriptive statistics of the contingency factors that are measured on a seven-
point Likert scale indicate either average score (e.g. PEU) or above average score 
(e.g. strategy and decentralisation). These results suggest that companies, in general, 
tend to experience a moderate level of PEU (3.45 out of 7) regarding the predictability 
of changes in their customers’ demand and taste, product attributes and design and 
competitors’ actions. 
Companies also tend to be more differentiators than cost leaders in formulating their 
strategies (4.7 out of 7), especially in their products quality. High scores on the 
strategy scale indicate differentiation strategies and low scores indicate cost 
leadership strategies. Moreover, companies tend to be more decentralised through 
delegating authorities in decision making, regarding the development of new 
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products, hiring and firing personnel, pricing of new products and significant price 
changes. 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of Contingency Factors 
Constructs Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Agency conflicts       
Beta (AG1) 0.793 0.397 0.07 2.19 0.649 0.371 
Company size       
Log (no. of employees) (SZ1) 6.5489 2.113 3.93 12.97 0.780 0.226 
No. of employees 11394 53868 51 428202   
Uncertainty* 3.4543 .9397 1 6.33 -0.564 2.825 
Customer’s demand and taste (UN1) 3.389 1.175 1 6 0.002 0.484 
Product attributes and design (UN2) 3.079 1.660 1 6 -0.226 0.667 
Competitors’ actions (UN3) 3.893 1.318 1 7 -0.253 1.255 
Strategy* 4.7987 .8797 1 6.67 -.326 0.026 
Brand image (ST1) 4.56 1.258 1 7 -.251 -.395 
Product features (ST2) 4.82 .969 1 7 -.014 .022 
Product quality (ST3) 5.01 .976 1 7 -.701 .295 
Decentralisation* 4.551 1.369 1 7 -0.498 0.047 
Development of new products 
(DC1) 
4.84 1.590 1 7 -0.846 1.134 
Hiring and firing personnel (DC2) 4.41 1.678 1 7 -0.344 -0.661 
Pricing of new products and 
significant price changes (DC3) 
4.41 1.730 1 7 -0.441 -0.288 
*Descriptive data of contingency factors averaged across all measures for the sample (N=113) are shown in italic. 
Measures statistics are shown in regular font below the construct name. 
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The descriptive statistics of the other contingency factors that are measured using 
archive data reveal that company size, measured by the number of employees, ranges 
from 51 to 428,202 employees, with mean equal to 11,394 employees. This mean 
indicates that the company size in the sample tends to be large, which may be affected 
by the existence of several companies with extremely large numbers of employees 
(outliers). Finally, the risk measure (Beta), as a surrogate for agency conflicts, ranges 
from 0.07 to 2.19, with mean equal to 0.793. However, this variable varies from one 
industry to another.  
Further to normality testing of the contingency factors, skewness and kurtosis 
statistics, in general fall within the acceptable range ± 2.58 (Hair et al. 2010) except 
for the kurtosis of PEU (2.825). These results suggest that data related to the 
contingency factors in general are normally distributed, except for PEU, which 
slightly violates the normal distribution assumption. 
6.3.3 Compliance with the CCCG 
Compliance with the CCCG has been measured as the percentage of compliance with 
the code provisions, based on content analysis of the annual report. The descriptive 
statistics of compliance with the CCCG, including minimum and maximum values, 
mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis are presented in table 6.3. 
The results indicate that most companies are highly compliant with the code 
provisions (mean 80%). Skewness and kurtosis statistics, in general, fall within the 
acceptable range ± 2.58 (Hair et al. 2010). These results suggest that the data related 
to compliance with the CG are normally distributed. 
 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics of Compliance with the CCCG 
Construct Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Compliance       
Percentage of compliance     
with the CCCG  
 provisions (CM) 
80.07 21.232 13.79 100 -1.030 0.155 
 
The details of compliance with the code provisions are presented in the next section. 
The statistics are presented for the two main groups of companies (companies listed 
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on the Main Market and AIM) as the code provisions and the compliance 
requirements are different in each group of companies. 
6.3.3.1 Companies Listed on the Main Market 
A summary of compliance with the provisions of the CCCG in the Main Market is 
presented in detail in appendix 6. The descriptive statistics, in general, indicate a high 
degree of compliance with the CCCG provisions. Though it is on a “comply or 
explain” basis, most companies show a high degree of compliance with the code 
provisions. 
For instance, the percentage of compliance with the code provisions ranges from 
71.6% (provision A.3.2 that requires at least half of the board members to be non-
executive and independent directors) to 100% (e.g. provision A.1.1 that requires a 
statement of how the board operates). In addition, 19 provisions (16.8% of the total 
code provisions) satisfy 100% compliance level and 41 provisions (84% of the total 
code provisions) satisfy more than 90% compliance level by the companies in the 
sample. 
6.3.3.2 Companies Listed on AIM  
A summary of compliance with the CG guidelines in AIM, published by the QCA, is 
presented in detail in appendix 7. The descriptive statistics indicate an average level 
of compliance to the CG guidelines. For instance, no single provision has satisfied 
100% compliance level. The highest compliance level was 98.11% (provision number 
22 that requires a statement of directors’ responsibilities). Only 8 provisions (28.5% 
of the total provisions) have scored above 90% compliance. The lowest compliance 
level was 15.09% (provision number 17 that requires describing directors’ 
independence). However, these results are expected, as the companies listed on the 
AIM are not required, but urged to comply with these guidelines. 
6.3.4 Corporate Entrepreneurship 
According to the measurement model, three main dimensions have been suggested to 
measure CE. These dimensions include innovativeness, proactiveness and competitive 
aggressiveness. Moreover, a number of variables have been suggested to measure 
each dimension. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in measuring CE, 
including minimum and maximum values, mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis are presented in table 6.4.  
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In general, the descriptive statistics indicate above average scores of CE (4.43 out of 
7) and its dimensions, including innovativeness, proactiveness and competitive 
aggressiveness (from 4.1 to 4.7 out of 7). These results suggest that companies, in 
general, tend to be entrepreneurially oriented. In addition, skewness and kurtosis 
values are within the acceptable range ± 2.58 for all variables (Hair et al., 2010). 
These results suggest that data related to CE variables are normally distributed. 
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Construct Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Corporate Entrepreneurship* 4.433 1.035 1 7 -0.536 1.190 
Innovativeness 4.10 1.40 1 7 -0.153 -0.639 
Emphasis on R&D and 
innovation 4.05 1.651 1 7 0.019 -1.059 
New lines of products 4.45 1.707 1 7 -.0310 -.0769 
Change in product lines 4.01 1.552 1 7 -0.041 -.652 
Proactiveness 4.49 1.099 1 7 -0.576 0.888 
Initiatives in dealing with 
competitors 4.63 1.115 1 7 -0.168 0.428 
New products, techniques and 
technologies 4.66 1.386 1 7 -0.670 0.360 
Competitive posture 4.34 1.425 1 7 -0.475 -0.172 
Competitive aggressiveness       
Aggressiveness and intense 
competition 4.70 1.32 1 7 -0.651 0.991 
*Descriptive data of CE averaged across all constructs for the sample (N=113) are shown in italic. Measures 
statistics are shown in regular font below the construct name. 
6.3.5 Organisational Performance  
Organisational performance was measured using two different sets of variables to 
capture the multiple aspects of performance. These measures include perceived 
performance and market-based performance. The descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in measuring organisational performance, including minimum and maximum 
values, mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis are presented in table 6.5.   
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The descriptive statistics of indicate above average score of perceived performance 
(4.618 out of 7) and its measures (from 4.43 to 4.8 out of 7). These results suggest 
that companies tend to have high perceived performance. The market-based 
performance, measured by TSR, indicates a wide range of values from -217% to 
334%, with mean value of 19.92%. However, this variable varies from one industry to 
another. 
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics of Organisational Performance 
Construct Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Perceived performance* 4.618 0.867 1.67 6.33 -0.213 0.477 
Sales growth 4.43 1.209 1 7 -0.260 0.135 
Development of new products 4.59 1.067 1 7 -.0179 0.674 
Public image and goodwill 4.80 1.104 1 7 -0.431 0.754 
Market-based performance       
Total Shareholder Return 19.92 67.13 -217.15 334 1.661 8.866 
*Descriptive data of perceived performance averaged across all constructs for the sample (N=113) are shown in 
italic. Measures statistics are shown in regular font below the construct name. 
The skewness and kurtosis values of perceived performance are within the acceptable 
range ± 2.58 (Hair et al. 2010). However, kurtosis value is well beyond the acceptable 
range for market-based performance because of the high degree of variation in this 
objective measure. These results suggest that data related to perceived performance 
measures are normally distributed, while the data related to market-based 
performance measures are not.  
6.4 Structural Model Assessment 
Traditional parametric based techniques for significance testing in general are not 
appropriate for PLS-SEM because it assumes a distribution free variance (Chin, 
1998). Therefore, evaluating PLS-SEM models should be performed using non-
parametric prediction-oriented measures, instead of measures which are based on fit 
(Chin, 1998). 
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According to Chin (1998) and Hair et al. (2011), the following measures can be used 
to assess PLS structural model: coefficient of determination (R-square), path 
coefficients and the Stone-Geisser test of predictive relevance. Resampling methods, 
such as bootstrapping and jackknifing, can be used to assess the significance and 
stability of path coefficient estimates.  In addition, Tenenhaus et al. (2004) propose a 
global criterion for goodness of fit. 
Finally, Hensler and Chin (2010) emphasise the importance of assessing observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity, considering the possibility of classifying the data into sub-
groups. These proposed measures to assess the structural model can be explained in 
detail as follows:  
6.4.1 Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Coefficient of determination (R2) is the primary criterion used to evaluate the inner 
model, as it represents the amount of variance explained of endogenous latent variable 
(Hair et al., 2011b). However, deciding which level of R2 is high varies from one 
discipline to another (Hair et al., 2011a). 
For instance, R2 of 0.2 can be considered high in certain areas of research, such as 
consumer behaviour, while R2 of 0.75 would be perceived as high in success driver 
studies (Hair et al., 2011a). In marketing research, for example, R2 of 0.25, 0.5 and 
0.75 for endogenous variable can be considered as weak, moderate and substantial 
respectively (Hair et al., 2011a).  
In management accounting research, there is no specific threshold of high R2 value. 
However, in the very few studies that have used PLS-SEM in management accounting 
research, the highest R2 value was neither very low as consumer behaviour research 
(0.2), nor very high as marketing research (0.75 or more). For instance, in the study of 
Chenhall (2005), R2 of the endogenous latent variables was between 0.17 and 0.32. In 
Vandenbosch’s (1999) study, R2 value was 0.42.  
In the current study, exploring the values of R2 of endogenous latent variables 
(dependent constructs) in table 6.6 reveals that R2 value ranges from 0.12 and 0.40 
.These values fall within the acceptable range compared with other studies in the field 
of management accounting research. 
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Table 6.6: Summary of R2, Communality and Redundancy 
Construct R2 Communality Redundancy 
Size  0.906  
Agency conflicts  0.659  
Uncertainty  0.795  
Strategy  0.791  
Decentralisation  0.678  
Compliance*VBM  0.667  
VBM 0.12 0.717 0.10038 
Compliance 0.18 1.000 0.14000 
Corporate Entrepreneurship 0.39 0.694 0.28454 
Perceived Performance 0.40 0.659 0.25860 
Market-based performance 0.13 1.000 0.12035 
 
6.4.2 Path Coefficients  
 “The individual path coefficients of the PLS structural model can be interpreted as 
standardised beta coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions” (Hair et al., 
2011a). Regression coefficient or beta (β) is “the estimated change in the dependent 
variable for a unit change of the independent variable” (Hair et al., 2010: p.163). The 
estimated regression coefficient represents both the type and strength of relationship 
between independent and dependent variables (Hair et al., 2010). While its sign 
indicates whether the relationship between the two variables is positive or negative, 
the value of the coefficient represents the degree to which the independent variable is 
associated with the dependent variable, providing that the regression coefficient is 
statistically significant (Hair et al., 2010). 
To assess the significance of path coefficients, the t test and the calculated p value for 
each coefficient (Maruyama, 1998) can be used as a basis for testing the proposed 
relationships between variables in SEM (Hair et al., 1998). Assessing the significance 
of individual path coefficients and calculating the p value in PLS-SEM can be 
performed using resample methods of bootstrapping or jackknifing, as PLS-SEM does 
not make any assumptions regarding data distribution.  
This study uses the bootstrapping resample method (100 resamples) to assess the 
significance of path coefficient, which is the default and recommended number of 
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resamples in the used software package of Warp-PLS. Using a number of resambles 
above 100 adds no or little to the reliability of the p value estimates (Kock, 2011). The 
jackknifing method was not used, as it is viewed in general as less efficient than 
bootstrapping, and is regarded as an approximation of the bootstrapping method 
(Chin, 1998).  
One important feature of the Warp-PLS software, compared to the other PLS-based 
SEM software systems, is providing p values ready, instead of providing standard 
errors and t values, and leaving the users to discover what the corresponding p values 
are. Arguably, providing p values associated with path coefficients are more 
meaningful than t values for the purpose of hypothesis testing (Kock, 2011). This is 
because p values reflect not only the strength of the relationship, as provided by the 
path coefficient itself, but also the power of the test, which increases with sample size 
(Kock, 2011). The results of path coefficients and the p values calculated to assess the 
significance of path coefficients will be presented in detail in table 6.10, as a part of 
the hypotheses testing procedures. These results are based on a significance level of 
10% (p ≤ 0.10). 
6.4.3 Predictive Relevance 
According to Chin (1998) and Hair et al. (2011b), assessing the predictive relevance 
is as important as evaluating the magnitude of path coefficients using R2. The 
predictive relevance can be assessed using the Stone-Geisser’s Q2 criterion developed 
by Geisser (1974) and Stone (1974). This criterion is a synthesis of cross-validation 
and function fitting (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2011b). The rationale of this criterion is 
that “the prediction of observables or potential observables is of much greater 
relevance than the estimation of what are often artificial construct parameters” 
(Geisser, 1975, p.320). It has been argued that this criterion fits PLS-SEM “as hand in 
glove” (Wold, 1982: p.30). 
This criterion is calculated in the PLS-SEM using the blindfolding procedure that 
omits a part of the data (using omission distance D) for a specific group of indicators 
while the parameters are estimated, then it attempts to estimate the omitted part using 
the estimated parameters till every data point to be omitted and estimated (Chin, 
1998). The omission distance (D) value is normally chosen between 5 and 10, so the 
number of valid observations divided by D should not be an integer (Hair et al., 
2011a). 
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According to Chin (1998), Stone-Geisser’s Q2 criterion can be calculated as follows: 
Q2 = 1- ( ∑D ED ÷ ∑D OD ) 
Where: 
E   the sum of squares of prediction error when the omitted data points are predicted 
D   the omission distance 
O   the sum of squares of prediction error using the mean of prediction. 
Two forms of Q2 have been suggested in the literature (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2011a), 
namely cross-validated communality and cross-validated redundancy. “A cross-
validated communality Q2 is obtained if prediction of the data points is made by the 
underlying latent variable score, whereas a cross-validated redundancy Q2  is obtained 
if prediction is made by those latent variables that predict the block in question” 
(Chin, 1998: p.20). In other words, a cross-validated communality Q2 predicts an 
observed variable of an endogenous latent variable using only the observed variables 
of this latent variable, while a cross-validated redundancy Q2 indirectly assesses the 
model capacity to predict the observed variables from a prediction of their own latent 
variables using the related structural relation (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). 
While CV-communality measures the quality of the measurement model, CV-
redundancy, instead, measures the quality of the structural model (Tenenhaus et al., 
2005). Generally speaking, CV-redundancy is more recommended for assessing the 
predictive relevance in PLS-SEM, as it uses both the estimates of the measurement 
model and the structural model for data prediction (Hair et al., 2011a). In general, Q2 
> 0 indicates a predictive relevance of a model, whereas Q2 < 0 indicates a lack of 
predictive relevance of a model (Chin, 1998). 
In the current study, both CV-communality and CV-redundancy statistics were 
calculated using the blindfolding procedure in the Smart-PLS software. The results of 
CV-communality and CV-redundancy statistics (see table 6.7) indicate a positive Q2 
value for all constructs, suggesting a predictive relevance for the tested model in this 
study. These results imply that the structural relationships proposed in the tested 
model are not only limited to the current set of data, but also can be used to predict 
the endogenous latent variables using other sets of data.   
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Table 6.7: Cross-validated Communality and Redundancy  
Construct Cv-communality  Cv-redundancy  
Size 0.4211  
Agency cost 0.0000   
Uncertainty 0.0881  
Strategy 0.5426  
Decentralisation 0.3366   
Compliance*VBM 0.2428  
VBM 0.4491  0.0747 
Compliance 0.0000  0.1132 
Corporate Entrepreneurship 0.3825 0.2125 
Perceived Performance 0.3235 0.2014 
Market-based performance 0.000  0.0492 
 
6.4.4 Goodness of Fit  
Unlike classic CB-SEM, there is no proper overall criterion for goodness of fit in 
PLS-SEM (Hulland, 1999; Hair et al., 2011b). While CB-SEM comprises parametric 
estimation procedures that attempt to reproduce, as closely as possible the observed 
covariance matrix, PLS-SEM’s main objective is to minimise the error or to maximise 
the explained variance in endogenous variables measured by R2 (Hulland, 1999).  
Some scholars provide goodness of fit criteria such as the Bentler-Bonett fit index 
(Bentler and Bonett, 1980) and the global criterion for goodness of fit (Tenenhaus et 
al., 2004). However, these criteria have been criticised for being meaningless as they 
assume that the estimated model parameters are selected in an attempt to minimise the 
difference between the observed and the reproduced covariance matrices (Hulland, 
1999). Further, the global criterion for goodness of fit is based on the model average 
R2 and average communality of reflective models, which is not applicable in the case 
of formative models or single indicator construct (Hair et al., 2011b). In addition, it is 
not easy to set a threshold for the acceptable level of goodness of fit measure, as there 
is no common acceptable threshold of R2   (Hair et al., 2011b). 
This study does not provide any goodness of fit measures because of the 
inappropriateness of goodness of fit measures to PLS-SEM, especially that some 
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constructs are measured using single measures (e.g. compliance with the CCCG and 
the market-based performance). 
6.4.5 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity arises from strong correlation between two or more predictors in the 
tested model. The best situation for a researcher would be to have high correlation 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable, but with little 
correlation among the independent variables (Hair et al., 2010). High level of 
multicollinearity threatens the validity of results extracted from the tested model, 
because it leads to incorrect estimation of the regression coefficients and probably its 
sign as well (Hair et al., 2010). “As multicollinearity increases, the total variance 
explained decreases (estimation). Moreover, the amount of unique variance of 
independent variable is reduced to levels that make estimation of their individual 
effects quite problematic (explanation)” (Hair et al., 2010: p.201).  
One way to assess multicollinearity is to check the correlation matrix of independent 
variables. The existence of high correlations between independent variables (in 
general 0.90 or more) is an indication of a multicollinearity problem (Hair et al., 
2010). In the current study the correlation matrix between independent variables (see 
table 6.8) has been examined, which indicates that there is no high correlation 
between independent variables (the maximum in the correlation matrix is 0.525). 
Table 6.8: Correlation Matrix between Independent Variables (Constructs) 
 Size Agency Uncert. Strategy Dec. VBM Comp CE Com* 
VBM 
Size 1         
Agenc 0.042 1        
Uncert 0.153 -0.055 1       
Strat. -0.049 -0.082 0.244 1      
Dec. 0.099 0.169 0.191 0.256 1     
VBM 0.046 0.269 -0.039 -0.178 0.157 1    
Comp 0.148 0.389 -0.026 -0.003 0.289 0.226 1   
CE 0.160 -0.002 0.325 0.525 0.258 -0.021 0.114 1  
Com* 
VBM -0.053 -0.073 -0.005 0.073 -0.046 0.071 -0.251 -0.173 1 
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Multicollinearity can also be assessed using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 
independent variables, which indicates whether a predictor has a strong linear 
relationship with other predictors. The common cut-off threshold of VIF is 10, so if 
the VIF exceeds this limit it is an indication of a multicollinearity problem (Hair et al., 
2010).  
Table 6.9: Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)  
 Size Agency Uncert. Strategy Decent. VBM Comp. CE 
Comp*
VBM 
VBM 1.042 1.053 1.116 1.145 1.147 1.080    
Comp. 1.003 1.079    1.179    
CE 1.061 1.24 1.123 1.204 1.243 1.074 1.385  1.11 
Perceived 
performance 
     1.074 1.147 1.037 1.11 
Market-
based 
Performance 
     1.08 1.147 1.037 1.11 
 
In the current study the VIFs of independent variables (see table 6.9) have been 
checked, which indicates that the largest value of VIF is 1.385. These results of the 
correlation matrix and VIFs provide an assurance that there are no concerns over the 
mulitcollinearity in this study. 
6.5 Hypothesis Testing 
In this section the research hypotheses are tested and reported. For this purpose, the 
hypotheses are classified into four groups. The first group examines the association 
between contingency factors, VBM and organisational performance. The second 
group examines the association between contingency factors, compliance with the 
CCCG and organisational performance. The third group examines the association 
between contingency factors, CE and organisational performance. The fourth group 
examines the association between VBM, compliance with the CCCG and CE. In 
addition, it examines the indirect effect of VBM on performance acting through 
compliance with the CCCG and CE as intervening variables. Results are presented in 
table 6.10 and the path coefficients are superimposed on the path diagram in figure 
(6.1) for ease of interpretation. 
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Table 6.10: Path Coefficients-Whole Sample (p value of the t tests in parentheses) 
Paths from Predicted 
Sign 
Paths to 
VBM Compliance CE Perceived 
Performance 
Market-
based 
Performance 
Agency Conflicts +, +, - 0.223*** 
(0.008) 
0.35*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.008 
(0.476) 
  
Company Size +, +, - 0.012 
(0.454) 
0.127*** 
(0.005) 
0.135* 
(0.071) 
  
PEU +, + -0.013 
(0.372) 
 0.173** 
(0.049) 
  
Strategy +, + -0.20*** 
(0.004) 
 0.501*** 
(<0.001) 
  
Decentralisation +, + 0.171** 
(0.026) 
 0.085 
(0.213) 
  
VBM +, +, +, +  0.125** 
(0.050) 
0.071 
(0.194) 
-0.105* 
(0.082) 
-0.057 
(0.324) 
Compliance -, +, +   0.021 
(0.444) 
-0.015 
(0.443) 
0.380*** 
(<0.001) 
CE +, +    0.628*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.089 
(0.236) 
VBM*Compliance -, +, +   -0.199** 
(0.030) 
0.068 
(0.216) 
0.022 
(0.399) 
R2  0.123 O.184 0.391 0.396 0.134 
* p ≤ 0.10, 1 tailed 
** p ≤ 0.05, 1 tailed 
*** p ≤ 0.01, 1 tailed 
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Figure 6.1: Path Diagram with Path Coefficients-Whole Sample 
 
6.5.1 Contingency Factors, VBM and Performance 
The study sought to establish that VBM would be associated significantly with 
company size, agency costs, PEU, strategy and decentralisation, which in turn 
increases organisational performance. A structural model was developed to examine 
the association between VBM, contingency factors and organisational performance. 
This section presents the results of the contingency relationships between agency 
conflicts, company size, PEU, strategy and decentralisation on the one hand, and 
VBM on the other. In addition, the effect of fit between the contingency factors and 
VBM on organisational performance will be highlighted. 
6.5.1.1 VBM and Performance 
Hypothesis (1) predicts that VBM is positively associated with organisational 
performance. However, the results indicate that VBM is negatively, but not 
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significantly, related to market-based performance (β = -0.057 and p = 0.324). 
Meanwhile, the relationship between VBM and perceived performance is negative 
and significant (β = -0.105 and p ≤ 0.10). Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported. 
6.5.1.2 Agency Conflicts and VBM 
Hypothesis (2) predicts a positive relationship between VBM and agency conflicts. 
The results suggest a significant positive association (β = 0.223 and p ≤ 0.01) between 
VBM and agency conflicts, which supports the hypothesised relationship between 
agency conflicts and VBM. Accordingly, this hypothesis is supported. 
6.5.1.3 Company Size and VBM 
Hypothesis (3) predicts that VBM is positively associated with company size. 
However, the non-significant positive coefficient of company size (β = 0.013 and p = 
0.454) does not support the hypothesised relationship between company size and 
VBM. Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported. 
6.5.1.4 PEU and VBM 
Hypothesis (4) predicts a positive relationship between PEU and VBM. However, the 
non-significant negative coefficient of PEU (β = -0.013 and p = 0.372) does not 
support the hypothesised relationship between PEU and VBM. Accordingly, this 
hypothesis is not supported. 
6.5.1.5 Strategy and VBM 
Hypothesis (5) predicts a positive association between VBM and differentiation 
strategies. Surprisingly and contrary to the hypothesised relationship, the significant 
negative coefficient of strategy (β = -0.20 and p ≤ 0.01) suggests that VBM is 
positively associated with low cost strategies but not with differentiation strategies, as 
low levels on the strategy scale can be interpreted as low cost strategies. As a result, 
this hypothesis is not supported. 
6.5.1.6 Decentralisation and VBM 
Consistent with hypothesis (6), which predicts a positive relationship between 
decentralization and VBM, a significant positive association (β = 0.171 and p ≤ 0.05) 
was found between decentralisation and VBM. Consequently, this hypothesis is 
supported. 
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6.5.2 Contingency factors, Compliance and Performance 
This section presents the results of the contingency relationships between agency 
conflicts, and company size on the one hand; and compliance with the CCCG on the 
other, in addition to the effect of fit between these contingency factors and 
compliance with the CCCG on performance. 
6.5.2.1 Compliance and Performance 
Hypothesis (7) predicts a positive relationship between compliance with the CCCG 
and organisational performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results suggest 
that compliance with the CCCG is significantly and positively associated (β = 0.380 
and p ≤ 0.01) with market-based performance, but non-significantly associated (β = -
0.015 and p = 0.443) with perceived performance. Therefore, this hypothesis is 
partially supported. 
6.5.2.2 Agency Conflicts and Compliance 
Consistent with hypothesis (8), the results suggest a significant positive association (β 
= 0.35 and p ≤ 0.01) between agency conflicts and compliance with the CCCG. 
Consequently, this hypothesis is supported. 
6.5.2.3 Company Size and compliance 
Consistent with hypothesis (9) the results suggest a significant positive association (β 
= 0.127 and p ≤ 0.01) between company size and compliance with the CCCG. 
Accordingly, this hypothesis is supported. 
6.5.3 Contingency Factors, CE and Performance 
This section presents the results of the contingency relationships between agency 
conflicts, company size, PEU, strategy and decentralisation on the one hand, and CE 
on the other. In addition, it presents the effect of fit between the contingency factors 
and CE on organisational performance. 
6.5.3.1 CE and Performance 
Hypothesis (10) predicts a positive relationship between CE and performance. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the results suggest that CE is significantly and 
positively (β = 0.628 and p ≤ 0.01) associated with perceived performance, but non-
significantly associated (β = -0.089 and p = 0.236) with market-based performance. 
Hence, this hypothesis is partially supported. 
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6.5.3.2 Agency Conflicts and CE 
Hypothesis (11) predicts that CE is negatively associated with agency conflicts. 
However, the results show non-significant negative relationship (β = -0.008 and p = 
0.476) between agency conflicts and CE, which does not support the hypothesised 
relationship. As a result, this hypothesis is not supported 
6.5.3.3 Company Size and CE 
Hypothesis (12) predicts a negative relationship between company size and CE. 
Surprisingly and contrary to this hypothesis, the results suggest a positive association 
between company size and CE. This relationship is significant (β = 0.135 and p ≤ 
0.10). Accordingly, this hypothesis is not supported.  
6.5.3.4 PEU and CE 
Hypothesis (13) predicts a positive association between PEU and CE. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, the results of the structural model suggest a significant positive 
relationship (β = 0.173 and p ≤ 0.05) between CE and PEU. Consequently, this 
hypothesis is supported. 
6.5.3.5 Strategy and CE 
Hypothesis (14) predicts a positive association between strategy and CE. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, the results of the structural model suggest a significant positive 
relationship (β = 0.501 and p ≤ 0.01) between strategy and CE. As a result, this 
hypothesis is supported. 
6.5.3.6 Decentralisation and CE 
Hypothesis (15) predicts that CE is positively associated with decentralisation. 
However, the non-significant positive coefficient of decentralisation (β = 0.085 and p 
= 0.213) does not support the hypothesised relationship between decentralisation and 
CE. Thus, this hypothesis is not supported. 
6.5.4 VBM, Compliance and CE 
This section presents the results of the inter-relationships between VBM, compliance 
with the CCCG and CE. Besides, the results of the indirect effect of VBM on 
organisational performance through compliance with the CCCG and CE as 
intervening variables are also presented. 
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6.5.4.1 VBM and Compliance 
Hypothesis (16) predicts that VBM is positively associated with compliance with the 
CCCG. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results suggest a significant positive 
association (β = 0.125 and p ≤ 0.05) between VBM and compliance with the CCCG. 
Accordingly, this hypothesis is supported. 
6.5.4.2 VBM and CE 
Hypothesis (17) predicts that VBM is positively associated with CE. However, the 
results of the structural model suggest a non-significant positive relationship (β = 
0.071 and p = 0.194) between VBM and CE, which does not support the hypothesised 
relationship between VBM and CE. Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported. 
6.5.4.3 Compliance and CE 
Hypothesis (18) predicts that compliance with the CCCG is negatively associated 
with CE, based on the argument that more focus on control and accountability may 
negatively affect enterprise and innovation (O'Sullivan, 2000). However, the non-
significant positive coefficient of compliance with the CCCG (β = 0.021 and p = 
0.444) does not support the hypothesised relationship between compliance with the 
CCCG and CE. Consequently, this hypothesis is not supported.  
6.5.4.4 VBM*Compliance and CE  
Hypothesis (19) predicts that the interaction between VBM and compliance with the 
CCCG is negatively associated with CE. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results 
suggest that the interaction between VBM and compliance with the CCCG is 
significantly and negatively (β = -0.199 and p ≤ 0.05) associated with CE, which 
supports this hypothesis. 
6.5.4.5 VBM*Compliance and Performance 
Hypothesis (20) predicts that the interaction between VBM and compliance with the 
CCCG is positively associated with performance. However, no significant effect was 
found for the interaction between VBM and compliance with the CCCG on perceived 
performance (β = 0.068 and p = 0.216), or even market-based performance (β = 0.022 
and p = 0.399). As a result, this hypothesis is not supported. 
6.5.4.6 The Mediating Effect of Compliance with the CCCG  
Hypothesis (16a) predicts a significant mediating effect of compliance with the 
CCCG on the relationship between VBM and performance. The mediating effect of 
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compliance with the CCCG was tested, using the procedures suggested by Baron and 
Kenny (1986). According to these procedures, to establish mediation effect three 
equations should be estimated and the following conditions must be satisfied:  
“First, the independent variable must affect the mediator in the first equation; second, 
the independent variable must be shown to affect the dependent variable in the second 
equation; and third, the mediator must affect the dependent variable in the third 
equation” (Baron and Kenny, 1986: p.1177). To establish mediation, the direct effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable must be less when the mediator 
exists than its effect without having a mediator (Baron and Kenny, 1986). “Perfect 
mediation holds if the independent variable has no effect when the mediator is 
controlled” (Baron and Kenny, 1986: p.1177). Further, the mediation effect implies 
that the independent variable causes the mediator; therefore, they should be correlated 
(Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
In the current study these conditions were examined using the path coefficients 
presented in table 6.10 and figure 6.1, as it comprises both the direct and the indirect 
effects of VBM on performance as follows: 
When compliance with the CCCG (mediator) was added to the path between VBM 
(independent variable) and the market-based performance (dependent variable), the 
direct relationship between VBM and the market-based performance decreased and  
became non-significant (β = -0.057, p = 0.324). However, the indirect path between 
VBM and market-based performance through compliance is all significant, as VBM 
significantly affects compliance (β = 0.125, p ≤ 0.05), which in turn significantly 
affects market-based performance (β = 0.380, p ≤ 0.01). This suggests a full 
mediation effect of compliance with the CCCG on the relationship between VBM and 
market-based performance. 
However, there is no evidence to support any mediation effect of compliance with the 
CCCG on the relationship between VBM and the perceived performance, as 
compliance (mediator) is not significantly associated (β = -0.015, p = 0.443) with 
perceived performance (dependent variable). According to Baron and Kenny (1986), 
this violates the third condition to establish the mediation effect. In summary, 
compliance with the CCCG mediates the relationship between VBM and market-
based performance, but does not mediate the relationship between VBM and 
perceived performance. As a result, hypothesis 16a is partially supported. 
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6.5.4.7 The Mediating Effect of CE 
Hypothesis (17a) predicts a significant mediating effect of CE on the relationship 
between VBM and performance. The mediating effect of CE was tested using the 
same procedures suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). However, no evidence 
supports any mediation effect of CE on the relationship between CE and performance, 
as VBM (independent variable) is not significantly associated with CE (mediator). 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), this violates the first condition to establish a 
mediation effect. Therefore, hypothesis 17a is not supported at all. 
6.6 Assessing Unobserved Data Heterogeneity 
“PLS-SEM applications are usually based on the assumption that the data stem from a 
single population. In many real world applications, however, this assumption of 
homogeneity is unrealistic, as different population parameters are likely to occur for 
different sub-populations” (Hair et al., 2011b). Heterogeneity of data or observations 
can threaten the validity of PLS-SEM results, as different segments are likely to have 
different population parameters (Hair et al., 2011a). Therefore, assessing the potential 
sources of heterogeneity using multi-group analysis or moderator analysis is crucial 
for PLS-SEM results (Rigdon et al., 2010).  
While taking the observed heterogeneity into consideration appears to be valuable 
from the theoretical perspective, heterogeneity is unobservable, in general, and cannot 
be reasoned to predetermined variables (Hair et al., 2011a). Failing to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in data analysis can lead to misleading interpretation of 
results (Jedidi et al., 1997). 
Therefore, a number of complementary techniques are proposed to deal with 
unobserved heterogeneity. Among these techniques, the Finite Mixture Partial Least 
Squares (FIMIX-PLS) approach can be considered as the main technique used to date 
(Hahn et al., 2002; Hair et al., 2011a). FIMIX-PLS approach joins a Finite Mixture 
procedure with the Expectation-Maximisation (EM), regarding the predictions based 
on ordinary least squares in PLS-SEM (Hahn et al., 2002). 
6.6.1 Finite Mixture Partial Least Squares (FIMIX-PLS) 
According to Ringle et al. (2011), FIMIX-PLS first identifies if there are any 
distinctive groups of observations in the overall data set that may cause heterogeneity 
in estimating the PLS structural model parameters, and provides indicators of possible 
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segmentation. In the second step, the researcher should identify an explanatory 
variable that leads to similar clustering of data, as suggested by FIMIX-PLS 
outcomes. The third step includes identifying separate sets of data used as new inputs 
for multi-group analysis using PLS-SEM. FIMIX-PLS does not suggest the number of 
segments, as the identification of an appropriate number of segments is not 
straightforward (Ringle et al., 2010) and identifying satisfactory solutions is not 
possible for several reasons (Wedel and Kamakura, 2000). 
However, Hahn et al. (2002) suggest repeated operation of FIMIX-PLS using 
different numbers of classes and to compare the outcomes of different classes using a 
number of criteria, such as the lnL, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Consistent 
Information Criterion (CAIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), to 
provide indicators for identifying an appropriate number of segments (Ringle et al., 
2010). In addition, the Entropy Statistic (EN), with value ranging from 0 to 1, 
indicates the degree of separation in the individually estimated class probabilities 
(Ramaswamy et al., 1993).The higher the EN (0.5 or above), the higher the quality of 
separation into number of classes (Ringle et al., 2010). 
Table 6.11: Outcomes of FIMIX-PLS 
Number of segments 2 
Segment 1  58.41% (67 companies) 
Segment 2 41.59% (46 companies) 
Fit Indices  
AIC    1756.98 
BIC   1945.17 
CAIC   1945.77 
EN      0.6131 
 
In the current study the FIMIX-PLS technique was performed for the whole data set 
using the Smart-PLS software. The results (see table 6.11) indicate a value for EN 
equal to 0.6131 (greater than 0.5), which suggest heterogeneity in the data set. 
Therefore, the sample should be classified into two segments or clusters. 
6.6.2 Segmentation and Ex-Post Analysis 
The results of FIMIX-PLS suggest segmenting the data set into two groups 
(segments), as follows: 67 companies in the first segment and 46 companies in the 
193 
 
second segment. After identifying the two segments, the type of stock market was 
identified as a possible explanatory variable for clustering the data into two segments, 
as suggested by FIMIX-PLS outcomes.  
The justification of selecting the type of stock market, as an explanatory factor for 
data clustering, is based on the statistics in table 6.12, which indicate that 87% of the 
companies in segment 1 are listed on the Main Market and 95% of the companies in 
segment 2 are listed on AIM. This implies that companies in segment 1 have some 
common characteristics, which are significantly different from the characteristics of 
companies in segment 2. The different characteristics of companies in the two 
segments are expected to affect the structural relationships proposed in the tested 
model. 
Table 6.12: Statistics of Segmentation  
 Segment 1 Segment 2 Total 
 No. of 
Companies 
% No. of 
Companies 
%  
Main Market 58 87% 2 5% 60 
AIM 9 13% 44 95% 53 
Total 67 100% 46 100% 113 
 
AIM provides a mechanism for companies looking for access to capital to realise their 
growth and innovation potential. Since launch in 1995, it has helped over 3,100 
companies raise capital of over £67 billion. AIM plays a vital role in the funding 
environment for small and medium-sized enterprises as they develop their businesses 
(LSE, 2010). 
However, the main differences between the admission criteria and the continuing 
obligations for AIM and the Main market are presented in table 6.13. After 
identifying the possible explanatory variable for segmentation, two separate sets of 
data, as suggested by FIMIX-PLS, were used as new inputs for multi-group analysis 
using PLS-SEM.  
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Table 6.13: Comparison between AIM and the Main Market 
Main Market AIM 
Minimum market capitalisation No minimum market capitalisation 
Normally three-year trading record required No trading record requirement 
Minimum 25 per cent shares in public hands 
 
No prescribed level of shares to be in public 
hands 
Prior shareholder approval required for 
substantial acquisitions and disposals 
(Premium Listing only) 
No prior shareholder approval for most 
transactions 
Sponsors needed for certain transactions 
(Premium Listing only) 
 
Nominated Adviser required at all times 
Compliance with the CCCG  is compulsory Compliance with the QCA, based on the 
CCCG is voluntary. 
Source: LSE (2010, p. 6) 
6.6.3 Multi-Group Analysis 
Multi-group analysis was performed to test the research hypotheses for each segment 
(group) and to examine any differences between the two segments regarding the 
structural relationships between the research constructs. Therefore, two sets of data 
were analysed using PLS-SEM to test the same structural relationships that have been 
tested before for the whole sample. As suggested by the FIMIX-PLS, the first set of 
data (segment 1) comprises 67 companies, mostly listed on the Main Market, and the 
second set of data (segment 2) comprises 46 companies, mostly listed on AIM.  
The results of the multi-group analysis are presented in table 6.14, which shows the 
path coefficients for the two segments in comparison with the whole sample. In 
addition, the path coefficients are superimposed on the path diagram in figures 6.2 
and 6.3 for segment 1 and segment 2 respectively for ease of interpretation.  
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Table 6.14: Path Coefficients-Whole Sample and Segments (p value for the t tests in 
parentheses) 
Hypotheses Predicted 
Sign 
Whole Sample Segment (1) Segment (2) 
  β p β p β p 
VBM-PP (H1) + -0.105* 
 
0.082 -0.016 0.389 -0.224*** 0.009 
VBM-MP (H1) + -0.057 
 
0.324 0.223 0.185 -0.277** 0.049 
Agency-VBM (H2) + 0.223*** 
 
0.008 0.069 0.319 0.645*** 0.005 
Size-VBM (H3) + 0.012 
 
0.454 0.280 0.445 -0.323* 0.055 
Uncertainty-VBM (H4) + -0.013 
 
0.372 0.137 0.471 -0.057 0.417 
Strategy-VBM (H5) + -0.20*** 
 
0.004 -0.149 0.460 0.065 0.351 
Decent.-VBM (H6) + 0.171** 
 
0.026 0.404*** <0.001 -0.035 0.439 
Compliance-PP (H7) + -0.015 
 
0.443 0.019 0.423 0.134 0.198 
Compliance- MP (H7) + 0.380*** 
 
<0.001 0.29** 0.031 0.546*** <0.001 
Agency -comp. (H8) + 0.35*** 
 
<0.001 0.439*** <0.001 -0.123 0.289 
Size-compliance (H9) + 0.127*** 
 
0.005 0.227*** 0.001 0.391*** 0.002 
CE-PP (H10) + 0.628*** 
 
<0.001 0.355*** 0.010 0.819*** 0.001 
CE-MP (H10) + -0.089 
 
0.236 -0.148 0.362 0.283*** 0.004 
Agency -CE (H11) - -0.008 
 
0.476 -0.101 0.422 -0.002 0.473 
Size-CE (H12) - 0.135* 
 
0.071 0.254** 0.025 0.093 0.399 
Uncertainty-CE (H13) + 0.173** 
 
0.049 0.385** 0.030 -0.020 0.363 
Strategy-CE (H14) + 0.501*** 
 
<0.001 0.299*** 0.005 0.748*** 0.001 
Decent.-CE(H15) + 0.085 
 
0.213 0.18** 0.033 -0.073 0.407 
VBM-Comp (H16) + 0.125** 
 
0.050 0.237*** 0.009 0.232 0.211 
VBM-CE (H17) + 0.071 
 
0.194 -0.281 0.227 0.285** 0.043 
Compliance-CE (H18) - 0.021 
 
0.444 0.376 0.156 -0.28** 0.037 
VBM*Comp-CE (H19) - -0.199** 
 
0.030 -0.047 0.405 -0.282* 0.074 
VBM*Com.-MP (H20) + 0.022 
 
0.399 -0.128 0.288 0.271** 0.041 
VBM*Comp-PP (H20) + 0.068 
 
0.216 -0.205 0.368 0.191 0.107 
* p ≤ 0.10, 1 tailed, ** p ≤ 0.05, 1 tailed, *** p ≤ 0.01, 1 tailed 
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Fig. 6.2: Path Diagram with Path Coefficients- Segment 1 
 
 
Fig. 6.3: Path Diagram with Path Coefficients- Segment 2 
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The results of the multi-group analysis, in general, suggest that a large number of the 
hypothesised relationships between the research constructs vary from one segment to 
another. Furthermore, the results at the segment level sometimes are different from 
the results at the whole sample level. These differences will be discussed in detail in 
the next chapter. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter presented the procedures followed to assess the structural model and the 
results of hypotheses testing. These procedures started with data examination 
including checking the missing data, outliers and testing the normality assumption. In 
addition, the descriptive statistics were presented for the research constructs. 
The rest of this chapter presented the results of the structural model analysis and 
hypotheses testing using PLS-SEM. The procedures of assessing the structural model 
results include path coefficients, R2, t test, predictive relevance and FIMIX-PLS for 
assessing unobserved data heterogeneity. The assessment of unobserved data 
heterogeneity has suggested segmenting the sample data into two groups. 
Accordingly, data segmentation and multi-group analysis has been performed to 
examine how the results of hypotheses testing are different between the two groups. A 
number of the hypothesised relationships were supported (e.g. VBM is positively 
associated with agency conflicts and decentralisation, compliance with the CCCG is 
positively associated with agency conflicts and company size, CE is positively 
associated with PEU, differentiation strategies) and some others were not supported 
(e.g. VBM is not associated with PEU and company size, CE is not associated with 
agency conflicts and decentralisation). However, discussing these results will be 
provided in detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter (7)  
Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the research hypotheses were tested and the results were 
reported. This chapter aims to interpret and discuss the demonstrated results, which 
can help to answer the research questions and achieve the research objectives. Further, 
this chapter aims to test two competing models for the direct and indirect relationships 
between VBM and organisational performance, acting through compliance and CE as 
intervening variables.  
The discussion of results is classified into four main groups according to the groups of 
hypotheses. The second section of this chapter will discuss the results of hypotheses 
related to the relationships between contingency factors, VBM and performance. The 
third section will discuss the results of hypotheses related to the relationships between 
contingency factors, compliance with the CCCG and performance. The fourth section 
will discuss the results of hypotheses related to the relationships between contingency 
factors, CE and performance. The fifth section will discuss the results of hypotheses 
related to the relationships between VBM, compliance with the CCCG, CE and 
performance. In the sixth section further analysis for two competing models 
presenting direct and the indirect relationships between VBM and performance will 
be discussed. Finally, the seventh section will provide a summary of the chapter. 
7.2 Contingency Factors, VBM and Performance 
This section discusses in detail the results of the contingency relationships between 
agency conflicts, company size, PEU, strategy and decentralisation on one hand and 
VBM on the other, in addition to the effect of fit between the contingency factors and 
VBM on organisational performance. 
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7.2.1 VBM and Performance 
The results indicate, unexpectedly, that VBM is non-significantly associated with 
market-based performance. Additionally, the relationship between VBM and 
perceived performance is negative and significant. These results, in general, failed to 
support hypothesis (1).  
This non-significant relationship between VBM and market-based performance is 
consistent with the results of some previous studies which also failed to find a positive 
association between VBM and performance. For instance, Dodd and Chen (1996) 
conclude that other performance measures (e.g. ROA) outperform EVA in explaining 
the change of stock returns for a sample of US companies. Similarly, Biddle et al. 
(1997) provide evidence against the effectiveness of EVA in explaining changes in 
the stock returns compared with earnings before extraordinary items. Hogan and 
Lewis (2005) also found improvements in operating performance after adoption of 
EVA, but not statistically different from the non adopters. Interestingly, Cooper and 
Petry (1994) found a negative association between VBM and organisational 
performance. These unexpected results have been explained by industry and corporate 
life-cycle effects, reputation concerns and bureaucratic inefficiencies (Cooper and 
Petry, 1994).  
However, few empirical studies have been conducted in the UK, and most of these 
studies fail to provide evidence of association between VBM and organisational 
performance. For instance, Cooper et al. (2001) conclude that VBM companies do not 
outperform other companies with traditional PMSs. These results have been partly 
attributed to the difficulty in classifying companies into pure VBM adopters and non- 
adopters, especially that a large number of companies use value-based measures along 
with other traditional performance measures. Moreover, other reasons are related to 
industry’s effect, unrepresentative sample and inhomogeneous groups of companies 
that use different value-based measures. 
Similarly, Ismail (2006) provides evidence that net operating profit after tax 
outperforms EVA and residual income in explaining changes in stock returns for a 
sample of UK companies. These results have been attributed to the limited ability of 
one factor (EVA), to explain variations in stock returns, as other factors that may 
cause changes in stock returns should be taken into consideration including 
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customers, employees, community satisfaction, product quality and market share 
growth (Chen and Dodd, 2001; Ismail, 2006). 
The non-significant direct relationship between VBM and market-based performance 
can also be explained by the significant indirect effect of VBM on market-base 
performance acting through compliance with the CCCG as mediating variable. This 
implies that the indirect effect of VBM on market-based performance through 
compliance is more important than the direct effect (Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
Further to the negative and significant relationship between VBM and the perceived 
performance, this can be explained by the emphasis of VBM on the shareholder value 
creation measured by EP. VBM is critical to the other performance measures (e.g. net 
profit, ROI) that do not take the cost of capital into consideration. Therefore, VBM 
implementation may not lead to improved performance measured in other measures 
(such as traditional financial measures and non-financial performance measures), as 
they are not among VBM priorities or objectives. Therefore, the negative association 
between VBM and perceived performance is not surprising, since VBM addresses the 
limitations of these measures for valuation and decision making (Copeland et al., 
2000; Lueg and Schaffer, 2010). 
Further to the multi-group analysis, the results, in general, fail to support any 
significant relationship between VBM and organisational performance at the level of 
segment 1. However, the negative association between VBM and organisational 
performance (both market-based and perceived performance) is significant only in 
segment 2. This can be explained as VBM implementation may not fit small 
companies, as suggested by prior studies, because its implementation is costly and 
may not be affordable for small companies. Accordingly, the negative effect of VBM 
implementation on organisational performance could be significant in small 
companies (segment 2), because its implementation does not fit this size of 
companies. 
7.2.2 Agency Conflicts and VBM 
As expected in hypothesis (2), the results confirm the significant positive association 
between VBM and agency conflicts. These results are consistent with the agency 
theory argument that agency conflicts can be resolved using incentive contracts that 
align the interest of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 
and Murphy 1990; Denis, 2001). Outcome-based contracts possibly align the interests 
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of agents and principals, because the rewards for both groups depend on the same 
actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jones and Butler, 1992). Tying managers’ 
incentives to shareholder value creation using the VBM approach is a good example 
of outcome-based contracts that can be used to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. Therefore, the greater the agency conflicts, the more likely it is VBM 
will be be adopted to mitigate agency conflicts (Lovata and Costigan, 2002). 
The results are also consistent with prior research, which argues that VBM reduces 
the moral hazard problem and aligns the managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
(Stewart, 1991; Lovata and Costigan, 2002), through linking their compensations to 
shareholder value (Ryan and Trahan, 2007). Lovata and Costigan (2002) also provide 
empirical evidence on positive association between EVA adoption and agency 
conflicts, measured by the percentage of management ownership and the percentage 
of institutional investors, for a sample of US companies. 
Further to the multi-group analysis, the results of the whole sample suggest a 
significant positive relationship between agency conflicts and VBM. However, the 
positive relationship is significant only for segment 2, and non-significant for segment 
1. These differences can be explained as VBM acts not only as a PMS, but also as a 
CG mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts. The significant association between 
VBM and agency conflicts in segment 2 can be attributed to the relatively weak CG 
structure in these companies, due to the lack of compulsory compliance with the 
CCCG. Therefore, companies in segment 2, especially those with high agency 
conflicts, may adopt VBM to mitigate these conflicts, especially as most companies in 
this segment are small sized and cannot afford to comply with many of the CCCG 
provisions. However, companies in segment 1 can respond to the agency conflicts 
through compliance with the CCCG, especially they can comply with most, if not all, 
the CCCG provisions. Accordingly, the demand on VBM in these companies would 
be less than other companies in segment 2. 
7.2.3 Company Size and VBM 
Unexpectedly, the results do not support the proposed positive relationship between 
company size and VBM in hypothesis (3). These results do not support the view that 
the larger the company size, the more sophisticated the PMS (Haldma and Laats, 
2002; Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008), as the high cost of VBM implementation 
makes it only affordable to large companies (Boulos et al., 2001). 
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However, the results are consistent with the findings of some previous studies that fail 
to provide evidence on the association between VBM implementation and company 
size. For instance, Ryan and Trahan (2007) provide evidence of improvements in 
organisational performance after implementing VBM. However, large organisations 
show fewer improvements than small organisations, which has been explained by the 
large amount of monitoring costs that large companies may incur (Ryan and Trahan, 
2007). Similarly, Garvey and Milbourn (2000) found no significant effect for 
company size on VBM adoption decision. 
Further to the multi-group analysis, the results of the whole sample and segment 1 
suggest a non-significant positive relationship between company size and VBM. 
However, the relationship was significantly negative between company size and VBM 
in segment 2. These differences can be explained building on the explanation 
provided in the last hypothesis that VBM may be demanded, as a CG mechanism in 
companies in segment 2, because of the weak CG structure in these companies.  
7.2.4 PEU and VBM 
Surprisingly, the results do not support the proposed positive relationship between 
PEU and VBM in hypothesis (4). These results do not support the view that VBM, as 
a sophisticated PMS (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008), is likely to be adopted in 
uncertain environments to reduce PEU and improve managerial decision-making 
(Chong and Chong, 1997).  
One possible explanation of the insignificance association between VBM and PEU is 
that high level of PEU makes performance evaluation more subjective (Govindarajan, 
1984), non-accounting style rather than a budget or profit constrained style is more 
appropriate (Ross, 1995). Therefore, decision makers are likely to seek external, non-
financial and ex ante information (Gordon and Narayanan, 1984). In other words, 
PEU is likely to be associated with a more open, externally focused, non financial 
style of MCS (Chenhall, 2007). 
Based on the above argument, organisations with a greater level of PEU may not 
adopt VBM because it is more focused on financial measures. Besides, estimating 
cash flow, as an essential part in calculating value-based measures, under these 
uncertain conditions is likely to be far from accurate, and managers’ performance will 
be assessed based on events out of their control, as these measures will not be 
accurately estimated (Chenhall, 2006). Similarly, Ittner and Larcker (1998) conclude 
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that VBM implementation may not be appropriate when value-based measures 
become regularly negative in cyclical industries. 
Further to the results of the multi-group analysis, no significant relationship was 
found between PEU and VBM at any level either for the whole sample or for any 
segment. However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge there is no empirical 
evidence in the VBM literature that can support either view. While the results of the 
present study provide evidence against VBM as a sophisticated management 
accounting practice, more empirical studies are needed in this area of research to 
develop a better understanding for the relationship between VBM implementation and  
PEU. 
7.2.5 Strategy and VBM 
Surprisingly, and contrary to the proposed relationship in hypothesis (5), the results 
suggest that VBM is positively associated with low cost strategies instead of 
differentiation strategies. These results contradict the view that VBM, as a 
sophisticated PMS, is likely to be adopted by prospectors/product 
differentiators/builders (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). One possible explanation for 
these results is that VBM is based on financial measures.  
In general, the financial measures are less relevant than other non-financial 
performance measures (e.g. developing new products and customer satisfaction) for 
prospectors/product differentiators/builders, where the main goal is to develop new 
products. Financial measures are more relevant to defenders/cost leaders/harvesters’, 
where the main goal is to increase efficiency (Lovata and Costigan, 2002). Therefore, 
VBM can be more relevant to companies that adopt conservative strategies (cost 
leadership), where there is less PEU and cash flows are more stable and predictable 
(Chenhall, 2006).  
Interestingly, these results are in line with the findings of Lovata and Costigan (2002), 
who indicate that prospectors are less likely to use EVA in measuring performance 
compared with defenders. The findings were also unexpected by Lovata and Costigan 
(2002), as the proposed accounting adjustments to research and development (R&D) 
in EVA calculations are central to its contribution to performance measurement over  
traditional measures. Surprisingly, prospectors (high R&D to sales ratio), “whose 
current earnings are less relevant to predict future success tend to use other 
performance evaluation measures instead” (Lovata and Costigan, 2002: p. 226). 
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Accordingly, Lovata and Costigan (2002) conclude that identifying best incentives for 
managers seems to be more complex than inferred by proponents of EVA. However, 
the results of the relationships between VBM and both PEU and strategy, in general, 
cast doubt over the sophistication of VBM as a MAP.  
Further to the multi-group analysis, while the results of the whole sample suggest 
positive association between low cost strategies and VBM, no significant relationship 
was found between strategy and VBM at the segment level. This may help to explain 
the unexpected results at the sample level, as the relationship between VBM and 
strategy is not clear enough at the segment level. 
7.2.6 Decentralisation and VBM 
As expected in hypothesis (6), the results confirm the positive association between 
decentralisation and VBM. These results are consistent with the argument that VBM 
can work only if decision making is decentralised (Bannister and Jesuthasan, 1997) 
and business units are empowered (Boulos et al., 2001). Empowering business units 
helps to evaluate the strategic options and subsequent investment, based on 
maximising the business unit’s long-term EP (Boulos et al., 2001). Further, 
“decentralised organisation structure is recommended for value to happen, as this 
enables transparency and clear communication” (Copeland et al., 2000: p.96). 
  
The results are also consistent with the findings of McLaren’s (2005) case study of 
three organisations in New Zealand, commissioned by CIMA. The author points out 
how EVA cascade down the organisation at divisional, process and product levels. 
The findings also highlight the importance of decentralised decision making to 
implement EVA successfully, as its secondary measures (value drivers) lie at the 
lower levels of organisation, where the interface with customers, suppliers and 
employees exists. The study also concludes that EVA implementation may not be 
appropriate in countries with a culture of centralised decision making (McLaren, 
2005). 
The results are also consistent with the findings of Francis and Minchington’s (2002) 
survey of 258 companies in the UK, which point out the increasing popularity of new 
measures (e.g. value-based measures) at divisional level. The study also suggests 
using value drivers as a proxy of shareholder value analysis or EVA at divisional 
205 
 
level, to overcome the theatrical and technical problems of implementing these 
measures at divisional level and to build goal congruence within organisations.   
Further to the multi-group analysis, the results of the whole sample suggest a 
significant positive relationship between decentralisation and VBM. However, the 
positive relationship is significant for segment 1 only and not for segment 2. These 
differences can be explained as decentralisation, in general, becomes important when 
the company size grows. Therefore, the association between decentralisation and 
VBM is only significant in the large companies in segment 1. 
In summary, the results of the contingency relationships between agency conflicts, 
company size, PEU, strategy, decentralisation and VBM suggest that, in practice, 
VBM implementation does not always take place in a context that matches the one 
proposed in the literature. Further, some of the characteristics of this context seem to 
be contradictory at times. As predicted, the results provide support to the hypothesised 
positive association between agency conflicts, decentralisation and VBM. However, 
the results do not find a significant relationship between VBM and PEU and company 
size. Interestingly, the results suggest a positive association between VBM and low 
cost strategies, whereas a positive association has been hypothesised between VBM 
and differentiation strategies. Moreover, the results fail to find support for the 
hypothesised positive direct association between VBM and organisational 
performance.  
7.3 Contingency factors, Compliance and Performance 
This section discusses the results of the contingency relationship between agency 
conflicts and company size on one hand, and compliance with the CCCG on the other, 
in addition to the effect of compliance with the CCCG on organisational performance. 
7.3.1 Compliance and Performance 
As expected in hypothesis (7) the results confirm the positive association between 
compliance with the CCCG and market-based performance, but failed to find similar 
association with perceived performance. The results with respect to perceived 
performance are expected as CG mechanisms are normally connected in the literature 
to the investors’ reactions and stock market returns. However, the results with respect 
to the market-based performance  are consistent with the argument of agency theory 
that monitoring agents (management) behaviour reduces the possible conflict of 
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interest between principals (shareholders) and agents, minimises agency costs and 
protects shareholders’ investments (Hendrey and Keil, 2004). Therefore, CG 
mechanisms are as effectives as they can reduce agency costs and achieve a high level 
of performance (Aguilera et al., 2008). 
The results are also consistent with previous studies that suggest that CG structure is 
one of the critical factors in shaping firm value and development of financial markets 
across countries (La Porta et al., 2000). However, in the UK, most previous studies 
examine the effect of compliance with the Cadbury Report on performance (e.g. 
Vafeas and Theodorou,1998; Faccio and Lasfer, 1999; Dedman, 2002) with less 
empirical evidence on compliance with the recent versions of the CCCG (e.g. Arcot et 
al. 2010). Therefore, these results contribute to the literature and provide empirical 
evidence of the association between compliance with the CCCG and market-based 
performance. 
The results of the multi-group analysis indicate a significant positive relationship 
between compliance with the CCCG and market-based performance, at both the 
sample level and segment level. Similarly, there is no difference between the sample 
and segments results regarding the non-significant relationship between compliance 
with the CCCG and perceived performance. 
7.3.2 Agency Conflicts and Compliance 
As expected in hypothesis (8) the results confirm the positive association between 
agency conflicts and compliance with the CCCG. These results are consistent with the 
agency theory argument that resolving agency conflicts require monitoring 
management (Denis, 2001) through selecting suitable monitoring and bonding control 
methods to align interests and optimise performance (Jones and Butler, 1992).  
The results are in line with the findings of the survey conducted by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), which indicate that “corporate governance deals with the agency 
problem: the separation of management and finance” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: p. 
703). According to Aguilera et al. (2008), a great part of the literature is based on the 
agency theory premise that a wide range of CG mechanisms can be used to monitor 
management and restrict managerial opportunism. The literature also provides 
evidence on positive association between agency conflicts in a company and CG 
mechanisms that can mitigate these conflicts (Dey, 2008). However, the effectiveness 
of these mechanisms is determined by reducing agency costs and achieving a high 
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level of financial performance (Aguilera et al. 2008), which has been supported before 
in testing the relationship between compliance with the CCCG and performance. 
The results of the multi-group analysis suggest a significant positive relationship 
between agency conflicts and compliance with the CCCG for the whole sample. 
However, the positive relationship is significant only for segment 1, and non-
significant for segment 2. As previously explained in hypothesis (2), companies in the 
two segments may respond to agency conflicts differently. For instance, companies in 
segment 1 respond to agency conflicts through compliance with the CCCG due to its 
compulsory nature and their capabilities to comply with its provisions. Therefore, 
these companies are likely to have a strong CG structure making VBM 
implementation, as an additional CG mechanism, less appealing for these companies. 
This can explain why agency conflicts are significantly associated with compliance 
with the CCCG and not with VBM in these companies. However, companies in 
segment 2 respond to agency conflicts through implementing VBM due to the lack of 
capabilities and enforcement regarding the compliance with the CCCG. Therefore, 
these companies are likely to have a weak CG structure making VBM 
implementation, as a CG mechanism, more appealing for these companies. This can 
explain why agency conflicts are significantly associated with VBM and not with 
compliance with the CCCG for these companies.  
7.3.3 Company Size and Compliance 
As expected in hypothesis (9) the results support the proposed positive relationship 
between company size and compliance with the CCCG. These results are consistent 
with the agency theory argument that increased company size causes agency conflicts 
(Jones and Butler, 1992) which, in turn, leads to greater demand on CG mechanisms 
to mitigate these conflicts (Dey, 2008). 
The results are also consistent with prior research, which finds a positive association 
between company size and CG mechanisms (Gompers et al. 2003). Further, 
compliance with some provisions of CG codes can be costly and not appropriate to 
small companies (Arcot et al., 2010). In addition, the fit between compliance with CG 
codes and company size is important in predicting performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006), which has been supported before in testing the relationship between 
compliance with the CCCG and performance (hypothesis 7). 
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The results of the multi-group analysis indicate a significant positive relationship 
between company size and compliance with the CCCG at all levels (both sample and 
segment levels). The results, in general, highlight the importance of company size in 
explaining the compliance with the CCCG, even within small companies.  
In summary, the results of the second group of hypotheses suggest that compliance 
with the CCCG takes place, to a large extent, in a context that matches the one 
proposed in the literature. As predicted, the results provide support to the 
hypothesised positive association between agency conflicts, company size and 
compliance with the CCCG. Furthermore, the results support the hypothesised 
positive direct association between compliance with the CCCG codes and market-
based performance.  
7.4 Contingency Factors, CE and Performance 
This section discusses the results of the contingency relationships between agency 
conflicts, company size, PEU, strategy and decentralisation on one hand and CE on 
the other, in addition to the effect of CE on performance. 
7.4.1 CE and Performance 
As expected in hypothesis (10), the results support the proposed positive relationship 
between CE and the perceived performance, but fail to find a similar association with 
market-based performance. These results are consistent with the view that CE is a key 
element of organisational success (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) and prerequisite for 
yielding a high performance from a new entry (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Zahra, 
1993b). This argument has been criticised for being normative (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996), however, the results of the current study provide evidence that support this 
argument.  
Because performance is a multidimensional construct, the relationship between CE 
and organisational performance is sensitive, to a large extent, to the type of 
performance measures used (Lampkin and Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009). However, 
performance measures used in the CE literature include financial performance 
measures (e.g. sales growth, profitability and wealth creation) (Antoncic and Hisrich, 
2004) and non financial performance measures (e.g. satisfaction and overall success 
ratings by owners or business managers) (Rauch et al., 2009). For instance, previous 
studies provide evidence of positive association between CE and financial 
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performance measured by sales growth and profitability (Covin and Slevin, 1986; 
Zahra, 1991; 1993a; Zahra and Covin, 1995), sales growth but not profitability 
(Morris and Sexton, 1996), organisation wealth creation, or all of these measures  
(growth, profitability and wealth creation) (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2004).  
In the current study, the positive association between CE and perceived performance 
can be attributed to the existence of financial and non-financial measures in  
perceived performance, which is consistent with the results of previous studies. 
Similarly, the results of multi-group analysis indicate a significant positive 
relationship between CE and perceived performance, at both sample and segment 
levels. 
Interestingly, the positive relationship between CE and market-based performance is 
only significant at the level of segment 2. While compliance with the CCCG is the 
only significant predictor of market-based performance at both sample and segment 1 
levels, CE is an important predictor of market-based performance at segment 2 level. 
While the stock market of segment 2 (AIM) still gives an important weight for 
compliance with the CCCG, not all companies are expected to comply with the code 
provisions. Therefore, the entrepreneurial orientation for these companies plays an 
important role in shareholder value creation. 
7.4.2 Agency Conflicts and CE 
The results fail to confirm the proposed negative relationship between agency 
conflicts and CE in hypothesis (11). These results do not support the view that agency 
conflicts cause agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which, in turn, exhaust a 
company’s resources and may constrain innovation and CE (Miller, 2011). The non-
significant negative coefficient of agency conflicts can be explained as the negative 
effect of agency conflicts on CE may be ameliorated by VBM implementation and 
other CG mechanisms, which act as effective tools to mitigate agency conflicts. The 
agency conflicts can be partly solved through rewarding agents and increasing their 
equity stake in the company to bear uncertainty and to overcome risk aversion (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jones and Butler, 1992). 
The results of the multi-group analysis also could not find any significant relationship 
between agency conflicts on CE at the segment level. However, more empirical 
studies are needed in this area of research to develop a better understanding of the 
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relationship between agency conflicts and CE, taking into consideration the CG 
mechanisms that may affect this relationship. 
7.4.3 Company Size and CE 
Surprisingly, and contrary to hypothesis (12), the results suggest a positive association 
between company size and CE instead of the proposed negative association. This 
contradicts the view that smaller companies may be more entrepreneurial (Mintzberg, 
1973), as they are more flexible, and can quickly adapt to changes in environment to 
take new opportunities (Rauch et al., 2009). The results also contradict the results of 
some empirical studies, which suggest that company size is negatively associated with 
internal innovation (Hit et al., 1996). However, the results of some other studies 
suggest a positive association between CE and company size (Miles and Arnold, 
1991). Therefore, some scholars call for further exploration of this relationship (e.g. 
Antoncic and Hisrich, 2004).  
While the results of the current study fail to provide evidence on company size as an 
antecedent to CE, previous studies examine the moderation effect of company size on 
the relationship between CE and organisational performance, also with mixed results. 
For instance, Antoncic and Hisrich (2004) find no significant effect of company size 
as a control variable on the association between CE and performance. However, 
Rauch et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence, based on meta- analysis of previous 
studies, on the moderation effect of company size on the relationship between CE and 
performance. 
According to Rauch et al. (2009), the effect of company size is significantly higher in 
micro companies (less than 50 employees) than small companies (50-499 employees), 
but no significant difference exists between small and large companies (more than 
500 employees). Conversely, Covin and Covin (1990) found that “very small firms 
may not generally benefit from aggressive behaviour in hostile environments the way 
slightly larger firms often do” (Covin and Covin, 1990: p. 43-44). These results were 
explained as small companies may need to have minimum size to be able to benefit 
from adopting aggressive strategies in hostile environments (Covin and Covin,1990). 
The mixed results in the literature with regard to the size effect can be explained by 
the different operational definitions of company size in different studies and different 
contexts. For instance, small size companies in the US, where most of the empirical 
studies were conducted, are companies with less than 500 employees, while small 
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companies in the UK are companies with less than 50 employees. The wide range of 
small companies in the US allows the largest company, for example, in this group to 
be many times the size of the smallest company in the same group. Besides, the 
different ways of testing the size effect (e.g. antecedent or moderator) and different 
dimensions used to operationally define CE in previous studies have contributed to 
the inconsistent results. 
The multi-group analysis results indicate that while the positive association between 
company size and CE is significant at the sample and segment 1 level, this association 
is non-significant at the level of segment 2. This can be explained as a great number 
of small companies in segment 2 may not generally benefit from the entrepreneurial 
orientation in hostile environments as larger companies in the same segment (Covin 
and Covin, 1990). These companies may need to have a minimum size to be able to 
benefit from entrepreneurial orientation implementing aggressive strategies in hostile 
environments (Covin and Slovin, 1990). 
7.4.4 PEU and CE 
As expected in hypothesis (13), the results support the proposed positive relationship 
between PEU and CE. The results are in line with the view that companies respond to 
challenging conditions in dynamic environments through innovative behaviour, risk 
taking and proactiveness (Khandwalla, 1987). According to Miller (1983), the more 
the dynamic and hostile the external environment, the more the companies will be 
entrepreneurial. The results are also consistent with prior research, which finds that 
PEU is positively associated with product innovation (Miller and Friesen, 1982). In 
another study, Miller (1983) provides evidence on the association between dynamism, 
hostility and environmental heterogeneity with entrepreneurship. 
However, there is a debate in the literature on whether PEU acts as antecedent to CE 
or only acts as a moderator to the relationship between CE and performance. Many 
studies suggest a moderating effect of PEU to the relationship between CE and 
performance. For instance, the findings of Covin and Covin’s (1990) study suggest a 
positive association between the aggressive competitive orientation and performance 
in a hostile environment. Similarly, Covin and Slevin (1989) provide evidence on the 
moderating effect of environmental hostility on the CE-performance relationship. 
Also, Dess et al. (1997) argue that PEU and heterogeneity positively moderate the 
performance of companies with entrepreneurial orientation. 
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Few studies suggest that PEU is an antecedent to CE which, in turn, mediates the 
relationship between PEU and performance. For instance, the findings of Zahra 
(1991) suggest that CE is positively associated with environmental characteristics of 
dynamism, heterogeneity and hostility. In addition, CE mediates the relationship 
between the environmental characteristics and performance. Similarly, Zahra (1993a) 
provides evidence on different combinations of CE (innovation, venturing and 
renewal) that companies choose from to fit their environmental characteristics 
(hostility and munificence). This fit is associated with performance. 
However, the results of this study support the second stream of studies, which 
assumes that entrepreneurial orientation of a company is a reflection of the level of 
PEU that this company is already encountering. The results of this hypothesis together 
with hypothesis (10) support the notion that CE mediates the relationship between 
PEU and performance. 
The results of the multi-group analysis indicate a significant positive relationship 
between PEU and CE at the level of the whole sample and segment 1only. However, a 
non-significant relationship was found at segment 2 level. The non-significant 
relationship between PEU and CE in segment 2 can be related to the previous 
hypothesis, as company size in this segment may not meet the minimum level that 
enables companies to benefit from CE in an uncertain environment. 
7.4.5 Strategy and CE 
As expected in hypothesis (14), the results support the proposed positive relationship 
between strategy and CE. These results support the view that CE is closer to 
differentiation strategies than low cost strategies (Dess et al., 1997). Differentiators 
rely on strong market abilities, creative flair, product engineering skills and effective 
coordination across functional areas, whereas low-cost leaders emphasise tight cost 
controls, process engineering skills, efficient distribution systems and structured sets 
of organisational responsibilities (Porter, 1980: pp.40-41).  
These results are also consistent with prior studies. For instance, the findings of Covin 
et al. (1994) suggest that companies with build-oriented strategic missions (normally 
associated with differentiation strategies) outperform companies with hold and 
harvest-oriented strategic missions (normally associated with low cost strategies), 
when they adopt entrepreneurially strategic postures. Similarly, Gupta and 
Govindarajan (1984) found that greater willingness to take risks contributes to 
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performance in the case of build strategic mission, and hinder it in the case of harvest 
strategic mission.  
However, some studies fail to support the hypothesised relationship. For instance, 
Dess et al. (1997) found positive association between cost leadership strategies and 
CE. Similarly, Zahra and Covin (1993), provide evidence of a positive association 
between cost leadership strategies and new product development. These results have 
been attributed to the narrow conceptualisation of entrepreneurial strategies and the 
increased global competition, which challenge managers to find new strategic 
combinations (Dess et al., 1997). 
The results of the multi-group analysis indicate a significant positive relationship 
between differentiation strategies and CE, at both sample and segment levels. No 
difference was found between the results at any level, which provides strong support 
to the hypothesised relationship. 
7.4.6 Decentralisation and CE 
The results fail to support the proposed positive relationship between decentralisation 
and CE in hypothesis (15). These results, in general, do not support the view that 
organic organisation type is more appropriate than mechanistic organisation type for 
organisations with entrepreneurial orientation (Khandwalla, 1977). The results are 
also inconsistent with the findings of previous studies that provide evidence on the 
association between CE and decentralisation (e.g. Covin and Slevin 1991). 
One possible explanation of these results is that the appropriate level of 
centralisation/decentralisation of decision making in an entrepreneurial context 
depends on the type of structure (simple, planning and organic) (Miller, 1983). For 
simple companies (small size companies with power centralised at the top), 
centralisation of decision making is likely to be associated with entrepreneurship, as 
the leader has the ultimate power to initiate innovations and entrepreneurial ventures 
(Miller, 1983). Planning firms are bigger, their objectives are smooth and their 
operations are efficient through the use of formal controls and plans. Like simple 
firms, power is centralised and the locus of control of the CEO is an important 
determinant of entrepreneurial orientation (Miller, 1983). In contrast, organic firms 
endeavour to adapt to their environments and stress expertise-based power and open 
communication. Unlike simple and planning firms, decentralisation of decision 
making in organic firms is positively associated with entrepreneurship (Miller, 1983). 
214 
 
Given the wide range of companies used in the current study, possibly with different 
types of structure, the association between decentralisation and CE is not that clear. 
Another possible explanation is that the dimensions of CE, as a multidimensional 
construct, may vary independently (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). For instance, organic 
structure is likely to be associated with the innovativeness dimension of CE, as it 
embeds decentralisation and low formalisation, which may encourage the autonomy 
and creativeness required for innovations (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). However, this 
structure may negatively affect a firm’s ability to strongly focus on effective 
competition with industry competitors (competitive aggressiveness). This structure 
can add some difficulties in integrating and harmonising primary and support 
activities in a firm’s value chain (Porter, 1980). Therefore, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
hypothesise that in firms with high innovativeness more organic structure will be 
associated with higher performance, whereas in firms with strong competitive 
aggressiveness, more organic structure will be associated with lower performance. 
The results of the multi-group analysis also provide another possible explanation, 
which indicate a non-significant relationship between decentralisation and CE, only at 
the sample and segment 2 levels. However, a significant positive relationship was 
found at segment 1 level. This can be explained as the decentralised structure, 
basically, becomes necessary in large companies, as is the case in segment 1. 
However, a decentralised structure becomes unnecessary and inappropriate in small 
companies, as is the case in segment 2. 
In summary, the results of the structural model of the proposed relationships between 
the contingency factors and CE, in general, suggest that in practice, CE does not 
always take place in a context that matches the one proposed in the literature. As 
predicted, the results provide support to the hypothesised positive association between 
PEU, differentiation strategies and CE. However, the results could not find a 
significant relationship between agency conflicts, decentralisation and CE. 
Interestingly, the results suggest a positive association between company size and CE, 
whereas a negative association has been hypothesised. Further, the results support the 
hypothesised positive association between CE and perceived performance.  
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7.5 VBM, Compliance and CE 
This section discusses the results of the inter-relationships between VBM, compliance 
with the CCCG and CE. Also, the results of the indirect effect of VBM on 
organisational performance through compliance with the CCCG and CE as 
intervening variables are also discussed. 
7.5.1 VBM and Compliance 
As expected in hypothesis (16) the results support the proposed positive relationship 
between VBM and compliance with the CCCG. The results are consistent with the 
agency theory argument that the interests of management and shareholders can be 
aligned through monitoring managers and providing them with incentives (Denis, 
2001). Previous studies suggest that VBM can be used to mitigate agency conflicts, as 
it provides a set of metrics that measure and reward management performance, to 
align managers and shareholder interests (Ryan and Trahan, 2007). Therefore, VBM 
can be considered as a form of CG per se (Garvey and Milbourn, 2000; Lander and 
Reinstein, 2005; Ryan and Trahan, 2007) that works with other CG mechanisms to 
mitigate agency conflicts.  
While equity-based managerial incentives can align the interests of agents and 
principals (Jensen and Murphy 1990), it may not be sufficient to mitigate agency 
conflicts (Healy, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dey, 2008). Other CG mechanisms 
may be needed to complement VBM, such as board of directors (Fama and Jensen 
1983a) and management ownership (Audretsch et al., 2009) to monitor management 
performance. The results of previous studies also suggest that some CG mechanisms 
such as managerial ownership can complement VBM and motivate managers making 
VBM implementation successful (Ryan and Trahan, 2007). 
The results of the multi-group analysis indicate that VBM is positively associated 
with compliance with the CCCG at all levels except for segment 2, where the positive 
relationship is non-significant. This can be explained by the lack of resources and 
enforcement for compliance with the CCCG in the companies listed on the AIM.  
These results also support the indirect positive association between VBM and 
organisational performance acting through compliance with CG, as predicted in 
hypothesis (16a). These results are consistent with the findings of El-Mir and Seboui 
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(2008) that the convergence or divergence between EVA and the created shareholder 
value are largely explained by CG practices.  
7.5.2 VBM and CE 
The results fail to support the proposed positive relationship between VBM and CE in 
hypothesis (17). These results do not support the view that creating shareholder value 
requires VBM adopters to exhibit more entrepreneurial orientation. The results imply 
that companies respond to agency problems through adopting VBM and other CG 
mechanisms, emphasising the control role of board of directors and paying less 
attention to CE and the strategy role. This view is consistent with the agency theory 
assumption that the major role of the board of directors is to monitor agents’ 
(executives) behaviour to ensure efficiency and safeguard principals’ 
(owners/shareholders) interests (Zahra and Pearce, 1989: p. 293).  
According to Zahra and Pearce (1989), the board of directors undertakes three critical 
roles (service, strategy and control). From the agency theory perspective, control is 
the most important role for the board of directors, followed by service and strategy 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989). While agency theory has very clear propositions on the 
monitoring and control role of the board of directors (Eisenhardt, 1989), its standpoint 
with regard to the strategy role is not as explicit (Hendrey and Keil, 2004). Though 
agency theorists (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999) stress 
the importance of the strategy role of boards of directors, they acknowledge that there 
is little evidence to support this argument (Hendrey and Keil, 2004).  
The results are consistent with the findings of the INSEAD survey of VBM, which 
suggests that VBM implementation has no impact on a company’s innovation, but 
does not encourage seeking new opportunities in new markets or new product areas 
(Boulos et al., 2001). Similarly, Cooper et al. (2001) point out that the difference 
between VBM adopters and non-adopters is not statistically significant in terms of 
innovation capacity.  
The results of the multi-group analysis indicate a non-significant relationship between 
VBM and CE at the levels of whole sample and segment 1. However, a significant 
positive relationship exists at the level of segment 2. This can be explained as VBM 
adopters overemphasise compliance with the CCCG at the expense of CE, especially 
in the Main Market, where the compliance is compulsory. Alternatively, at the level 
of smaller companies (AIM), CE would be overemphasised at the expense of 
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compliance; especially that compliance with the CCCG is voluntary for these 
companies and may not be feasible. 
However, these results also fail to support the indirect positive association between 
VBM and organisational performance acting through CE, as predicted in hypothesis 
(17a). However, as there is no evidence of significant association between VBM and 
CE, the indirect positive association between VBM and performance acting through 
CE cannot be supported.  
7.5.3 Compliance and CE 
The results fail to support the negative relationship between compliance with the 
CCCG and CE as proposed in hypothesis (18). These results do not support the notion 
of tension between conformance and performance, which is based on the argument 
that more focus on control and accountability may negatively affect enterprise and 
innovation (O'Sullivan, 2000). One possible explanation of these results is the flexible 
regulatory regime in the UK, which has been established and pioneered the principle-
based approach to CG (Arcot and Bruno, 2005). Additionally, the code provisions in 
the UK are constantly subject to revisions and amendments to respond to any 
concerns raised by companies and any changes in the business environment. 
Therefore, many versions were issued from the CCCG in the last decade. 
Unlike the mandatory regulatory regime, the voluntary nature of compliance with the 
code provisions allows companies to adopt CG mechanisms that fit these companies 
and provide disclosure and explanation for non-compliance with any other provisions. 
The literature suggests that non-compliance with the code provisions for genuine 
reasons, explained in the annual report, does not negatively affect the company 
performance (Arcot and Bruno, 2005).  
The results also can be explained as compliance with some provisions in the code 
(e.g. outside directors) may negatively affect CE. Compliance with other provisions 
(e.g. stock ownership by outside directors) may positively affect CE, and can 
somewhat mitigate the negative impact of other mechanisms (Zahra, 1996). 
Therefore, the final effect of compliance with the code provisions may depend on the 
relative significance of each effect. This can justify the importance of examining the 
overall effect of compliance with the code provisions, compared with examining the 
effect of complying with single provisions. 
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The results of the multi-group analysis indicate a non-significant positive relationship 
between compliance with the CCCG and CE at the levels of the whole sample and 
segment 1. However, a significant negative relationship is found at segment 2 level. 
This can be explained as compliance with the CCCG in smaller companies in AIM 
may not be feasible or relevant because of limited resources available in these 
companies. Therefore, compliance with the code provisions at this level can seriously 
hinder their entrepreneurial activities. 
7.5.4 VBM*Compliance and CE  
As expected in hypothesis (19), the results support the proposed negative effect of the 
interaction between VBM and compliance with the CCCG on CE. These results 
support the notion of tension between accountability and enterprise. Combining 
VBM, which acts as a CG mechanism, with other CG mechanisms may emphasise 
more control and accountability at the expense of enterprise and innovation 
(O'Sullivan, 2000).  
The results are in line with the argument of Aguilera et al. (2008) that the advantages 
of improving legal protection for shareholders through greater disclosure, auditing 
and control may be sacrificed by over regulating the CG environment in ways that 
divert it from flexibility and risk taking. The results are also consistent with the notion 
of complementarities between CG practices, which suggests interaction effects or 
clustering of characteristics into particular combinations, making some of these 
combinations more effective than others (Aguilera et al., 2008). However, to the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, no empirical evidence was provided in the literature 
regarding the complementarities between VBM and CG mechanisms. Therefore, these 
results contribute to the literature by providing insights into the interaction effect of 
VBM and CG on CE. 
The results of the multi-group analysis indicate that the negative effect of the 
interaction term between VBM and compliance with the CCCG on CE is significant 
at all levels, except for segment 1. This can be explained by the flexibility of the 
“comply or explain” basis used in the UK, which makes compliance with the CCCG 
provisions possible for the large companies, without seriously damaging their 
entrepreneurial orientation. However, for small companies in segment 2, while it is 
not compulsory, compliance with the CCCG can hinder entrepreneurial orientation 
and offset the significant positive effect of VBM on CE. 
219 
 
7.5.5 VBM*Compliance and Performance 
The results fail to support the proposed positive effect of the interaction between 
VBM and compliance with the CCCG on both market-based performance and 
perceived performance (hypothesis 20).  
The non-significant positive effect of the interaction between VBM and compliance 
on market-based performance can be explained by the non-significant negative effect 
of VBM on market-based performance, which probably offsets the significant positive 
effect of compliance with the CCCG on market-based performance. This implies a 
possible trade-off between compliance with the CCCG and VBM, especially for 
companies in segment 1 because they have a strong CG structure. The literature 
suggests that CG mechanisms may have potential trade-offs in terms of their 
effectiveness and their effects on organisational performance (Crouch et al. 2005). 
These results can also be explained by the significant indirect effect of VBM on 
market-based performance through compliance with the CCCG as an intervening 
variable, which makes both the direct and interaction effects less significant in 
predicting market-based performance. 
The results of the multi-group analysis indicate that the interaction between VBM and 
compliance has no significant effect on organisational performance at any level, 
except for a significant positive effect of the interaction on market-based performance 
at the level of segment 2. These results suggest that there is no trade-off between 
compliance with the CCCG and VBM for companies in segment 2, especially that 
they already have weak CG structure. 
Further, the non-significant positive effect of the interaction between VBM and 
compliance on perceived performance is expected, as both VBM and compliance with 
the CCCG do not target these measures of performance. Also, the negative direct 
effects of both VBM and compliance with the CCCG on perceived performance are 
either non-significant or significant at level p ≤ 0.10.   
In summary, the results of the fourth group of hypotheses provide support to the 
hypothesised positive association between VBM and compliance with the CCCG, but 
not with CE. However, the results do find negative association between compliance 
with the CCCG and CE. Furthermore, the results support the positive indirect effect of 
VBM on market-based performance acting through compliance with the CCCG as an 
intervening variable, with less support to the other forms of effect (direct effect and 
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interaction effect). However, the results fail to support the indirect positive effect of 
VBM on performance acting through CE as intervening variable.  
7.6 Further Analysis 
Following the Shield et al. (2000) approach for testing competing models, two models 
were developed and tested on the effects of VBM on organisational performance 
using PLS-SEM. The direct model proposes tha VBM directly affects organisational 
performance, whereas the indirect model proposes that the effect of VBM on 
organisational performance is indirect acting through the mediating influence of 
compliance with the CCCG and CE.  
Previous studies in the VBM literature assume that VBM directly affects 
organisational performance. Therefore, these studies investigate either the 
independent direct effect of VBM or the interaction direct effects of VBM with other 
moderator variables (e.g environmental and organisational factors) on organisational 
performance. However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous studies 
have investigated the indirect effect of VBM on organisational performance. Unlike 
previous studies, this study examines the indirect effect of VBM on performance, in 
addition to the direct effect. “Investigating the indirect and total effects can help to 
answer important questions that are not addressed by examining the direct effects” 
(Bollen, 1989: p. 376), especially when the results of previous studies are equivocal. 
7.6.1 The Direct Effect Model 
The direct effect of VBM on performance has been investigated in many previous 
studies (e.g. Stewart, 1991, 1994; Dodd and Chen, 1996; Grant, 1996; Biddle et al., 
1997; Chen and Dodd, 1997; Lehn and Makhija, 1997; Bao and Bao, 1998; Young 
and O’Byrne, 2001). These studies rely on arguments of superiority of residual 
income variants over traditional performance measures (e.g. ROI), which are basically 
drawn from the finance theory (Seal, 2010). The evidence from these studies is, to a 
large extent, mixed and the majority of these studies fail to support a positive direct 
effect for VBM on organisational performance. 
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Figure 7.1: The Direct Effect Model 
However, the direct model in the current study, as presented in figure 7.1, is not an 
exception. In line with a large number of previous studies, the results of the direct 
model fail to provide evidence of a significant direct effect of VBM on market-based 
performance. Unsurprisingly, the results suggest a significant direct and negative 
effect of VBM on perceived performance, as the theoretical foundation of VBM does 
not assume any positive association between VBM and perceived performance. 
Instead, VBM builds on the premise of the subjectivity and inappropriateness of 
traditional performance measures (e.g. net profit) for measuring shareholder value, as 
these measures do not take into consideration the cost of capital. 
7.6.2 The Indirect Effect Model 
Unlike previous studies, the indirect model proposes that the effect of VBM on 
organisational performance is indirect, acting through compliance with the CCCG and 
CE as intervening variables. The indirect model builds on the premise of the EG 
framework. The basic notion of the EG framework is that good CG or conformance 
on its own cannot make a company successful, the performance dimension that 
focuses on strategy and value creation is rather important, and achieving the balance 
between the two dimensions is crucial (Connell, 2004). Accordingly, the indirect 
model assesses the effectiveness of VBM in achieving the balance between 
conformance (compliance with the CCCG) and performance (CE) dimensions of EG. 
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The results of the indirect model in the current study, as presented in figure 7.2,  
suggest that VBM has a significant indirect positive effect on market-based 
performance acting through compliance with the CCCG as an intervening variable. 
However, the results fail to support the mediating effect of CE on the relationship 
between VBM and organisational performance in general, because VBM is not 
associated with CE.  
 
Figure 7.2: The Indirect Effect Model 
The indirect model suggests that both compliance with the CCCG and CE are 
important in predicting organisational performance. While compliance with the 
CCCG is positively associated with market-based performance, CE is positively 
associated with perceived performance. However, the results suggest that VBM is 
only positively associated with compliance with the CCCG, but not with CE, which 
can help explain the mixed results in previous studies that assume only direct effect.  
These results support the argument that VBM aims to mitigate agency conflicts and 
align the interests of management and shareholders. Therefore, VBM implementation 
is likely to be complemented with other CG mechanisms to acheive this objective 
which, subsequently, can lead to increased market-based performance. However, 
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VBM gives less attention to CE, which implies that VBM fails to balance the 
conformance and performance dimensions. These results diagnose and provide 
insights into some  problems and weaknesses regarding VBM implementaion. 
Developing a better understanding of these problems and weaknesses can help to 
improve practice and clear some of the ambiguity from previous studies. 
7.6.3 Testing the Competing Models 
As this study uses PLS-SEM for statistical data analysis, where there is no generally 
accepted global measure of goodness of fit (Hair et al., 2011a), the comparison 
between the proposed models cannot be performed based on goodness of fit measures, 
as suggested by the studies based on CB-SEM (e.g. Shields et al., 2000). Therefore, 
the comparison will be based on the change in R2, as a main evaluation criterion for 
models based on PLS-SEM. 
This study used the change in R2 to evaluate the competing models, as suggested by 
Chin (1998). This method, in general, can be used to examine whether a particular 
independent latent variable has a significant impact on a dependent latent variable in 
two steps (Chin, 1998).  In the first step change in R2 is calculated through comparing 
R2 before and after adding a particular independent latent variable to the model. The 
second step is to relate the change in R2 to (1- R2) getting the effect size f 2 , which can 
be of small, medium, or large effect on the structural model, if  f 2 equal to 0.02, 0.15 
and 0.35 respectively (Chin, 1998). 
f 2 = 
R2 included - R2 excluded 
1- R2 included 
 
Applying this formula to both perceived performance and market-based performance 
gives the following results. 
f 2 (Perceived Performance)  = 
      0.38– 0.01 
1- 0.38 
                                                           = 0.60  
f 2 (Market-based Performance) = 
      0.13 – 0.0 
1- 0.13 
                                                       = 0.15 
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The results suggest that including compliance with the CCCG and CE have a 
significant effect on predicting changes in organisational performance in general. The 
effect size on perceived performance is large (f 2 is greater than 0.35) and medium on 
market-based performance (f 2 equal to 0.15). 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter discussed the results of the hypotheses testing as suggested by the 
structural model in the previous chapter. The discussion included explanation of the 
results from the theory and prior literature. In addition, the chapter discussed the 
results of the multi-group analysis and the differences between the two segments in 
the study sample. Finally, the last part of this chapter presented a further analysis 
including assessment of the direct and indirect effect models to examine the indirect 
effect of VBM on organisational performance acting through compliance with the 
CCCG and CE.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This study addresses the tension between conformance and performance dimensions 
within the EG framework. This framework broadens the concept of governance 
beyond the compliance to a set of rules, to include the performance aspects of 
governance that focus on strategy, entrepreneurial orientation and value creation. So, 
the CG system focuses not only on monitoring managerial performance to ensure 
accountability of management to shareholders, but also on mechanisms that motivate 
management to create and optimise shareholder wealth. The main objective of the EG 
framework is to keep a balance between the conformance and performance 
dimensions of governance. However, few studies address this framework and the 
possible tension between conformance and performance. Further, there is little 
agreement on the relationship between conformance and performance in the 
governance context among the few studies that have addressed this issue.  
To address the possible tension between conformance and performance, this study 
combines agency theory and contingency theory lenses to develop a theoretical model 
of EG. Agency theory is used because the research problem is basically based on the 
agency problem that results from the separation of ownership and control. 
Contingency theory, as a more contextualised theory, is used to explain the 
organisational performance as a fit between contingency factors and structure. The 
theoretical model is based on the notion that both conformance and performance 
dimensions are important predictors of organisational performance providing they fit 
with the context. Further, the effectiveness of PMS, such as VBM can be assessed 
through examining its association with the conformance and performance dimensions 
of EG, as important predictors of organisational performance. The conformance 
dimension is operationalised in the current study using CG structure, and the 
performance dimension is operationalised using CE. In addition, a number of 
contingency factors are examined including agency conflicts, company size, PEU, 
strategy and decentralisation. 
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To test the theoretical model a positivist approach is adopted, and a cross-sectional 
survey methodology is used for a sample of UK quoted companies. The UK is an 
interesting context to conduct this study, where the development of the regulatory 
framework of CG provides a good example of the debate on the accountability and 
enterprise aspects of governance. The data are collected using multiple methods 
including questionnaire, content analysis and archive databases. Further, PLS-SEM is 
adopted for data analysis and testing the research hypotheses. 
The second section in this chapter will provide a summary of the research findings, 
based on the data analysis and the tested hypotheses. In the third section, the research 
questions will be recalled in an attempt to find answers to these questions, based on 
the findings of this study. The fourth section will present the main conclusions of this 
study, based on the main findings and the answers of the research questions. In the 
fifth section, the main contributions of this study will be outlined. The last section of 
this chapter will present the limitations of this study and the possible directions for 
future research. 
8.2  Summary of Research Findings 
Testing the proposed contingency relationships between agency conflicts, company 
size, PEU, strategy and decentralisation on one hand and compliance with the CCCG, 
CE and VBM on the other indicate the following results: 
1- VBM is positively associated with agency conflicts, decentralisation and 
unexpectedly low cost strategies. However, VBM is not significantly 
associated with PEU and company size.  
2- Compliance with the CCCG is positively associated with agency conflicts and 
company size.  
3- CE is positively associated with PEU, differentiation strategies and company 
size. However, it is not significantly associated with agency conflicts and 
decentralisation. 
4- The fit between compliance with the CCCG, agency conflicts and company 
size significantly predicts market-based performance, but not perceived 
performance. 
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5- The fit between CE, PEU, differentiation strategies and company size 
significantly predicts perceived performance, but not market-based 
performance.  
6- The effect of fit between VBM, agency conflicts, decentralisation and low cost 
strategies on organisational performance shows mixed results. Further to the 
direct effect on organisational performance, the fit has a significant negative 
effect on market-based performance, but no significant direct effect on 
perceived performance is found. However, VBM indirectly has a significant 
positive effect on market-based performance, acting through compliance with 
the CCCG as an intervening variable.  
7- VBM is significantly and positively associated with the compliance with the 
CCCG. However, VBM is not significantly associated with CE. 
8- No evidence is found for significant association between compliance with the 
CCCG and CE.   
9- Though the interaction term between VBM and compliance with the CCCG 
has no significant effect on organisational performance, it has a significant 
negative effect on CE.   
The results, in general, support a number of contingency relationships between the 
proposed contingency factors on one hand and VBM, compliance with the CCCG and 
CE on the other. It also suggests that using both compliance with the CCCG and CE 
as intervening variables to the relationship between VBM and performance contribute 
to explaining the mixed results in the VBM literature. In terms of the objectives of the 
EG framework, no evidence is found to support that VBM can achieve the balance 
between the conformance and performance dimensions. VBM is likely to emphasise 
the compliance with the CCCG (conformance) at the expense of CE (performance). 
Based on these findings, the research questions can be recalled in an attempt to find 
some answers to these questions, as will be explained in the next section.    
8.3  Restatement of Research Questions 
This study addresses four main questions, as stated in the first chapter. These 
questions are as follows: 
1- Is there any potential trade-off or tension between conformance and 
performance? 
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2- Does VBM achieve the objectives of EG, keeping the balance between 
conformance and performance?  
3- Is there any contingency relationship between agency conflicts, company size, 
PEU, strategy and decentralization on the one hand, and VBM, the 
conformance and performance dimensions of EG on the other ? 
4- Does the fit between contingency factors, VBM, and the conformance and 
performance dimensions of EG positively affect organisational performance? 
To address the research questions a theoretical framework was developed and the 
proposed hypotheses have been tested based on the data analysis. This section 
discusses the possible answers to these questions based on the research findings.  
8.3.1 The First Research Question 
The study first questioned the tension between conformance and performance, as it is 
not clear from the literature whether this tension exists or not. Further, the debate on 
the tension between conformance and performance lacked empirical evidence. To 
address this question this study operationally defines the conformance and 
performance dimensions as CG and CE respectively. CG is measured using the 
compliance with the CCCG in the UK and CE is measured using innovation, 
proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness for the same companies.  
The structural relationship between compliance with the CCCG and CE is assessed 
using PLS-SEM. The results suggest a non-significant association between 
compliance with the CCCG and CE. This relationship is particularly applicable to   
the companies listed on the Main Market, where compliance with the CCCG is 
compulsory. However, compliance with the CCCG in the companies listed on AIM 
(segment 2), which is voluntary, has a significant negative effect on CE.  
The non-significant relationships between compliance with the CCCG and CE, for the 
companies listed on the Main Market, have been attributed to the flexible regulatory 
regime in the UK, as a pioneer to the principle-based approach to CG (Arcot and 
Bruno, 2005). The “comply or explain” basis of the code provisions allows companies 
listed on the Main Market to flexibly adopt CG mechanisms that fit these companies 
and provide disclosure and explanation for non-compliance with any other provisions. 
More flexibility adds to the system through the continuous revisions and amendments 
to the code provisions that allow addressing any concerns raised by companies 
regarding their compliance with the code provisions. 
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However, compliance with the CCCG by companies listed on AIM can significantly 
hinder their entrepreneurial orientation, because most of these companies are small 
sized and may not have enough resources to comply with many of the code 
provisions. Therefore, compliance with the code provisions is not compulsory in this 
type of company. 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that, in general, there is no evidence either of 
association or conflict between conformance and performance in the companies listed 
on the Main Market. However, there is evidence of conflict between conformance and 
performance at the level of the companies listed on AIM. Further, more emphasis on 
conformance through adopting additional forms of governance (e.g. VBM) to the 
compliance with the CCCG can negatively affect the performance dimension, 
especially in the companies listed on AIM.  
8.3.2 The Second Research Question 
The second research question is related to the extent to which VBM can achieve EG 
objectives keeping the balance between conformance and performance. To address 
this question, this study examines the association between VBM and both the levels of 
CE and compliance with the CCCG in a sample of UK quoted companies. To 
examine the association between VBM, CE and compliance with the CCCG, the 
structural relationships between VBM, CE and compliance with the CCCG are tested. 
The results suggest a significant positive relationship between VBM and compliance 
with the CCCG. However, no significant relationship is found between VBM and CE. 
These relationships between VBM, compliance with the CCCG and CE are 
particularly applicable to the companies listed on the Main Market, where compliance 
is compulsory. 
These results imply that companies that adopt VBM are likely to be more compliant 
with the CCCG than other companies to mitigate agency conflicts and better align the 
interests of managers and shareholders. However, companies that adopt VBM may 
not pay similar attention to CE. Therefore, the results suggest that VBM adopters fail 
to keep a balance between conformance and performance, which may help to explain 
the conflicting results in the VBM literature. These results can be explained from the 
agency theory perspective, which assumes that the board of directors consider control 
as the most important role and the strategy role comes next in importance (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). 
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8.3.3 The Third Research Question 
The third research question is related to the contingency relationships between agency 
conflicts, company size, PEU, strategy and decentralisation on the one hand, and 
VBM, compliance with the CCCG and CE on the other. To address this question this 
study examines the association between these contingency factors, VBM, compliance 
with the CCCG and CE.  
To examine this association the structural relationships between VBM, compliance 
with the CCCG and CE are tested. The results, in general, suggest that VBM is likely 
to be associated with agency conflicts and decentralisation as expected. However, 
VBM implementation is not associated with PEU and company size. Surprisingly, 
VBM implementation is associated with low cost strategies, but not with 
differentiation strategies as hypothesised. 
The results also suggest that compliance with the CCCG is likely to be associated 
with agency conflicts and company size, as predicted. Furthermore, the results suggest 
that CE is positively associated with PEU, differentiation strategies as predicted. 
However, CE is not associated with agency conflicts and decentralisation. 
Interestingly, CE is positively associated with company size and CE, whereas a 
negative association is hypothesised.  
In summary, the results, in general, provide evidence of contingency relationships 
between agency conflicts, company size, PEU, strategy and decentralisation on one 
hand, and VBM, compliance with the CCCG and CE on the other. While not all the 
predicted relationships are supported, a large number of the proposed contingency 
relationships are. In addition, justification and explanation of the unsupported 
relationships has been provided in the previous chapter.    
8.3.4 The Fourth Research Question 
The fourth research question is related to the effect of the fit between the contingency 
factors, VBM, compliance with the CCCG and CE on organisational performance. To 
address this question the study examines the effect of the association between the 
contingency factors, VBM, compliance with the CCCG and CE on organisational 
performance. To examine these relationships, the structural relationships between 
VBM, compliance with the CCCG, CE and performance are tested.  
231 
 
The results support the basic assumption of the contingency theory that fit between 
contingency factors and structure is associated with organisational performance. For 
instance, the fit between agency conflicts, company size and compliance with the 
CCCG is associated with the market-based performance. The fit between PEU, 
differentiation strategies, company size and CE is associated with the perceived 
performance. Further, the results suggest that the fit between agency conflicts, 
decentralisation, low cost strategies and VBM is indirectly associated with market-
based performance acting through compliance with the CCCG as an intervening 
variable. Based on this discussion for the research questions and the main findings, a 
number of conclusions can be inferred, as will be explained in the next section. 
8.4  Conclusions 
This study has analysed the EG framework in the UK, where the context and the 
regulatory framework emphasise the need for a CG system to address both 
accountability and enterprise and the interaction between these aspects (Short et al., 
1999). The study provides evidence in support of the regulatory governance 
framework in the UK. The results, in general, do not provide evidence of a significant 
association between compliance with the CCCG and CE. The results imply that UK 
companies can comply with the CCCG for the sake of accountability to shareholders, 
without any fear of losing their entrepreneurial orientation and value creation. This 
can be attributed to the flexibility embedded in the “comply or explain” approach 
adopted in the UK, which allows companies not to comply with the code provisions 
for genuine reasons that can be explained in their annual reports. Further, the 
compliance requirements with the code provisions vary according to the company size 
and the code provisions are subject to regular revisions to correspond to any changes 
or concerns that may arise in the business society.  
However, the results provide evidence of significant negative effect of compliance 
with the CCCG provisions on the entrepreneurial orientation of the companies listed 
on AIM. Compliance with the CCCG in small companies with limited resources may 
not be relevant or practical, which may hinder the entrepreneurial orientation of these 
companies. Furthermore, while both compliance with the CCCG and VBM have no 
significant direct effect on CE, the interaction term between VBM and compliance 
with the CCCG may negatively affect CE, which can be explained as combining 
VBM, which acts as a CG mechanism, with other CG mechanisms may forcing 
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companies to overemphasise the control and accountability dimensions of 
governance, at the expense of the performance dimension. This negative effect is 
clearer in companies listed on AIM. 
The study provides evidence against VBM in achieving the objectives of EG in terms 
of keeping the balance between conformance and performance. VBM is significantly 
associated with compliance with the CCCG but not with CE, which implies that VBM 
tends to emphasise more the conformance dimension, than the performance 
dimension of EG. In other words, VBM implementation prioritises accountability 
over enterprise. This conclusion is basically applicable to the companies listed on the 
Main Market. However, the situation in the companies listed on AIM is different. 
VBM is significantly associated with CE, but not with compliance. This implies that 
VBM, at the level of small companies, tends to emphasise more the performance 
dimension than the conformance dimension of EG. These findings can be attributed to 
the non-compulsory nature of compliance with the CCCG in these companies, besides 
the relative importance of CE to smaller companies.  
Further, the association between VBM and compliance can be explained by the 
common antecedents between VBM and compliance with the CCCG (e.g. agency 
conflicts), which are different from some antecedents to CE (e.g. strategy). Therefore, 
VBM implementation is likely to be associated with strong CG structure as the 
context of high agency conflicts fits these practices. However, this context is unlikely 
to fit CE, which requires different antecedents. The similarities between the 
antecedents to both VBM and CG, which are less similar with the antecedents to CE, 
make the ability of VBM to balance conformance and performance questionable. 
The study also provides evidence of contingency relationships between VBM, agency 
conflicts, decentralisation and low cost strategies. This evidence contributes to the 
literature, which lacks evidence on such relationships regarding VBM practices. The 
supported contingency relationships in the current study highlight the importance of 
the agency problem in explaining the decision of adopting VBM as an important 
governance mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts, which is consistent with the 
agency theory assumptions. Interestingly, this relationship was clearer at the level of 
small companies listed on AIM. This unexpected relationship can be explained as 
these companies may adopt VBM as a governance tool, to mitigate agency conflicts 
and compensate the weaknesses on their CG structures, given the lack of resources 
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and the voluntary nature of compliance with the CCCG at this level. However, the 
literature suggests that VBM implementation may not be appropriate at this level, 
which rather necessitates much of the resources. This can partly explain the 
significant negative association between VBM implementation and organisational 
performance at this level. 
Unlike the convention wisdom in the literature, the study provides evidence of 
association between VBM implementation and low cost strategies, which raises an 
important question with regard to classifying VBM as a sophisticated MAP, 
especially when the non-significant negative association between VBM and PEU is 
also considered. The results contradict the conventional wisdom that sophisticated 
MAPs are more appropriate to highly uncertain contexts and differentiation strategies. 
The association between VBM and contexts that are similar to the less sophisticated 
MAPs can be attributed to the fact that the VBM approach rests solely on financial 
measures (value-based measures). These measures are based on projection of cash 
flow, which may not be applicable to a highly uncertain environment.  
However, VBM cannot be reduced to a number of financial measures, rather it is a 
comprehensive management approach, and measuring performance is only part of 
VBM practices. Interestingly, VBM implementation is significantly associated with 
decentralisation, which is more appropriate to the sophisticated MAPs. These 
contradictory findings regarding the context on which VBM operates point out the 
ambiguity regarding the classification of VBM practices into sophisticated or less 
sophisticated MAPs. Therefore, this study contends that the ambiguity in judging 
VBM as sophisticated or less sophisticated MAPs due to combining some antecedents 
and characteristics of each group, has contributed to the lack of empirical evidence in 
the literature regarding the appropriate context of VBM implementation. 
Accordingly, the implications of misfit between VBM and some contingency factors 
(e.g. PEU and company size) can partly explain the lack of evidence regarding the 
existence of direct positive association with organisational performance. In addition, 
the significant indirect effects of VBM on organisational performance through 
compliance with the CCCG and CE, as intervening variables, may explain the non-
significant direct effect of VBM on organisational performance. For instance, VBM 
has no significant direct effect on market-based performance overall and at the level 
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of large companies, because it positively and indirectly affects market-based 
performance acting through compliance with the CCCG as an intervening variable.  
The study also provides evidence on contingency relationships between agency 
conflicts, company size and compliance with the CCCG, especially at the level of 
large companies listed on the Main Market, where compliance with the CCCG is of 
great importance due to the compulsory nature of compliance. Further, the 
implications of fit between agency conflicts, company size and compliance with the 
CCCG have a significant positive effect on the market-based performance. Finally, 
the study provides evidence of contingency relationships between PEU, 
differentiation strategies, company size and CE. Further, the implications of fit 
between these contingency factors and CE have a significant positive effect on the 
perceived performance. These findings have contributed to the literature in different 
disciplines (e.g. management accounting, CG and entrepreneurship). These 
contributions will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
8.5 Revisiting the research hypotheses 
Because of the large number of rejected hypotheses (almost half) in the current study, 
it was important to revisit these hypotheses in light of the results obtained from the 
data analysis. Revisiting the hypotheses can provide useful insights into the developed 
theoretical framework in the current study, especially that some of the proposed 
relationships are not well established in the literature. Therefore, the four groups of 
hypotheses were revisited as follows:  
The first group of hypotheses relate to the relationships between contingency factors, 
VBM and organisational performance. Due to the lack of evidence on contingency 
relationships between VBM and the proposed contingency factors (e.g. PEU and 
strategy) in the literature, this study adopted the view that VBM is one of the 
sophisticated MAPs (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008). Accordingly, it has been 
hypothesised that VBM be associated with high PEU, differentiation strategies and 
decentralised structure. However, VBM as a PMS was criticised as being focused 
only on financial measures, which may make low PEU, low cost strategies and 
centralised structure (Lovata and Costigan. 2002). The results of the current study 
suggest that VBM, as a holistic management approach, combines some characteristics 
of the sophisticated MAPs and the traditional MAPs that focus only on the financial 
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measures. Therefore, the results provide evidence of association between VBM and 
contradictory contingency factors such as low cost strategies and decentralisation. 
These results suggest that the practice is far more complicated than the simple 
taxonomies in the contingency-based studies (e.g. sophisticated and traditional 
MAPs). Additionally, the multi-group analysis has contributed to explaining some of 
the unexpected results (e.g. the contingency relationship between VBM and strategy). 
The results of the second group of hypotheses related to the contingency relationships 
between agency conflicts, company size, compliance with the CCCG and 
organisational performance support the proposed relationships and emphasise the 
importance of CG mechanisms in mitigating agency conflicts. These results support 
the main assumptions of agency theory. 
The results of the third group of hypotheses relate to the relationships between 
contingency factors, CE and organisational performance support, to a large extent, the 
proposed relationships. However, the unexpected positive association between 
company size and CE has been explained by the different operational definitions of 
company size in the literature. The non significant relationship between 
decentralisation and CE has been explained by the multi-group analysis. In addition, 
the non-significant relationship between the agency conflicts and CE has been 
explained by the role of VBM and CG mechanisms in mitigating the possible negative 
effect of agency conflicts on CE, which support the assumptions of agency theory. 
The results of the fourth group of hypotheses relate to the relationships between 
VBM, compliance with the CCCG, CE and organisational performance support the 
proposed association between VBM and compliance with the CCCG but not with CE. 
These results emphasise the role of VBM in mitigating agency conflicts not only as a 
PMS, but also as a CG mechanism, which support the assumptions of agency theory. 
However, the results help to diagnose the problems of VBM implementation in failing 
to achieve the right balance between conformance and performance. The multi-group 
analysis has also contributed to explain the unexpected results. 
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8.6  Research Contributions 
This study addresses the possible tension between conformance and performance 
within the EG framework, and assesses the ability of VBM to maintain the balance 
between conformance and performance. Achieving the aim of this study contributes to 
the literature through developing a theoretical model of EG that addresses the possible 
tension between conformance and performance, based on integrating perspectives 
from the agency theory and contingency theories. The theoretical model proposes the 
VBM approach to achieve the objectives of EG, maintaining a balance between 
conformance and performance. Further, the theoretical model is empirically tested 
through conducting an empirical study, based on a positivistic approach in the UK. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the literature at different levels, namely 
theoretical, methodological and empirical.  
At the theoretical level this study bridges the gap between different disciplines 
including management accounting, CG and entrepreneurship, through developing a 
conceptual model that links a PMS, i.e. VBM, to CG mechanisms and CE, an area 
which is under-researched in the literature. Integrating both the contingency theory 
and the agency theory lenses contributes to the development of a comprehensive 
model of EG. Unlike previous studies, the developed theoretical model adopts a 
holistic approach to provide insights into the inter-relationships between VBM, CG 
and CE, as important predictors of organisational performance, rather than 
investigating the effect of each of these practices separately on organisational 
performance.  
At the methodological level, unlike previous studies that have addressed the EG 
framework, this study operationalises the conformance and performance dimensions 
into measurable constructs using CG and CE. This study also conducts an empirical 
study using a positivistic approach for more generalisable findings. Unlike previous 
studies in the VBM literature, this study measures VBM practices on a continuum 
rather than categories, to capture the variation in VBM practices between companies. 
Further, the use of multiple data collection methods (e.g. questionnaire, content 
analysis and archive data) provides a consistent body of evidence that increase the 
confidence in the findings (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). Finally, using a powerful 
statistical technique of multivariate data analysis (PLS-SEM) enables examination of 
multiple relationships between constructs simultaneously and obtains robust findings. 
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At the empirical level, the study is undertaken in the UK; though it is different from 
the US in many aspects, very few studies have been conducted in this context in a 
number of research areas such as VBM, CG and CE. Unlike previous studies, which 
have focused mainly on large quoted companies, the study sample comprises a wide 
range of quoted companies in the UK, with different regulatory frameworks to gain 
insights into the relationship between conformance and performance in different 
forms of companies.    
Finally, the findings of the current study contribute to developing a better 
understanding of a number of issues. For instance, the study provides evidence against 
the argument of the tension between conformance and performance at the level of the 
companies listed in the Main Market, which ensures the flexibility of the adopted 
regulatory regime of CG in the UK. However, the study provides evidence against 
compliance with the CCCG at the level of companies listed in AIM, as it negatively 
affects their entrepreneurial orientations. Furthermore, the study provides evidence of 
association between VBM and agency conflicts, strategy and decentralisation. The 
findings suggest that VBM does not achieve the objectives of EG, as a result of the 
overemphasis on conformance at the expense of performance, which can contribute to 
explaining the mixed results in the VBM literature. However, the current study is not 
without limitations. These limitations and venues for future research will be explained 
in detail in the next section. 
8.7  Limitations and Directions of Future Research 
Though the aforementioned merits of this study, a number of limitations can be 
mentioned to be addressed in future research. These limitations can be classified into 
theoretical, methodological and empirical limitations.  
At the theoretical level, because of the complexity of the theoretical model in the 
current study, organisational factors related to VBM success (e.g. top management 
support and training management and employees on VBM implementation) are not 
considered in the theoretical model. Future studies can explicitly address the effects of 
these factors as moderators of the relationships between VBM and organisational 
performance. 
In addition, this study does not examine the effect of compliance with each of the 
CCCG provisions on the other constructs (e.g. CE and organisational performance). 
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However, future research can examine these relationships to gain insights into the 
effect of compliance with the individual provisions of the CCCG on CE and 
organisational performance. 
The theoretical framework is based on agency theory and contingency theory. 
Although integrating both theories has contributed to developing a comprehensive 
theoretical framework to address the research problem, both theories have been 
criticised for ignoring the social power and factors that may affect the choices and 
practices of a company. So, using more socially oriented theoretical lenses, such as 
the institutional theory, in future research can help to gain insights into the social 
factors that may influence the conformance and performance dimensions of EG. In 
addition, using the agency theory perspective in developing the theoretical 
framework, which focuses on the relationship between management and shareholders 
only, ignoring other stakeholders, has contributed to a narrow perspective to the EG 
framework. Using other theoretical perspectives (e.g. stakeholder theory), which 
considers other stakeholders, in future research can contribute to a wider perspective 
to the EG framework. 
At the methodological level, this study uses a cross sectional survey methodology, 
which does not establish causality relationships between constructs. Studies which 
embrace a longitudinal perspective and panel data for a number of years would be in a 
position to see how the dynamics of VBM implementation and its relationships with 
compliance and CE develop and change over time.   
Further, because the sample size is not large enough this study could not distinguish 
between different VBM measures (e.g. EVA, CFROI) as suggested in the literature. 
Distinction between the different value-based measures would provide useful insights 
into possible differences in the results due to using different measures. The sample 
size in the current study was restricted by the response rate to the survey. The low 
response rate compromised the generalisability of the findings to the population (UK 
quoted companies). Other methods that are not restricted by response rate (e.g. panel 
data analysis or longitudinal study) can be used in future research for larger samples 
and greater generalisability of findings.  
At the empirical level, this study is limited to a sample of UK quoted companies, 
which may results in the findings being applicable only to this context. Future 
research can benefit from conducting comparative studies in different contexts with 
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different regulatory governance frameworks, to develop a better understanding of the 
relationship between conformance and performance in different contexts.   
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                                                                                                       23 September 2010 
Dear 
 
The effect of compliance with the combined code on corporate governance on 
entrepreneurial activities and performance 
 
We are currently undertaking a research project at Brunel University Business School 
which investigates how compliance with the combined code on corporate governance can 
affect a company’s entrepreneurial activities and performance. We are interested in the 
possible conflict between compliance and the spirit of enterprise necessary for economic 
success and whether an approach such as value-based management can mitigate the 
possible conflict. 
Your views on how the combined code on corporate governance affects your company are 
important and can help shape future regulation. Therefore, I would be very grateful if you 
would complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it as soon as possible, using the 
envelope provided. We are aware that this request is likely to be another burden in a busy 
schedule, but I have kept the questionnaire as brief as possible and it should only take 
about 15 minutes to complete. We will be happy to send you a summary of our findings if 
you wish. 
We assure you that all information provided by you will be used for this research purposes 
only and will be treated as strictly confidential. Information about your organisation will 
not be released under any circumstances, and the results will be reported in aggregate form 
within summarised tabulation. Thank you for your co-operation, and looking forward to 
receiving your response. 
Yours sincerely 
  
Magdy Kader                                                   Adel Elgharbawy 
Professor of Accounting                           Lecturer, PhD candidate                                                              
Tel: 01582743156                                               Tel: 018952 66317 - 07506175192 
Email: magdy.abdel-kader@beds.ac.uk Email: adel.elgharbawy@brunel.ac.uk 
Brunel University, Uxbridge, 
Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK 
Telephone +44 (0) 1895 274000 
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Section 1: Value-based Management practices  
 
1. How important are the following elements to the mission                         
of your company?                                                                                                               
(Tick the box under the number closest to your view) 
 
Not at all 
important 
 
 
Extremely 
important 
   1     2 3 4 5 6 7 
a. Shareholders □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
b. Customers □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
c. Employees □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
d. Suppliers □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
e. Social responsibility □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
f. Environment □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
g. Other (please specify)………………………………………. 
                                               ………………………………....... 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
2. How important are the following measures to the                                
strategy and objectives of your company?                                                             
(Tick the box under the number closest to your view) 
 
Not at all 
important  
 
 
Extremely 
important 
  1    2 3 4 5 6 7 
a. Net profit and/or cash flow □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
b. Share price and/or earnings per share (EPS) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
c. Economic profit or Economic Value Added (EVA)® □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
d. Cash flow return on investment (CFROI) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
e. Return on capital employed (ROCE) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
f. Total shareholder return (TSR)or total business return (TBR) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
g. Efficiency □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
h. Growth and/or market share □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
i. Customer satisfaction □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
j. Other (please specify)……………………………………… 
                                              ………………………………………                                     
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
3. Which of the following criteria are used when considering strategic and 
significant decisions (e.g. acquisition, divestment at corporate and at 
business unit levels?        (Tick as many as apply) 
 
Corporate 
(group) 
level 
 
Business  
unit     
level 
a. Accounting rate of return □ □ 
b. Payback period □ □ 
c. Discounted cash flow (e.g. net present value (NPV) or internal rate of return  □ □ 
d. Residual income or economic profit or Economic Value Added (EVA)® □ □ 
e. Cash flow return on investment (CFROI) □ □ 
f. Return on capital employed (ROCE)  □ □ 
g. Total shareholder return (TSR)or total business return (TBR) □ □ 
h. Growth and/or market share □ □ 
i. Environmental performance □ □ 
j. Other (please specify)...............………………………........... 
                                                                         …………………………………………………                                                                                                          
□ □ 
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4. What performance measures are used to evaluate performance                                    
at corporate and at business unit levels in your company?                                               
(Tick as many as apply) 
Corporate 
(group) 
level 
Business 
unit     
level 
a. Share price and/or earnings per share (EPS) □ □ 
b. Net profit and/or cash flow □ □ 
c. Residual income or economic profit or Economic Value Added (EVA)®                                                                                                                             □ □ 
d. Cash flow return on investment (CFROI) □ □ 
e. Return on capital employed (ROCE) □ □ 
f. Total shareholder return (TSR)or total business return (TBR) □ □ 
g. Efficiency □ □ 
h. Growth and/or market share □ □ 
i. Customer satisfaction □ □ 
j. Employee satisfaction □ □ 
k. Quality performance □ □ 
l. Other (please specify)               
………………………………………………………………………… 
□ □ 
 
 
5. Is there a managerial incentive scheme for rewarding managers/employees in your company?             
Yes   □                                                                                   No  □     (If no go directly to question 9) 
                     
                                                                                                                               
6. What measures are used for rewarding managers/employees in your          
managerial incentive scheme at corporate and at business unit levels?                         
(Tick as many as apply) 
Corporate 
(group) 
level 
 
Business   
unit     
level 
a. Share price and/or earnings per share (EPS) □ □ 
b. Net profit and/or cash flow □ □ 
c. Residual income or economic profit or Economic Value Added (EVA)®                                                                                                                             □ □ 
d. Cash flow return on investment (CFROI) □ □ 
e. Return on capital employed (ROCE) □ □ 
f. Total shareholder return (TSR)or total business return (TBR) □ □ 
g. Efficiency □ □ 
h. Growth and/or market Share □ □ 
i. Customer satisfaction □ □ 
j. Employee satisfaction □ □ 
k. Quality performance □ □ 
l. Other (please specify)               
………………………………………………………………………….. 
□ □ 
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Section 2: Environmental and organisational characteristics  
 
7. To what extent are the changes in these factors predictable?             
(Tick the box under the number closest to your view) 
 
Highly 
predictable 
 
 
Highly 
unpredictabl
     1     2 3 4 5 6 7 
a. Manufacturing technology □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
b. Competitors’ actions □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
c. Customers’ demand and taste □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
d. Product attributes/design □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
e. Raw material availability □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
f. Labour union actions □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
g. Government regulation □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
8. To what extent does the Chief Executive of your company           
delegate decision making to others? (Tick the box under the              
number closest to  your view) 
       No 
delegation  
 Full 
delegation 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a. Development of new products □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
b. The hiring and firing of managerial personnel □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
c. Selection of large new investments □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
d. Pricing of new products and significant price changes                                      
in existing products 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
e. Budget setting □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
9. How do you rate your company’s position relative to                                 
your competitors in the following areas?                                                           
(Tick the box under the number closest to your view)                                                              
Significantly  Significantly 
lower  higher 
        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a. Product sales prices □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
b. Percentage of sales spent on marketing expenses □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
c. Percentage of sales spent on research and development □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
d. Brand image □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
e. Product features □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
f. Product quality □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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10. Each of the following statements describes two extreme positions a company could take in one 
situation, (please circle the number in each situation that best approximates the actual position of your 
a. In general, the top managers of my company favour…… 
A strong emphasis on the 
marketing of   tried and true 
products or services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A strong emphasis on R&D, technological 
leadership and innovations 
b. How many new lines of products or services has your firm marketed in the past 5 years? 
No new lines of products/services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very many new lines of products/services 
c. In my company, changes in product or services lines…  
Have been mostly of a minor 
nature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Have usually been quite dramatic 
d. In dealing with its competitors, company….. 
Typically responds to actions 
which competitors initiate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Typically initiates actions which 
competitors then respond to 
e. My company is….. 
Very seldom the first business to 
introduce new products/services, 
administrative techniques and 
operating technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very often the first business to introduce 
new products/services, administrative 
techniques and operating technologies  
f. My company…… 
Typically seeks to avoid 
competitive clashes, preferring a 
“live-and -let-live” posture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Typically adopts a very competitive, “undo-
the-competitors” posture 
g. In general, the top managers of my company have……. 
A strong proclivity for low-risk 
projects   (with normal and certain 
rates of return) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A strong proclivity for high-risk projects 
(with chances of very high returns) 
h. In general, the top managers of my company believe that, owing to the nature of the environment,… 
It is best to explore it gradually via 
careful, incremental behaviour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bold, wide-ranging acts are necessary to 
achieve the firm’s objectives. 
i. When confronted with decision-making situations involving uncertainty, my company…. 
Typically adopts a cautious, ‘wait 
and see’ posture to minimise the 
probability of making costly 
decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Typically adopts a bold, aggressive posture 
to maximise the probability of exploiting 
potential opportunities 
j. My company is….. 
Making no special effort to take 
business from the competition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very aggressive and intensely competitive 
k. My company …… 
Requires individuals/teams to rely 
on senior managers to guide their 
work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Supports the efforts of individuals/teams 
that work autonomously 
l. In general, the top managers of my company believe that the best results occur when… 
The CEO and top managers 
provide the primary impetus for 
pursuing business opportunities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Individuals/ teams decide for themselves 
what business opportunities to pursue 
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m. In my company Individuals/teams pursuing business opportunities are…. 
Expected to obtain approval from 
their supervisor(s) before making 
decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Making decisions on their own without 
constantly referring to their supervisor(s) 
 
n. In my company….. 
Employee initiatives and input 
play a major role in identifying and 
selecting the entrepreneurial 
opportunities my firm pursues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The CEO and top management team play a 
major role in identifying and selecting the 
entrepreneurial opportunities my firm 
pursues 
 
11. How do you rate your company’s position relative to                                 
your competitors in the following areas?                                                           
(Tick the box under the number closest to your view)                                                              
Significantly  Significantly 
lower  higher 
        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a. Profitability (measured by ROI for e.g.) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
b. Growth rate of sales or revenue □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
c. Development of new products/services □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
d. Customer satisfaction □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
e. Public image and goodwill □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 And finally 
 1. Your name (optional): 
 2. Your job title (optional): 
 3- If you would like to receive a summary of the findings, please provide an e-mail address:  
 4- Would you be willing to have a short meeting to discuss some of the issues in more details?                     
□  Yes                                                                                      □  No            
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
Please return the questionnaire in the prepaid envelope provided to: 
 
 
 
                                                 
Mr.Adel Elgharbawy 
Brunel Business School 
Brunel University-West London 
Michael Sterling  
Uxbridge 
Middlesex 
UB8 3PH 
Ref.  
This code is used to avoid sending   
you any unnecessary reminders 
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Brunel Business School 
Research Ethics  
Participant Information Sheet 
1. Title of Research: An examination of the role of Value-based Management in 
achieving the objectives of Enterprise Governance: a contingency approach 
2. Researcher: Student on PhD programme, Brunel Business School, Brunel 
University 
3. Contact Email: adel.elgharbawy@brunel.ac.uk 
4. Purpose of the research:  The research project investigates the effect of 
compliance to the UK combined code of corporate governance on the enterprise 
activities and performance and whether an approach known as value-based 
management (VBM) can play a role in achieving a balance between the compliance and 
enterprise activities should a conflict exists. 
5. What is involved: The project includes a questionnaire-based survey for the largest 
quoted companies in the UK. Finance directors (CFOs) or controllers, will be targeted to 
fill in the questionnaire. 
6. Voluntary nature of participation and confidentiality. Your participation by 
completing the enclosed questionnaire is absolutely optional but important for the 
success of this study and the completion of the PhD thesis. We assure you that all 
information provided by you will be used for this research purposes only, will be treated 
as “Strictly confidential” and will not be released under any circumstances.  The results 
will be reported in aggregate form within summarized tabulation.  
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Appendix 3 
The Reminding Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                 
  
 
 
 
Dear  
 
The effect of compliance with the combined code on corporate governance on 
entrepreneurial activities and performance 
We recently wrote asking for your help with the above survey, but to date have not 
received a reply. In case yours has got lost in the post, I enclose another questionnaire and 
freepost envelope. Your company has been selected as one of the quoted companies in the 
UK which is likely to be affected by compliance with the combined code on corporate 
governance; we are interested in investigating the possible effect of compliance on 
performance. 
The success of this research can help shape future regulation which entirely depends on 
getting a reasonable response from the business community. Your contribution is important 
and really appreciated. Therefore, I hope you will be able to find time to complete the 
enclosed questionnaire, which should take about 15 minutes and you might not answer all 
questions depending on your answer. 
I can assure you that information provided will be used for this research purposes only and 
will be treated as strictly confidential. The results will be reported in aggregate form within 
summarised tabulation. As a little thank you for your help, I would like to share a summary 
of the findings with you, as we believe you will find them both interesting and useful.  
Thank you for your co-operation, looking forward to receiving your response. 
Yours sincerely 
 
  
Magdy Kader                                                   Adel Elgharbawy 
Professor of Accounting                           Lecturer, PhD candidate                                                              
Tel: 01582743156                                               Tel: 018952 66317 - 07506175192 
Email: magdy.abdel-kader@beds.ac.uk Email: adel.elgharbawy@brunel.ac.uk  
Brunel University, Uxbridge, 
Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK 
Telephone +44 (0) 1895 274000 
 
 
23 October 2010 
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Appendix 4 
 
The Coding Schedule of Compliance with the CCCG 
No. Provision Features of the provision Code  Categories 
1 A.1.1 A statement of how the board operates, 
decisions taken and delegated 
0/1 0 = No 
compliance 
1= Compliance  
2 A.1.2 Identifying names of 
chairman/CEO/board/members of committees. 
 
 
3 A.1.3 Chairman to meet non executive directors 
without executives and non executives to meet 
without chairman at least annually.  
  
4 A.1.4 Any concerns for directors about the running of 
company it should be recorded in board 
minutes. 
  
5 A.1.5 Company should arrange appropriate insurance 
cover in respect of legal actions against its 
directors. 
  
6 A.2.1 Separation of chairman and chief executive 
roles 
  
7 A.2.2 Chairman should meet the criteria of 
independence on appointment  
  
8 A.3.1 Statement of independence of non-executive 
directors including chairman upon appointment 
  
9 A.3.2 At least half the board (excluding chairman) 
should be independent non-executive directors. 
Smaller companies (below FTSE 350) at least 
two 
  
10 A.3.3 Appointment of one of the independent non-
executive directors to be the senior independent 
director for contact with shareholders if needed 
  
11 A.4.1 A nomination committee to lead the process of   
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board appointments with majority of 
independent non-executive directors. 
12 A.4.2 Evaluating the balance of skills, knowledge and 
Preparing a description of the role and 
capabilities required for particular appointment.  
  
13 A.4.3 For appointment of chairman, a job 
specification is needed including an assessment 
of time commitment expected.  
  
14 A.4.4 Terms and conditions of appointment of non 
executive directors should be made available for 
inspection 
  
15 A.4.5 Full time executive directors not to take more 
than one non executive directorship or 
chairmanship in a FTSE 100 company 
  
16 A.4.6 A separate section in the annual report to 
describe the work of nomination committee 
  
17 A.5.1 Chairman ensures that new directors receive a 
full formal and tailored induction on joining the 
board. 
  
18 A.5.2 Board ensure that new directors, especially non 
executive directors have access to independent 
professional advice at the company’s expense. 
  
19 A.5.3 All directors should have access to the advices 
and services of company secretary. 
  
20 A.6.1 Statement of how performance evaluation of the 
board and its committees has been conducted. 
  
21 A.7.1 Election of all directors by the shareholders at 
AGM, re-election at intervals no more than 3 
years.  
  
22 A.7.2 Re-election of non executive directors every 
three years. Any terms beyond 6 years to be 
investigated.  
  
23 B.1.1 Performance-related elements of remuneration 
should form a significant proportion of the total 
remuneration package of executive directors.  
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24 B.1.2 Executive share options shouldn’t be offered at 
a discount save as permitted by other provisions 
of the listing rules 
  
25 B.1.3 Remuneration of for non-executive directors 
shouldn’t include share options; otherwise 
advance shareholder approval is necessary. 
  
26 B.1.4 Description of the work of the remuneration 
committee. 
  
27 B.1.5 The remuneration committee should consider 
what compensation commitments for directors 
in event of early termination 
  
28 B.1.6 Notice or contract periods should be set at one 
year or less 
  
29 B.2.1 A remuneration committee of at least three (two 
in small companies) independent non-executive 
directors.  
  
30 B.2.2 The remuneration committee should have 
delegated responsibility for setting remuneration 
for all executive directors and the chairman.  
  
31 B.2.3 The board or shareholders should determine the 
remuneration of non-executive directors within 
the limits set in the article of association 
  
32 B.2.4 Shareholders should be invited specifically to 
approve all new long term incentive schemes 
and significant changes to existing schemes. 
  
33 C.1.1 The directors explain in the annual report their 
responsibility for preparing the accounts.  
  
34 C.1.2 Directors should report that the business is a 
going concern 
  
35 C.2.1 
 
The board should, at least annually, conduct a 
review of the effectiveness of the group’s 
system of internal controls and report it.  
  
36 C.3.1 The board should establish audit committee 
with at least three (or two in small companies) 
independent non-executive directors.  
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37 C.3.2 The main role and responsibilities of audit 
committee should be set out in written terms of 
reference and should include … 
  
38 C.3.3 The terms of reference of audit committee, 
should be made available in a separate section 
in annual report. 
  
39 C.3.4 Audit committee to review arrangements by 
which staff members may raise concerns about 
improprieties in financial reporting or other 
matters. 
  
40 C.3.5 Audit committee to monitor and review 
effectiveness of internal audit activities and 
consider the need for this function annually if 
not there. 
  
41 C.3.6 Audit committee should have primary 
responsibility for making a recommendation on 
the appointment and removal of external 
auditors. 
  
42 C.3.7 Explaining how the auditor’s independence is 
safeguarded if non audit services provided by 
the auditor 
  
43 D.1.1 Chairman should ensure the views of major 
shareholders are communicated to the board as a 
whole. 
  
44 D.1.2 Board statement about steps taken to ensure that 
members especially non-executives to develop 
an understanding of their views about the co. 
  
45 D.2.1 To provide a resolution and proxy on each 
substantial issue at AGM 
  
46 D.2.2 Ensuring that all valid proxy appointments 
received are properly recorded and counted. 
  
47 D.2.3 Chairman should arrange for the chairman of 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees 
to be available to answer questions at the AGM. 
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48 D.2.4 A notice to be sent to shareholders at least 20 
working days before the meeting.  
  
49 9.8.6 R & 
DTR 7.2.5 
R 
A statement of how co. has applied the main 
principles set out in section 1 of the combined 
code in a manner that would enable 
shareholders to evaluate how principles were 
applied.  
  
Maximum total score 49  
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Appendix 5 
 
The Coding Schedule of Compliance with the QCA 
Guidelines 
NO. Features of the provision Code Categories 
1 Matters reserved for the board  0/1 0 = No Compliance 
1= Compliance with 
provision 
2 Timely information   
3 Internal controls review   
4 Review includes financial, operational and risk 
management 
  
5 Chairman and CEO separation   
6 Two Independent Non-exec directors   
7 Re-election   
8 Audi committees   
9 At least two independent Non-executive 
directors in Audit committees 
  
10 Remuneration committee   
11 At least two independent Non-executive 
directors in remuneration Committee 
  
12 Nomination committee    
13 Dialogue with shareholders   
14 Corporate governance statement   
15 Statement of how the board operates   
16 Identity of Chairman, CEO, Members   
17 Describing directors ‘independence   
18 Identity of directors to be independent   
19 Board Performance evaluation    
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20 Biography of directors   
21 Number of meetings by board and committees   
22 Responsibility of directors   
23 Going concern statement   
24 Auditor independence safeguard non audit 
service 
  
25 Terms and conditions of non executive 
appointment 
  
26 Terms of reference of audit committee   
27 Terms of reference of remuneration committee   
28 Terms of reference of nomination committee   
 Maximum total score  28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Compliance with the CCCG 
Serial Provision 
no. 
Description No. of 
complying 
companies 
% of 
complying 
companies 
1 A.1.1 
A statement of how the board operates, decisions 
taken and delegated 
60 100.00 
2 A.1.2 
Identifying names of chairman/CEO/board/members 
of committees. 
60 100.00 
3 A.1.3 
Chairman to meet non executive directors without 
executives and non executives to meet without 
chairman at least annually.  
56 93.33 
4 A.1.4 
Any concerns for directors about the running of 
company it should be recorded in board minutes. 
60 100.00 
5 A.1.5 
Company should arrange appropriate insurance 
cover in respect of legal actions against its directors. 
59 98.33 
6 A.2.1 Separation of chairman and chief executive roles 52 86.66 
7 A.2.2 
Chairman should meet the criteria of independence 
on appointment  
48 80.00 
8 A.3.1 
Statement of independence of non-executive 
directors including chairman upon appointment 
46 76.66 
9 A.3.2 
At least half the board (excluding chairman) should 
be independent non-executive directors. Smaller 
companies (below FTSE 350) at least two 
43 71.66 
10 A.3.3 
Appointment of one of the independent non-
executive directors to be the senior independent 
director for contact with shareholders if needed 
55 91.66 
11 A.4.1 
A nomination committee to lead the process of board 
appointments with majority of independent non-
executive directors. 
46 76.66 
12 A.4.2 
Evaluating the balance of skills, knowledge and 
Preparing a description of the role and capabilities 
56 93.33 
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required for particular appointment.  
13 A.4.3 
For appointment of chairman, a job specification is 
needed including an assessment of time commitment 
expected.  
57 95.00 
14 A.4.4 Terms and conditions of appointment of non 
executive directors should be made available for 
inspection 
58 96.66 
15 A.4.5 Full time executive directors not to take more than 
one non executive directorship or chairmanship in a 
FTSE 100 company 
59 98.33 
16 A.4.6 A separate section in the annual report to describe 
the work of nomination committee 
54 90.00 
17 A.5.1 Chairman ensures that new directors receive a full 
formal and tailored induction on joining the board. 
59 98.33 
18 A.5.2 Board ensure that new directors especially non 
executive directors have access to independent 
professional advice at the company’s expense. 
58 96.66 
19 A.5.3 All directors should have access to the advices and 
services of company secretary. 
60 100.00 
20 A.6.1 Statement of how performance evaluation of the 
board and its committees has been conducted. 
55 91.66 
21 A.7.1 Election of all directors by the shareholders at AGM, 
re-election at intervals no more than 3 years.  
60 100.00 
22 A.7.2 Re-election of non executive directors every three 
years. Any terms beyond 6 years to be investigated.  
55 91.66 
23 B.1.1 Performance-related elements of remuneration 
should form a significant proportion of the total 
remuneration package of executive directors.  
58 96.66 
24 B.1.2 Executive share options shouldn’t be offered at a 
discount save as permitted by other provisions of the 
listing rules 
60 100.00 
25 B.1.3 Remuneration of for non-executive directors 
shouldn’t include share options; otherwise advance 
shareholder approval is necessary. 
60 100.00 
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26 B.1.4 Description of the work of the remuneration 
committee. 
60 100.00 
27 B.1.5 The remuneration committee should consider what 
compensation commitments for directors in event of 
early termination 
59 98.33 
28 B.1.6 Notice or contract periods should be set at one year 
or less 
59 98.33 
29 B.2.1 A remuneration committee of at least three (two in 
small companies) independent non-executive 
directors.  
51 85.00 
30 B.2.2 The remuneration committee should have delegated 
responsibility for setting remuneration for all 
executive directors and the chairman.  
58 96.66 
31 B.2.3 The board or shareholders should determine the 
remuneration of non-executive directors within the 
limits set in the article of association 
60 100.00 
32 B.2.4 Shareholders should be invited specifically to 
approve all new long term incentive schemes and 
significant changes to existing schemes. 
60 100.00 
33 C.1.1 The directors explain in the annual report their 
responsibility for preparing the accounts.  
60 100.00 
34 C.1.2 Directors should report that the business is a going 
concern 
60 100.00 
35 C.2.1 
 
The board should, at least annually, conduct a 
review of the effectiveness of the group’s system of 
internal controls and report it.  
60 100.00 
36 C.3.1 The board should establish audit committee with at 
least three (or two in small companies) independent 
non-executive directors.  
45 75.00 
37 C.3.2 The main role and responsibilities of audit 
committee should be set out in written terms of 
reference and should include … 
59 98.33 
38 C.3.3 The terms of reference of audit committee, should be 
made available in a separate section in annual report. 
59 98.33 
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39 C.3.4 Audit committee to review arrangements by which 
staff members may raise concerns about 
improprieties in financial reporting or other matters. 
59 98.33 
40 C.3.5 Audit committee to monitor and review 
effectiveness of internal audit activities, and 
consider the need for this function annually if not 
there. 
59 98.33 
41 C.3.6 Audit committee should have primary responsibility 
for making a recommendation on the appointment 
and removal of external auditors. 
59 98.33 
42 C.3.7 Explaining how the auditor’s independence is 
safeguarded if non audit services provided by the 
auditor 
59 98.33 
43 D.1.1 Chairman should ensure the views of major 
shareholders are communicated to the board as a 
whole. 
60 100.00 
44 D.1.2 Board statement about steps taken to ensure that 
members especially non-executives to develop an 
understanding of their views about the co. 
60 100.00 
45 D.2.1 To provide a resolution and proxy on each 
substantial issue at AGM 
60 100.00 
46 D.2.2 Ensuring that all valid proxy appointments received 
are properly recorded and counted. 
60 100.00 
47 D.2.3 Chairman should arrange for the chairman of audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees to be 
available to answer questions at the AGM. 
59 100.00 
48 D.2.4 A notice to be sent to shareholders at least 20 
working days before the meeting.  
60 98.33 
49 9.8.6 R 
& 
DTR 
7.2.5 R 
A statement of how co. has applied the main 
principles set out in section 1 of the combined code 
in a manner that would enable shareholders to 
evaluate how principles were applied.  
60 100.00 
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Appendix 7 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Compliance with the QCA 
Guidelines  
Provision 
No. 
Description No. of 
complying 
companies 
% of 
complying 
companies 
1 Matters reserved for the board  24 45.28 
2 Timely information 28 52.83 
3 Internal controls review 48 90.56 
4 Review includes financial, operational and risk 
management 
51 96.22 
5 Chairman and CEO separation 50 94.33 
6 Two Independent Non-exec directors 42 79.24 
7 Re-election 41 77.35 
8 Audi committees 51 96.22 
9 At least two independent Non-executive directors in 
Audit committees 
36 67.92 
10 Remuneration committee 50 94.33 
11 At least two independent Non-executive directors in 
remuneration Committee 
38 71.69 
12 Nomination committee  29 54.71 
13 Dialogue with shareholders 33 62.26 
14 Corporate governance statement 50 94.33 
15 Statement of how the board operates 34 64.15 
16 Identity of Chairman, CEO, Members 44 83.01 
17 Describing directors ‘independence 8 15.09 
18 Identity of directors to be independent 33 62.26 
19 Board Performance evaluation  10 18.86 
20 Biography of directors 43 81.13 
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21 Number of meetings by board and committees 29 54.71 
22 Responsibilities of directors 52 98.11 
23 Going concern statement 48 90.56 
24 Auditor independence safeguard non audit service 19 35.84 
25 Terms and conditions of non executive appointment 9 16.98 
26 Terms of reference of audit committee 32 60.37 
27 Terms of reference of remuneration committee 29 54.71 
28 Terms of reference of nomination committee 20 37.73 
 
 
